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This study seeks to investigate the role of Shari’ah boards in the context of Islamic 
finance and defines their legal position in law. It explains ambiguity over the 
concept of Shari’ah and its implications for the responsibilities of Shari’ah boards 
in the context of Islamic finance. In this regard, it investigates the history of 
Islamic law to explain the crucial role of Shari’ah jurists in the interpretation and 
implementation of Shari’ah principles in terms of legitimacy-making for 
commercial transactions. Shari’ah supervisory board as the second layer of 
governance bears a trust-like relationship with the Islamic financial institution and 
investors. This thesis establishes a fiduciary place for Shari’ah boards to explain 
their responsibilities according to common law and statute. It endeavours to 
explain the implications of value-creation and the success of the company for 
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    This study examines the nature of Shari’ah boards’ responsibilities on the one hand and their 
position in law on the other hand. Research and scholarship relating to the roles of Shari’ah 
boards is relatively patchy and comments are mainly focused on the description of the general 
responsibilities of Shari’ah boards rather supply evidence to explain the nature of their functions 
and their implications for the operation of Islamic financial institutions. This study attempts to 
define the legal position of Shari’ah supervisory board with regard to the governance of Islamic 
financial institutions according to conventional law. In this regard, it delves into the common law 
and the Companies Act 2006 to characterize the duties of Shari’ah boards in terms of 
value-creation and the success of the company. This entails in a first instance, explaining the 
fiduciary position of Shari’ah boards and then showing how their fiduciary duties require them to 
function for the best interest of the company. The fiduciary duties of Shari’ah board to the 
company require the examination of board of directors’ roles in strategy-making and controlling 
the company as well. In this regard, since Shari’ah compliance as the ultimate goal of the Islamic 
finance industry is interpreted in terms of Shari’ah boards’ fatwas, it is necessary to examine the 
implications of fatwas for the discretionary power and fiduciary duties of directors in the 





  The company laws of most jurisdictions like UK provide no privilege or specific regulation for 
the operation of Islamic financial institutions. Consequently, the legal structure of governing 
bodies of all companies in terms of rights and responsibilities of board of directors bears no 
religious characteristic. However, the institutionalization of Shari’ah supervisory board as the 
second layer of governance has raised many questions over its influence on the operation of 
Islamic financial institution. In other words, the conventional regulation does not define any 
legal positon for Shari’ah supervisory boards with regard to their duties to the company and 
investors. Although, International standard setting organizations such as the Islamic Financial 
Services Board have produced many standards in terms of Shari’ah boards’ duties, they are not 
mandatory and only carry a customary quality. Further, they do not define any legal position for 
Shari’ah boards and only present regulatory principles over their conducts. 
   In every legal system predictability and certainty are the crucial elements of the rule of law as 
they support the sound operation of all institutions and accordingly secure their long-term 
success. In this regard, ambiguity over the legal position of Shari’ah boards in terms of their 
responsibilities and liabilities has exposed the UK financial industry to further risks such as 
fraud. Also, due to the lack of a legal position for Shari’ah boards in company law, there is no 
clear concept and scope for the Shari’ah compliant operation of Islamic financial institutions. In 
this context, to preserve and reinforce investors’ confidence in the sound operation of markets, it 
is imperative to define the responsibilities and liabilities of Shari’ah boards according to the legal 





   As noted above, the aim of this study is to find answers for the questions over the position of 
Shari’ah boards in law, their duties with regard to the success of the Islamic financial institutions 
and accordingly their relation with directors’ prescriptive duties determined in Company law. In 
this regard, this thesis adopts the doctrinal analysis to clarify ambiguities and find answer for the 
aforementioned questions. The main sources relied upon by this thesis are rules and judgments 
derived from the common law and statutes. Also, the clarification over the sources of Islamic 
finance and the role of Shari’ah jurists in the history of Islam requires this study to examine the 
Quran, Sunnah and the principles of Islamic fiqh. 
   This thesis is divided into ten chapters. This chapter (1) has introduced the study with 
discussion about the research background, as well as the aim and objectives of the study and the 
questions that it addresses. It also discusses the importance of this research and the methodology 
employed by the researcher. It concludes with a brief overview of the respective chapters. 
Chapter 2 explains the development of the Islamic financial industry. It examines the concept of 
Shari’ah and its sources in the context of Islamic finance in terms of the strong juristic quality of 
Islamic jurisprudence. At last, it discusses the implications of legalistic approach in the 
interpretation of Shari’ah for the development of Islamic finance industry. 
   Chapter 3 examines the significance of Shari’ah boards in the development of Islamic finance. 
It discusses the evolvement of Shari’ah boards’ role from pure endorsement to auditing. It 
explains the ambiguity over the concept of Shari’ah compliance and its implications for Shari’ah 
certification and auditing as the main functions of Shari’ah supervision. In this regard, it 
examines the application of legalistic interpretation of Shari’ah in the engineering of innovative 




   Chapter 4 analyses the legal relation between Shari’ah boards and Islamic financial 
institutions. It explains the legal position of Shari’ah boards in terms of fiduciary duties they owe 
to the Islamic financial institutions and investors. It examines their fiduciary characteristics 
according to factors explained in common law. Further, this chapter examines the discretionary 
power of Shari’ah boards in terms of their access to critical resources such as confidential 
information. It shows the influence of dual quality of Shari’ah boards’ discretionary power on 
their ex ante and ex post functions. In this regard, it explains the relation between fiduciary duties 
of Shari’ah boards and directors’ fiduciary duty to promote the success of the company.  
   Chapter 5 examines the general duties of Shari’ah boards in the context of Islamic finance. It 
explains the influence of the authority of Islamic Schools of thought on Shari’ah boards’ 
members’ duties in terms of the interpretation of Shari’ah. It explains the imitation regime in 
Islamic law and its relation to the legalistic interpretation of Shari’ah compliance. In this regard, 
it analyses the auditing and advising duties of Shari’ah boards in terms of Shari’ah 
non-compliance risk management. It explains the role of Shari’ah boards in Shari’ah risk 
management and controlling losses resulting from operational risk. At last, it discusses the 
concept of Shari’ah audit and its issues in the context of Islamic finance. 
   Chapter 6 examines the implications of Shari’ah boards’ opinions for directors’ duty to 
promote the success of the company. In this regard, it explains the influence of their opinions 
over the prescriptive duties of directors in terms of their roles in strategy-making and controlling 
the company. It reviews the historical root of board of directors and defines its functions. 
Further, it examines legitimacy-making as the main function of directors in terms of Shari’ah 
compliance and analyses their strategy-making and controlling roles in terms of their fiduciary 




   Chapter 7 discusses the legal consequences of the breach of Shari’ah boards’ opinions by 
directors. It explains the fiduciary and non-fiduciary duties of directors in terms of Shari’ah 
compliance. In this regard, it examines the relation between investor protection and Shari’ah 
compliance with regard to Shari’ah boards’ opinions. It explains the role of fiduciary duty of 
loyalty as an accountability mechanism against directors’ non-Shari’ah compliant decisions. It 
reflects on the positive and negative approaches in the definition of loyalty and their implications 
for directors’ decisions. Further, it examines the liability of directors for their non-Shari’ah 
compliant decisions in terms of duty of care, skill and diligence. At last, it explains objective and 
subjective standards of care reflected in the company law in terms of directors’ decisions. 
   Chapter 8 discusses the role of Shari’ah boards in the Shari’ah governance of Islamic 
financial institutions. It defines corporate governance in a broad sense and explains its economic 
role in value-creation. Further, it explains similarities between principles of conventional 
governance and Islamic law in terms of ownership. Then, it examines the concept of Shari’ah 
governance and the role of Shari’ah boards in monitoring the Shari’ah compliant operation of 
Islamic financial institutions. In this regard, it reflects on the lack of transparency in the process 
of Shari’ah governance and its implications for the probity of the company operation.  
 
   Chapter 9 examines the issue of professionalism in the functions of Shari’ah boards and its 
implications for their regulation. It reflects on the concept of profession and its characteristics in 
the context of modern world. At the end, it analyses the lack of professionalism in Shari’ah 
boards’ functions through the explanation of its elements.  
   Chapter 10 concludes this study with an assessment of the research undertaken. It shows how 








 Islamic Finance in the Global Financial Services Industry 
 
  2.1 Introduction 
       
   This chapter addresses the place of Islamic finance in the Global financial services industry. 
It explains the principles of Shari’ah and their applications in the global markets. Further, it 
seeks to explicate the concept of Shari’ah and its place in the context of modern Islamic financial 
industry and examines the implications of international regulatory standards for the operation of 
Islamic finance. Also, it discusses the principles of Islamic financial law in light of classical and 
modern Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), and describes different types of Islamic financial 
institutions and their characteristics in terms of financial intermediation in the context of 
financial markets. 
  2.2 The Development of Islamic Finance 
 
   The development of Islamic finance industry is about the rebirth and readjustment of the 
Shari’ah in the modern world as it endeavours to organize resources on the basis of corporation 




underlines the importance of integrity of commerce.1 In this regard, although the existence of 
various Islamic schools of thought and accordingly the divergent interpretations over looking 
after others’ wealth demonstrates a disparate tradition, their interactions with global financial 
system reflect the crucial place of falah (well-being) in the Shari’ah.2  
  Islamic finance industry has experienced different phases of development. In the Bretton 
Woods’ era, a few experiments preceded the formal start of modern Islamic banking.3 In this 
regard, the first formal phase of Islamic finance coincided with the evolutionary change of the 
global financial system as it was shortly after the elimination of the gold backed exchange 
system of Bretton Woods.4The oil boom and increase in wealth encouraged Muslim countries to 
revive and follow Islamic principles in financial system, and it also had the effect of spurring the 
new Islamic financial institutions and research centres for faster development.5  
  The globalization of financial markets in the 1990s marked the dawn of the second phase of 
Islamic finance. Deregulation, liberalization and rapid innovations in financial systems expanded 
the number of market participants and enhanced financial integration.6Consequently, Islamic 
financial investment order based on profit and loss sharing converged with conventional finance 
                                                          
1 Barry A. K. Rider, ‘Islamic Financial Law: Back to Basics’ in the Changing Landscape of Islamic 
Finance (Islamic Financial Services Board 2011) 103-140. 
2 Muhammad Akram Khan, an Introduction to Islamic Economics (International Institute of Islamic 
Thought 1994) 33. 
3 For a further account See Rodney Wilson, Banking and Finance in the Arab Middle East (St. Martin’s 
Press 1983 ) 75; Rodney Wilson, ‘Islamic Development Finance in Malaysia’ in Saad Al-Harran (ed) 
Learning Issues in Islamic Banking and Finance (Pelanduk Publications 1995) 65. 
4 Filippo Cesarano, Monetary Theory and Bretton Woods (CUP 2006); Kern Alexander, Rahul Dhumale, 
and John Eatwell’ Global Governance of Financial Systems (OUP 2006) 20-23; Olorogun Lukman 
Ayinde, ’The Substitution Dilemma in Islamic Finance: Contemporary Muslim Legal Thought on the Use 
of Paper Money’ (2012) 1 (2) Aceh International Journal of Social Sciences 58. 
5 Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (2nd edn, Edinburg University Press 2010). 





and moved to a more pragmatic and diversified path.7 The convergence between Islamic and 
conventional financial systems led to a growing global network between two systems. Many 
Conventional banks started providing their Muslim or non-Muslim clients with Islamic financial 
products and services through their Islamic subsidiaries and Islamic windows.8 Simultaneously, 
Islamic financial institutions presented their sophisticated Shari’ah-compliant products nationally 
and internationally, and started investing and working closely with other conventional banks and 
stock markets such as London Metal Exchange.9 
   The third phase of Islamic finance can be characterized as a period of harmonization and 
competition. Remarkable developments involved Innumerable commercial, regulatory and 
standard-setting initiatives such as the creation of the Islamic Finance Services Boards (IFSB), 
the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), the Liquidity Management Centre (LMC), 
and the Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA).10 Further, in spite of the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) endeavours, new harmonized 
accounting and auditing rules and standards for Islamic contracts came into existence.11 In this 
regard, the financial meltdown resulted in a strong competitive spirit among Islamic institutions 
that paradoxically has evolved alongside the harmonizing initiatives.12 As a consequence of this 
                                                          
7 It is worth noting that globalization led to the new Islamic finance hubs with different approaches. For 
instance, while Development of Islamic finance in Malaysia is driven by development policy focused on 
finance for industrialization, Middle Eastern countries’ approach is primarily driven by oil boom’s 
surpluses. As a consequence Islamic finance is mainly concerned with asset management. See Warde (n 
5) 82. 
8 ibid 83-85. 
9 ibid.  
10 ibid 86-87.  
11  The growing integration of the Arab and Malaysian Islamic finance models is also an important 
development in the industry.   See Ibid. 
12 Maher Hassan and Jemma Dridi, ‘The Effects of Global Crisis on Islamic and Conventional Banks: A 
Comparative Study’ (2010) International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/10/201, 15-22 < 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10201.pdf> accessed 4 January 2012; Peter Vayanos and 




competitive spirit and new competition-and-integration-oriented policies, some jurisdictions 
have broadened their Shari’ah boards as they provide more flexibility for the operation of Islamic 
financial markets.13  
   2.3 Islamic Finance Sources 
 
   It is believed Shari’ah is the backbone of the religion of Islam and Islamic finance as its 
principles are the foundations of structure and performance of the industry. However, since the 
establishment and the operation of Islamic financial markets are based on conventional laws, a 
broad approach in our examination of sources is required. In this regard, there are two main 
sources: Shari’ah and international soft law.  
    2.3.1 Shari’ah 
 
    Shari’ah is defined as Islamic law asserted its system proceeded mainly from a high divine 
sources embodying God’s will.14 This narrow definition is based on the revealed sources of 
Shari’ah namely the Quran and the Sunnah. According to this approach ‘there is no scope for 
any doctrine of natural law, or for human positive law in any significant sense.’ 15  The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Competing-Successfull-Islamic-Banking.pdf> accessed 4 
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Global Perspective’ (2010) 19 Review of Financial Economics 101 < www.elsevier.com/locate/rfe > 
accessed 5 January 2013.   
13 For instance, some members of Shari’ah boards of Malaysian banks are now Arab scholars from the 
Middle East. See ‘CIMB group Appoints Industry Leading Experts to Shari’ah Committee’ (18 Jun 2007) 
http://www.cimb.com/index.php?ch=g2_mc&pg=g2_mc_news&ac=314&tpt=> accessed 5 January 2013.  
14 Majid Khadduri, ‘Nature and Sources of Islamic Law’ (1953) 22 the George Washington Law Review 
3, 5; Ian Edge, Islamic Law and Legal Theory (Dartmouth publishing company 1996); A. Ibrahim, 
Sources and Development of Muslim Law (Malaya law journal Ltd 1965). 




non-revealed sources of Shari’ah are, essentially, a series of legal reasoning methods16, such as 
Qiyas (analogy), Ijma (consensus of Ulama) and Hadith. In this regard, a more comprehensive 
definition encompasses the human quality of Shari’ah as well. When Muslims endeavour to 
understand the divine revelation and implement their understanding to meet the dynamic and 
diverse requirements of society, their finding become personal interpretation of Shari’ah, namely 
fiqh. In other words, ‘Shari’ah is not a codified body of law, but a principle-based legal system 
that is capable of development and subject to interpretation’17. Law in the context of Shari’ah 
encompasses all aspects of life, namely temporal and non-temporal, and as a consequence it 
conveys an inclusive concept for legal system that its aim is to provide believers with the right 
path.18 Further, since the enforcement of this law, in its modern sense, does not necessarily 
question the validity of Shari’ah, believers are bound to observe it.19  
   Theoretically, it is assumed that, this is not society which shapes the Shari’ah, but the 
Shari’ah forms society and its requirements.20 Despite the existence of this ideal tendency, the 
ever-changing needs of society and the adverse impacts of static laws, have led to the application 
of a functional Scholarship in the interpretation of Shari’ah. In this regard, the process of 
extracting legal rules from the sources of Shari’ah for the purpose of discovering God’s law is 
termed ijtihad. 21  This strong juristic characteristic of Shari’ah, with due concern for the 
expedients of time and place, formed an intense legal pluralism in Islamic law and as it helped 
                                                          
16 Richard Tredgett and others, ‘Cross-Currency Swap’ (Jun 2008) derivatives week 7 < 
www.derivativesweek.com/pdf/DW061608.pdf> accessed 5 January 2013. 
17 ibid. 
18 The connection between the generic and literal meanings of Shari’ah (the path a watering place) 
implies its inherent flexibility. See Chibli Mallat, the renewal of Islamic law (CUP 1993) 3. 
19 Khadduri (n 14) 6. 




the emergence of different schools of thought.22 This plurality is due to three reasons: firstly, 
different views of Sunni and Shia Schools of thought over the sources of Shari’ah, mainly on 
non-revealed sources23; secondly, dissimilarities in Legal Methodologies (usul al-fiqh) and Legal 
Maxims (qawa’id fiqhiyya);24Thirdly, diverse customs (urf).25  
   In this regard, there are four main Sunni schools of thought in Islam: the Hanafi, the Maliki, 
the Shafie and the Hanbali Schools of law; and one Shi’a School: Twelver (Athnā‘ashariyyah). 
The Hanafi School is one of the oldest and the most widespread School was developed in Kufah. 
The founder of the School is Imam Nu’man bin Thabit, known as Abu Hanifa. This school has a 
reputation for wider usage of reason, logic, opinion (ray), qiyas (analogy) and juristic equity 
(istihsan) in the process of ijtihad as they deal better with practical issues and allow wider 
discretion in interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah.26 
   The Maliki School is founded by Imam Malik bin Anas in Madinah. He is well known for his 
book Muwatta, a collection of hadith and narrations regarding the practice of the people of 
Medina, as a distinctive source in this school. This school tends to emphasis the authenticity of 
hadith and as a consequence its method of teaching is primarily based on the meaning of hadith 
in the context of actual problems. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
21 See Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (planduk publications, 1989); 
Sherman A. Jackson, Islamic Law and the State (Brill 1996); Bernard Weiss,’ Interpretation in Islamic 
Law: the Theory of Ijtihad’ (1978) 26 (2) the American Journal of Comparative Law 199. 
22 Baudoin Dupret, Maurits Berger and Laila al-Zwaini, Legal Pluralism in the Arab World (Brill 1999); 
Ihsan Yilmaz, Muslim Laws, Politics and Society in Modern Nation States (Ashgate 2005). 
23 Although jurists are agreed on qiyas (analogy) and ijma (consensus) as the two main non-revealed 
sources of Shari’ah, they differ widely on the definition and application of them. See Jamal Nasir, The 
Islamic Law of Personal Statutes (2nd edn, Graham & Trotman 1990) 7. 
24 While legal Methodology teaches how to derive legal rulings from the Shari’ah sources, legal Maxims 
explore the underlying structure of the rulings derived from the Shari’ah sources. 
25 The impact of different views of madahib on shaping the modern Islamic finance and the role of 
custom in commerce and finance is discussed in the next sections. 




    The Shafei School is founded by Imam Muhammad bin Idris al Syafi who opened a new 
phase of development in Islamic fiqh. In his book al-Risalah he expounded the methodology of 
Shari’ah ruling. It mainly gives a special and different place for qiyas to bring about uniformity 
in the decisions. He also had a controversial disagreement with the Maliki and the Hanafi 
Schools about the concept of Sunnah.27 The last Sunni school is Hanbali School founded by 
Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal al Shaibani and is considered the most conservative School due to its 
strict view on literal interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah.28  
   The Shi’a (Twelver) or Ja’fari School is the largest branch of Shi’a Islam. Its foundation is 
associated with Imam Ja’far al-Sadegh and is more hierarchical as is ruled by Shi’ah Imams. 
This school is more flexible as it insists more on intellect than analogy and a jurist has more 
power to alter a decision according to his reasoning.29 
   This intense pluralism in the interpretation of Shari’ah has had a deep impact on the structure 
of Islamic finance industry in terms of divergent juristic opinions over the structure and the 
operation of Shari’ah compliant products. In fact, the strong juristic characteristic of Shari’ah in 
the industry manifests itself through varied legal opinions issued by Islamic institutions’ Shari’ah 
boards and International standard setting organizations such as the AAOIFI. This fact implies the 
lack of an agreed definition for Shari’ah as its concept and implications are contingent upon 
Shari’ah Jurists’ interpretations.  
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Studies 239. 
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(Taylor & Francis 2006). 
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    2.3.2 International Soft Law 
 
    The Post-Bretton woods financial system led international financial policy to a drastic 
change. Liberalised markets have created more opportunities for profits, and at the same time 
have introduced several new levels of risks to financial systems. In fact, the new risks are the 
results of adopting innovative and complex financial instruments for better diversification of 
profits and also to hedge against increasing credit and market risks that impact the systemic 
stability of international financial system.30 In this regard, financial globalization led to the rise 
of multifunctional financial intermediaries, more interdependent financial networks, and 
consequently more exposure to systemic risk and at the same time necessitated more strength, 
coherence and effectiveness in international financial regulation. 31  In fact, the increasing 
frequency of global and regional financial crisis is the manifestation of deficiency in establishing 
international regulatory norms in a due institutional framework of standards required for 
promoting the efficient pricing of financial risk and consequently reducing occurrence and levels 
of systemic risk. 32  In this context, the main functions of international financial regulation, 
namely normative intervention, supervision and sanction, 33  are usually focused on crisis 
prevention and the maintenance of financial stability.34Particularly, after the recent financial 
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meltdown the supervisory function has got a macro-prudential feature to enhance systemic 
stability in the global financial networks.35  
   An optimal global governance of financial systems requires standards and rules resulted from 
an optimal international regulatory structure since they provide economic growth and stability as 
the public good.36 International rules and standards for financial regulation bear an inherent soft 
characteristics which mostly are legally nonbinding.37 These widely accepted standards are good 
practices which imply a common intent among international actors. Further, these standards lack 
the opinio juris as an important element of customary international law, and as the result, they 
present a soft power in the governance of international financial intermediation. In this context, 
the non-obligatory character of soft law is the predominant source of international financial 
regulation as it provides more flexibility in proper functioning of financial intermediaries.38 
These standards are mainly accepted as good practices and may be set out by public and private 
international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the Basel committee, International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA). 
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    In this regard, Islamic financial industry as a hybrid system emerged in the mid-1970s and 
accordingly its regulatory issues have not been apart from conventional financial system. The 
internationalization of financial markets and responses to financial scandals have increasingly 
necessitated coordinated global trends to issues related to global financial stability through 
standard setting and rule making. In banking industry, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Regulation and Supervision is the leading international standard-setting body with persuasive 
influence over banking regulation and economic growth. The Basel committee was established in 
1974 by the central bank governors of the Group of 10 countries (G10). The Basel Committee 
works informally and extends its network with banking regulators outside the G10 through 
establishing various consultation groups such as the Core Principles Liaison Group (CPLG).39 
By G7 communique in 1997 the Basel committee has got an authority to devise the core 
principles of prudential regulation for all countries with international banking activities. 40 
Although, in a legal sense, the Committee’s decisions are soft law and nonbinding, some market 
measures have made the Committee’s standards sanctionable.41 For example the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have a monitoring role in controlling member-states 
adherence to the standards and also they consider the level of standards ‘compliance as a 
criterion for funding and lending programs’.42  
   Despite the existence of major differences between Islamic and conventional banks in terms 
of assets and the liabilities, the increasing need for foreign investment necessities more 
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Committee core principles for effective banking supervision, but has evolved into a forum for more 
general issues. 
40 The Basil Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Strengthening Banking Supervision Worldwide’ (June 
1997) submission for the G-7 heads of government at the Denver Summit 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs28b.pdf> accessed 6 January 2012.  




competition between Islamic banks. Further, as the result of common financial risks in 
international banking system, Islamic banks are required to comply with international standards 
as well. Even though international banking standards, such as Basel Accords have never been 
intended for the Islamic financial industry, 43  global economy pressure and international 
organizations mandates have forced Islamic banks to meet those standards. For instance, 
Commercial banks in OECD44 countries should implement Basel II capital adequacy standards.45 
In this regard, both the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) tried to develop capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR) guidelines based on Basel II standards.46 This implies that, since capital adequacy is 
the cornerstone of international banking regulation, Islamic banks are required to follow the 
international standards as they enhance their creditability and growth.47  
   Further, international response to global financial stability encompasses financial securities 
regulation as well. 48  The globalization of securities markets and the desire of regulatory 
authorities in emerging economics, particularly in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to attract 
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foreign investment paved the way for more harmonized regulatory approaches through following 
international regulatory standards, such as the IOSCO objective and principles securities 
regulation and IOSCO Multilateral Memoranda of Understanding.49 In this context, regarding 
the compatibility of IOSCO’s principles with Islamic finance products and practices, IOSCO’s 
report in 2008 ‘has not identified any concerns in respect to the compatibility of the IOSCO core 
principles with the Islamic securities markets’.50  
   Also, in promoting the operational soundness and efficiency in Islamic financial industry, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’s Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP) has been implemented internationally including by the Islamic Development Bank and 
the IFSB member countries.51 Further, in assessing the improvement of the prudential regulatory 
framework, financial Sector Assessment Program for Islamic Financial System (iFSAP) looks 
upon regulatory standards established by international organizations such as BIS and IOSCO.52  
  2.4 Islamic Jurisprudence and Islamic Finance Development 
 
 
   It is assumed that each legal system is based on a set of high objectives rationalising the 
emergence and the development of new ideas as extensions, reactions to or substitute for earlier 
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one.53 However, the high objectives shall be reached through an efficient legal system, and 
adopting dynamic and just rules. In this regard, financial development is the outcome of a 
progressive legal system. Further, in the context of the modern economic system, financial and 
commercial laws are concerned with facilitating transactions in terms of the availability of 
products for trade and fostering the capacity of intermediaries and promoting stability.54 In other 
words, the existence and the structure of markets and intermediaries are mainly the result of 
economic and political realities, and accordingly law functions as a facilitative means to promote 
efficiency and confidence.55 Thus, adaptability of laws in terms of ability to evolve in response 
to the changing socioeconomic conditions receives a great attention.56  
   Modern finance is about how to manage money and includes transactions, services and 
operations needed for funding. Modern Islamic finance shares the same function but through the 
complying with Shari’ah principles. In other words, although the development of Islamic 
financial industry in the context of modern socioeconomic environment shares a common path 
with the conventional system, its operation is based on Shari’ah compliant techniques. 
   In this regard, Islamic finance industry is based on Islamic jurisprudence known as Fiqh 
al-Mu’amalaat, which includes all human interactions with regard to high objectives (Maqasid 
al-Shari’ah) originated from the perspective of the wealth in Islam.57 The crucial place of Justice 
in the process and the result of Islamic financial transactions reveals the ultimate objective of the 
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Shari’ah, namely achieving people’s benefits (maslahah) not only in this world, but also in the 
hereafter.58 ‘Say: my lord has commanded justice…’59 and ‘we sent our messengers with the 
clear signs and sent down the book and the balance with them so that mankind might establish 
justice…’ 60  Accordingly, it is important that Islamic jurists, particularly in commerce and 
finance, endeavour to adopt a more objective-oriented approach within Islamic legal theory.61  
   In this regard, the absence of legislative canonical texts led to the establishment of some 
process of juristic inference (ijtihad). 62  Ijtihad is the main instrument for achieving and 
maintaining the harmony between revealed and non-revealed sources of Shari’ah. 63 Ijtihad 
acknowledges the distinction between law and its sources in Islamic jurisprudence, and ‘this 
distinction assumes that the Holy Law, as the aggregate of divinely-ordained rules, is not entirely 
self-evident from the sacred text. If it were, the sacred texts would not be the sources of the law, 
but rather the law itself; they would constitute a divinely given code of law.’ 64  Its literal 
meaning, doing one’s highest endeavour has affinity to its actual process to deduce the divine 
law from the Shari’ah resources. In other words, the Law is the product of juristic interpretation 
of sources, a process of elucidating which is present but yet is not self-evident.65  
    Further, the inherent distinction between commercial and non-commercial issues reveals the 
significance role of sources used in the process of ijtihad. That is to say, the dynamic nature of 
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commerce requires a flexible, responsive and predictable legal system to meet the ever-changing 
exigencies of time. Different approaches in Islamic jurisprudence, traditionalist or rationalist, 
have led to applying different methods and sources of ijtihad. For example, although all Sunni 
Schools of thought are agreed on the importance of reasoning through analogy (qiyas), they 
contradict over its method and the extent of use.  
   The economic understanding of the best classical jurists shows their cognizance of reason on 
benefit analyses, and the importance of rationally justifiable rules in Muamalaat issues.66 For 
instance, in Hanafi School reason takes the form of qiyas, ijtihad bi al-ray and Istihsan (juristic 
preference),67 and in Maliki School rulings should be compatible with customary practice and 
should prevent significant harm. Also to meet public welfare, istislah (public interest) takes the 
primary place in reasoning. 68  The rational reasoning in muamalaat, requires a consistency 
between rational rules and revealed rules. In fact, the consistency between reason and revealed 
law, ‘led to the theory of the five “universals” which revelation aimed to protect: religion, life, 
reason, progeny and property.’69  
   Another aspect of the development of Islamic Finance is the scope of Individualism in Islamic 
law. Individualism and permissibility in Islamic contract law reveal the inherent duality of fiqh 
al-muamalaat. in order to establish balance in contractual relationships, Unlike the 
exchange-oriented English common law, individualism in Islamic law in concluding financial 
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contracts is restricted by distributive-orientated rules and principles such as equilibrium or the 
balance of values and the certainty of contractual obligations.70  Further, due to the lack of 
general theory of contract in Fiqh al-muamalat, sale (bay) represents the model of financing, and 
accordingly led to the doctrine of nominated contracts (uqud al mu’ayyana) in Islamic finance.71 
Despite of the great emphasis of contemporary jurists on nominate contracts with centrality of 
tangible subjects; the legal history of Islamic law acknowledges the importance of credit in some 
Islamic legal formulations such as hawalah and suftajah.72 However, as the consequence of 
dominance of the rigid sale-based model of financing, the sale-based financial investment policy 
with a great emphasis on the role of real economy activity got priority in Islamic fiqh. 
   In this regard, one of the beneficial legal devices for providing flexibility and adoptability in 
Islamic financial transactions is legal maxim. Legal maxims (Qawa’id al-Fiah) are part of 
Islamic jurisprudence and have a significant role in the development of Islamic finance. They are 
theoretical abstractions and the expressive of Shari’ah objectives. They are generally defined as 
the ‘statements of principles that are derived from the detailed reading of the rules of the Fiqh on 
various themes.’73 Although they are broad guidelines, they smooth scholars’ path to a better 
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comprehension of the Shari’ah. As a consequence, mujtahids consider them as persuasive and 
conducive evidence in ijtihad.74 The development of Legal maxims is part of the history of Fiqh, 
and generally involves three main stages: rudimentary beginning, incremental growth and 
full-blown development.75 The first stage started from the time of the Prophet until the end of 
the third Islamic century, and includes the main maxims derived from the Quran or the 
Ahadith.76 The second stage of development is in the era of imitation (taqlid) of the Islamic 
jurisprudence, focused on abstracting the implicit principles used by early jurists to relate the 
substantive details to a few general principles that can be applied in different legal issues.77 The 
third stage is identified by the composition of the Majallah al-Ahkam al-Adliyyah in 1870 by the 
Ottoman Empire, to update Shari’ah law according to conventional codes and custom (urf).78 In 
this regard, all Islamic schools of thought (Madahib) have agreed upon five normative legal 
maxims: 1- Acts are judged by the intention (al-umur bi maqasidiha); 2-the elimination of harm 
(al-darar yuzal); 3-Certainty is not overruled by doubt (al-yaqin la yazul bi l-shakk); 4-hardship 
begets facility (al-mashaqqah tajlib al-taysir); 5-custom is the basis of judgment (al-addah 
muhakkamah).79   
   Regarding the legal effect of the first maxims over commercial and financial contracts,80 
generally it is believed that intention in muamalaat is an assumed element, because it brings a 
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religious evaluation in ordinary life. 81  The maxim extent of application is a matter of 
disagreement between Islamic Schools of thought. While Hanbali and Maliki Schools consider 
the real intention in a contract, Hanafi and Shafei scholars give effect to words and forms as 
well.82 This raises the issue of hiyal (legal stratagems) and its implications for the design of 
some financial transactions with the element of riba. Hila is defined as the use of acumen by 
Muslim jurists to avoid legal responsibility.83 Although, Hanbali and Maliki schools consider 
hiyal as legal ruse violating the sprit of law, some scholars regard its legality as a procedural 
device to avoid clashes with the law and not to avoid the law.84 in other words, since the 
alleviation of financial predicaments is the main reason for using hiyal in transactions, they have 
been widely exercised by Islamic financial institutions. For instance, Al-Inah sale, termed 
tawarruq, and buy-back-based mark-up operations in the NIB system in Pakistan have been used 
to achieve the development goals.85 In this regard, some parameters are defined for hiyal, but the 
most important among them are the incentive of legally responsible individual and the objective 
of lawgiver, which should not contravene the great objectives of Shari’ah such as essentials 
(daruriat). 86  For example, liquidity management purposes in banking are categorized as 
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essentials and in this context the best exemplified hilah is sug al-sila87 in Malaysia Islamic 
banking as it facilitates overnight deposits and short term deposits.88  
   The elimination of harm and facility in financial transactions are critical parts of a benefit 
analysis in Islamic commercial law. For instance, home financing through murabaha and Bay bi 
Thaman Ajil, promotes social welfare and serve maslahah.89 It is worth noting, although Sunni 
Schools differ in restricting general rulings based on beneficial analysis, the overruling of 
explicit canonical rulings is not allowed by all of them. On this subject, although classical Hanafi 
and Maliki jurists have more liberal views than Hanbali and Shafei jurists,90 in practice some 
controversial transactions such as tawarruq in the GCC region, bay al-inah and bay al-dayn in 
Malaysia are only approved by the Hanbali and Shafei Schools.91  
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   In fact, the economic essence in fiqh al-muamalaat requires a rational inference for the 
maximization of benefits and the minimization of harm.92 This trend in the modern Islamic 
finance that paved the way for a rational and functional approach in ijtihad can be traced back to 
Ottomans’ codification of the Hanafi legal rules in 1876. In this regard, the adherence to 
maslahah in the ijtihad of contemporary international organizations is an expression of 
functionalism. For instance, the sale of arbun93 was not accepted by all Islamic schools, except 
by the Hanbali, but Islamic Fiqh Academy ruled urbun to be a permissible transactions.94  
   In this regard, adherence to custom (urf) has been another effective device in commercial 
rulings.95 The authority of urf, both as a source of law and as a device for extracting rules from 
sources, is derived from the Shari’ah texts. For example in the Quran verse 7:199, God enjoins 
three things among which is urf (literally translated good). However, some well-known jurists 
have admitted urf as an important legal consideration. For instance, Al-Sarakhsi in Al-Mabsut 
regards customary rights and rules as akin to canonical texts.96 Further, reasoning behind the 
most important credit transactions in the medieval Islamic system, such as Murabaha and ijara, 
was based on urf and practice.97 Regarding the importance of urf in Islamic law, it should be 
evaluated based on resulting benefits. In this context, there is a close connection between reason 
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and urf. 98  In other words, reasonableness is the criterion for a beneficial urf in financial 
transactions. Similarly, in English common law legal system, custom is regarded as a source of 
law when is reasonable and not repugnant to the common law.99 
   Islamic finance industry is flourishing mainly in countries with Sunni jurisprudence, thus the 
process of juristic inference (ijtihad) is restricted in Sunni schools. In this regard, since qiyas 
(analogical reasoning) is the predominant form of ijtihad;100 jurists’ endeavour has been for 
alternatives to conventional financial products by searching classical jurisprudence sources.101 
This mode of analysis is not unique to Islamic finance. In fact, common law legal analysis based 
on case studies and applying analogy reflects similarities between two legal systems 
methodologies.102  
    2.4.1 Juristic Ruling (Fatwa) and Islamic Finance 
 
 
    The emergence and the development of Islamic jurisprudence have been essentially based 
on the institution of Fatwa (Juristic ruling). Fatwa in Islamic finance has a crucial role in 
regulating markets through producing Islamic rules and Shari’ah standards. 103  The birth of 
Islamic finance is the result of a series of juristic rulings in the 1970s. In this regard, the fatwa at 
the first conference of Islamic banks in Dubai in 1979 concerning murabaha lil-amir b-il-shira 
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legal issues instigated the modern104 Fatwa-based Islamic finance as its emphasis was on the 
legal opinions of jurists as the main source of regulation for Shari’ah compliance aspects of 
Islamic financial institutions’ operation.  
   In this regard, the term law is about regulating human conduct. Law is used in many senses, 
but jurisprudentially refers to the body of rules, which can be formed in various ways such as 
status, judgements or juristic decisions.105 In the context of Islamic finance a fatwa can be 
regarded as law. Fatwas are legal opinions provided by jurist consults or muftis, with extremely 
moral figures, who traditionally have been concerned with the private questions about the 
permissibility of different acts. 106  This process of question-and-answer is accomplished by 
unconstrained jurists with varying degree of dependence on classical schools of thoughts 
(madahib).107 Historically, fatwa is considered as a personal or private legal relation between a 
questioner and a jurist over legal and non-legal issues. In this context, regarding the importance 
of legitimacy (or Shari’ah compliance) of the financial operation of Islamic financial institutions, 
the emergence of modern Islamic finance has given a significant place to the institution of 
fatwa.108  
   The development of the modern Islamic finance in terms of the renewal of authoritative 
interpretations in fiqh al-muamallat reflects its well-established relation to the notions of 
Collective ijtihad and Fatwas. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Majallat al-Ahkam 
al-adliyya became outdated, and accordingly new movements for modernizing legal systems 
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through collective and liberal ijtihad started.109 In the context of Islamic finance, collective 
ijtihad is considered as an applicable solution for the crisis of jurists’ thoughts.110 In this regard, 
modern financial fatwas have three forms: 1-international; 2-national; and 3-private.  
  International Islamic organizations, such as the Fiqh Academy of the Organization of Islamic 
Conference and the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) are the main international fatwa-ruling centres. The rationale behind the establishment 
of those organizations is to avoid fragmentation in opinions and achieve harmonization in the 
Islamic finance industry.111  At national level, some Islamic countries such as Malaysia has 
appointed Shari’ah jurists at central banks and national Shari’ah boards. In this regard, the 
national fatwas enhance the integrity of the given jurisdiction’s market in terms of predictable 
and sustainable development. The last category is concerned about private collective fatwas 
issued by Shari’ah boards of Islamic financial institutions. They have been individualized legal 
solutions provided by Shari’ah jurists who function in the form of a board and decide about the 
Shari’ah compliance desighn of financial products and the operation of Islamic financial 
institutions.112 In fact, issued fatwas are the proof of Islamicity and the legitimacy of Islamic 
finance.113 Although, in a legal sense, an issued fatwa by one Islamic financial institution’s 
Shari’ah board has no legal bearing on other Islamic financial institutions, the reputation of 
Shari’ah board’s members or the Institution may give rise to a wide recognition of the fatwa by 
other Islamic financial institutions.114 This is particularly true in the case of interpretation over 
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the permissibility of controversial transactions, such as organized tawarruq or murabaha lil-amir 
bi-al-shira. 115  
   As discussed before, since the issuance of a fatwa has been based on a private legal relation 
between a questioner and a jurist, consequently the nature of fatwa depends on the nature and the 
objective of the question.116 In this regard, the application of traditional notion of fatwa in the 
context of modern financial system may result in anomalies in the governance of Islamic 
financial institutions. For instance, the practice of paying fees to Shari’ah jurists casts doubt on 
their independency. In other words, since their discharge of duties (issuing fatwa and regulating 
Shari’ah issues) to Islamic financial institutions conflicts with their own interest, the quality of 
the issued fatwa may be affected.117  
   It is crucial for understanding the framework of a legal institution to comprehend its social 
aspect through the examination of its macro and micro functions. In this regard, a chain of 
functions is created between law and economy as the economy influences legal reasoning and in 
turn, the law influences economic outcome. 118  Further, an efficient transaction enhances 
economic efficiency, and accordingly results in progress and development. In conventional 
finance, the economic efficiency of transactions is evaluated based on the rationality of 
parties.119 In other words, parties’ financial and legal preferences in the form of mutual consent 
in a contract guide market movements. In the context of Islamic law, although mutual consent 
and individual rationality in economic transactions are necessary, they are not sufficient. 120 
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Financial rationality in Islamic financial transactions is circumscribed by injunctions against 
certain financial transactions, such as interest-bearing loans.121 This prohibition-driven122 feature 
of Islamic finance manifests itself in issued individual and collective fatwas. For instance, fatwas 
against organized tawarruq in Islamic finance by individual scholars, such as Taqi Usmani123, 
fatwa by Islamic organizations, like OIC Fiqh academy in 2009,124 and jurists’ denouncements 
against the 2002 fatwa issued by Rector of Al-Azhar, Dr. Tantawi over the depositor-bank 
relationship and legitimized collection of a fixed profit percentage.125  
   Despite the prohibition-driven feature of Islamic finance, intense development and 
competition policies in global economy have necessitated the influence of markets over tradition 
and doctrine.126 In fact, concerns over economic growth (as a darura) established the basis of the 
hidden cause (illah) for modern market-driven fatwas and accordingly paved the way for a 
relaxed-approach in fatwa ruling through the use of exceptional legal rules such as rukhas 
(exemptions) and talfiq (patching) in the case of necessity.127 For instance, the necessity of 
economic growth has been invoked in the controversial Egyptian fatwas over the permissibility 
of interest in banking.128 
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    The development-oriented fatwa ruling bears different forms. For instance, in the GCC, 
privatized fatwas are issued by Islamic financial institutions’ shari’ah boards and governments 
have no involvement in the process of fatwa issuing and they only prepare a proper ground for 
flourishing financial markets through legislation. 129  By contrast, some jurisdictions such as 
Malaysia established a central fatwa issuing authority by which all Islamic financial institutions’ 
Shari’ah boards are required to follow a compatible approach in their fatwa-ruling with the 
issued fatwas by the central Shari’ah council. However, despite the positive implications of 
development-oriented fatwas for competition in the industry and the acceleration of financial 
development, they mainly disregard and abate Islamic law Principles (qawa’id).130  In other 
words, macro-economic considerations play crucial role in issuing relaxed and adaptable fatwas 
in the industry. 
  2.5 Islamic Finance Principles 
 
 
   As we explained before, although permissibility (ibahah) is the basic idea in fiqh 
al-muamallat, law in the context of Islamic financial transactions is not based on unbounded 
human preferences, rather is defined vis-à-vis a bundle of principles, concerning high economic 
and moral objectives. The sanctity of human wealth in Islamic law revolves around the concepts 
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of fairness and efficiency. In other words, the function of financial contracts should be explained 
in terms of distributive justice and fair wealth distribution. In the context of Islamic law, the 
prohibitions of riba, gharar and maisir are the manifestations of distributive function of 
contract. 131  While financial regulators limit the scope of credit and risk trading to prevent 
systemic failures, the prohibition of riba and gharar are Islamic forms of prudential regulation 
aim to protect individuals from their own greed. 132  However, the interpretation of these 
principles is the matter of considerable diversity, which can be attributed to the different 
premises of madahib in ijtihad and accordingly the interpretation of the generic prohibitions in 
the Quran and Hdith.133  
    2.5.1 The Prohibition of Riba 
 
 
   ‘Riba’ literally refers to increase and ‘wrongful devouring of property’.134  Its technical 
meaning varies according to the source, and is not necessarily about interest.135 It refers to any 
unlawful or undeserved gain derived from the quantitative inequality of the counter values in 
transactions.136 The juristic meaning of Riba is commonly translated as Usury, a term that refers 
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to interest on loan.137However, interest or usury is only one form of riba. For instance, the 
imposition of late fees is an example of non-interest riba.138  In fact, this is not an agreed 
meaning for riba in Jurisprudence and since ‘the distinction between legitimate compensation 
and forbidden riba is the most fundamental distinguishing feature of Islamic finance’,139 this 
diversity in the meaning of riba impeded engineering new contracts, particularly in derivatives 
markets.140  
   The notion of riba and its implications may vary according to transactions’ operation. 
Generally, there are two main types of riba: riba al-nasi’a and riba al-fadl. Riba-al fadl or riba 
al-sunna141 refers to unlawful increase resulting from the simultaneous exchange of goods of the 
same type (jins), which are governed by the same efficient cause (illa),142 and riba al-nasi’a 
refers to riba al-quruth,143 is an increase in an amount of debt as a result of a delay or deferment 
in the payment of the debt.144 These kinds of riba are ex-ante restrictions on the formation of 
spot and credit contracts, and are based on a set of statements attributed to the Prophet.145  
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   Riba al-jahiliya is a kind of riba al-nasi’ah (practiced in pre-Islam era), is the ex-post 
restriction on settlement of monetary obligations in debt contracts146and refers to doubling the 
principle in exchange for more time.147 Three reasons have been introduced for expanding the 
framework of riba al-nasi’ah: 1- preventing the exploitation of poor debtor; 2-monetary 
uncertainty resulted from trading money; 3- trading foodstuffs for larger amounts of future 
foodstuff would lead to shortage in spot markets.148 In other words, legitimate return in Islamic 
finance derives from real economy activities and responsibility not from sale of credit. 149 
Further, the charitable nature of loan in Islam, as a way to help needy people, explains the 
prohibition of riba in credit transactions.150  
   The scope of riba al-fadl has been subject to different legal opinions over the illa (cause) that 
governs the species and the class of articles.151 Excessive gharar resulting from parties’ lack of 
knowledge about the result of the trade is considered the main reason for the prohibition of this 
kind of riba.152 In this regard, it is argued that the prohibition of riba al-fadl in such exchanges is 
for fairness and the ‘elimination of practices where unjust enrichment may occur’.153 The controversy 
over illah in ribawi items is more perplexed in currency exchanges (Sarf). For instance, Zahiri 
School in contrast to the other Sunni schools, rejects analogy (qiyas) in determining the law. It 
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assumes that the prohibition of riba in the hadith applies only to the six articles. Consequently, 
since paper money would not have the characteristics of gold and silver, is exchangeable with 
gold and silver on a deferred basis.154 International Association of Islamic Banks in response to 
the request of the Dubai Islamic Bank has adopted a similar interpretation.155 However, the 
Shari’ah board of the Kuwaiti Finance house strongly opposed the fatwa.156  
    2.5.2 The Prohibition of Gharar 
 
 
    Generally, legal rules and principles are the reflections of the prevailing economic 
philosophy in a system. In the context of commercial and financial transactions, efficient rules 
and principles provide more stability and flexibility for society. In this regard, the law of 
contracts and contractual relationships shape the form of property rights. Accordingly, since the 
proper operation of modern economy depends on contractual obligations and property rights, 
providing efficient legal framework for contracts is fundamental. 
   The concept of gharar in Islamic law may carry different meanings in relation to different 
contracts. Generally, gharar ‘encompasses some forms of incomplete information and/or 
deception’ 157 , as well as uncertainty in the elements of contracts, which creates risks in 
transactions and consequently, dislocates resources and property rights unfairly.158  
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   The normative justice of contract in Islamic law is based on welfare maximization and 
distribution with emphasis on the rights of parties and society.  In other words, prohibitive 
principles in contractual relationships, such as gharar aim to establish balance in contractual 
relationships by stressing on the subject of contract in terms of the specificity of existence, price, 
quality, quantity and delivery.159 In this regard, it is argued that the most cases of gharar are 
resulted from sale contracts.160 The correlation between gharar, as a state of uncertainty, and 
bilateral contracts is acknowledged by the AAOIFI as well.161 Accordingly, it is argued since the 
unlawful acquisition of wealth does not occur in a donation, there would be no loss.162 This view 
is used in designing takaful (Islamic insurance), which is mainly based on tabarru 
(non-commutative and voluntary contribution) and wakala (agency).  
   Regarding the inherent incompleteness of commercial transactions, we can see the existence 
of some degree of uncertainty.163 In this regard, accordingly jurists have distinguished between 
major gharar which vitiates the contract, minor gharar which is tolerable and average gharar (al 
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gharar al mutawwasit).164  In contrast to minor and average gharar, the major gharar (bay 
al-gharar) is about ‘unbundle and unnecessary sale of risk’165  and is regarded as the main 
subject of prohibition in contractual arrangements. 
   As mentioned before, sale is the model contract in Islamic jurisprudence, thus Shari’ah jurists 
analyse the concept of gharar and its legal implications in the light of essential elements of sale 
contract. Further, since the variability of gharar in different contracts have not been clarified in 
fiqh, its evaluation has been subject to different juristic opinions. In this regard, the level of 
gharar has been evaluated in light of custom (urf) and the interpretations of public good or 
maslaha by jurists.166 For instance, regarding the importance of maslaha in the interpretation of 
gharar and its legal consequences, the contract in question should not be the subject of public 
need (hajat al-nas),167 as the removal of hardship (raf al haraj) is of great significance by virtue 
of legal maxim.168 Concerning this issue, for instance, salam (advance purchase) and istisna 
(manufacture contract) are legal contracts regardless of gharar elements.169 In this regard, while 
classical fiqh often equates gharar with ignorance and the lack of information (jahl), 
contemporary jurists mainly examine gharar with regard to uncertain and hidden 
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consequences. 170  In other words, gharar is more comprehensive than jahl, and refers to 
everything unknown.171  
   Gharar may occur from the form of a contract when two sale contracts are combined into one 
(bay’atayn fi bay’a) or the completion of the contract is built upon a random selection of the 
subject matter to be sold (bay al-hasat).172In this regard, Islamic fiqh characterises sale contract 
as a legal tool for transferring the ownership of a property in rem or corpus (ayn) for a 
consideration (thaman).173 In Islamic law ayn is considered as the objects of contract, and to 
avoid gharar, must observe three main interrelated conditions: 1-existence; 2-ownership of the 
object; 3- possession.174 Accordingly failure to observe them will void the contract.175 This 
proposition is in contrast to jurists’ view on the meaning of gharar as uncertainty in the 
completion or the result of a contract.176  
   It is worth noting that, the prohibited uncertainty in commercial transactions is the result of 
the uncertainty of the main elements of contracts, and not from the outcome of contracts.177The 
mentioned requirements are the fundamental parts of arguments against conventional forward 
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and future contracts. In this regard, the purchase of non-existent object of contract, selling object 
prior to holding property title (i.e. short selling), and reselling the object of contract prior to 
actual delivery or receipt are the main objections against conventional forwards and futures.178 
Further, the Fiqh Academy of the Organization of the Islamic Conference ruled that Shari’ah 
allows the deferment of payment or delivery, but not both together in a contract.179 In other 
words, immediate and absolute sale is the only true form of contract, which requires ‘the object 
of a bona fide trade or exchange must exist with identifiable characteristics.180However, Islamic 
fiqh provides two exceptions, Salam (forward investment) and Istisna (manufacturing) based on 
the necessity and the darura of the time. Regarding the presence of gharar in the purchase of 
non-existent object (bay al madum) in futures commodity contracts, clearing procedure by 
clearing houses such as Malaysian Derivatives Clearing-House (MDCH), tend to preclude any 
uncertainty over the existence and the delivery of subject matter.181 Since, clearinghouses serve 
as counterparties and guaranty the performance of the contract,182the level of gharar in future 
commodities transactions is subject of doubt in modern jurists’ opinions.183  
   Another example concerning the element of gharar is option. Option contract is defined as ‘a 
contract between two parties in which one party (the buyer) has the right, but not the obligation, 
to buy or sell a specified asset at a specified price, at or before a specified date, from the other 
party (the seller). Thus an option conveys the right to buy or sell an underlying commodity at a 
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specified price within a specified period of time’.184 In this regard, since a valid subject of 
contract under Islamic law theory must be characterized as a tangible property (mal), a usufruct 
(manfaa’ah), or a pecuniary right (haqq mali),185 options cannot be regarded as property as they 
are pure rights, and fall into none of these categories.186 As such, options cannot be considered 
independent goods, and consequently the subject of contract.187  
   In compare to the Shari’ah, uncertainty in common law carries a narrower concept. As 
mentioned earlier, contract in a positivist legal system such as common law is established based 
on liberalism and voluntary exchange, and accordingly parties have wide autonomy in arranging 
contracts’ terms. In this regard, economy, competition and innovative financial instruments have 
exerted influence over the functions of contract, and shifted it to ‘as the organizing mechanism 
for cutting-edge innovation’.188 In this regard, although excessive uncertainty in the fundamental 
elements of a contract may result in failure,189 courts in commercial cases try to define the 
construction of contracts by looking into commercial and financial standard mentioned or 
assumed by custom in a certain field.190  
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    2.5.3 The Prohibition of Maisir 
 
    The rationale behind the prohibition of maisir (gambling) is in the Islamic doctrine of 
investment. Money should be earned by real economic activities and productive occupation, not 
by gambling, as ‘an activity that involves an arrangement between two or more parties, each of 
whom undertakes the risk of a loss for one means a gain for the other’.191 In this regard, the 
Quran and Sunnah forbid gains made from the games of chance (Qimar).192The term speculation 
as profit seeking in markets through engaging in risky transactions,193 is regarded as the main 
reason for unbounded innovative policies in the modern finance and accordingly the creation of 
systemic risk. In other words, the object of a gambling is risk,194  and the aim of financial 
regulation is to prevent and control individuals’ self-interested decisions in order to ensure public 
interest and financial stability195. 
   Gambling, as a kind of speculation, conflicts with the goals of regulation since it results in 
unfair distribution of wealth and market failure.196 Some conventional derivatives, particularly 
Over-The-Counter, have been used as gambling tools in financial markets and consequently their 
failures led to systemic risk and financial crisis. In this regard, Islamic law prohibits conventional 
options in indices as they are based on neither commodity, nor stocks, and nor anything else as 
underlying assets. 197  Speculation is the reason for the prohibition of conventional future 
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contracts too. Although, we should distinguish between speculation unrelated to any activity and 
speculation as part of some real activity which helps to shift risks,198 it is argued, since future is 
a bet on which way prices will move, is prohibited.199  
 
   2.6 Islamic Financial Institutions 
       
   In every economy, financial institutions as financial intermediaries serve two fundamental 
functions: the reallocation of surplus funds and providing financial solutions for market failures. 
Financial intermediaries reallocate surplus funds to economic units with funding needs 
(borrowers). 200  In this regard, savers and borrowers have different preferences in financial 
markets. While, savers have a preference for future consumption with inclination to have easy 
access to their savings, borrowers would rather invest resources in projects for higher returns in 
future.201 Accordingly, ‘Reconciling the different desires of savers and borrowers in terms of 
maturity and returns’ is the main intermediaries’ function. 202  Financial intermediaries also 
provide financial solutions for market failures, such as information asymmetry and high 
transaction costs.203 In this context, the functions of intermediaries due to globalization and 
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competitive impulses have been changed and the intermediation process shifted from more 
straightforward credit intermediation to risk intermediation.204  
   Islamic and conventional financial intermediaries perform aforementioned tasks according to 
different economic philosophy. In contrast to conventional system by which profit maximization 
constitutes the primary concern in transactions, Islamic financial intermediation aims to enhance 
fairness in transactions and accordingly place equal emphasis on the ethical and social 
dimensions.205 As such, interest-bearing transactions are prohibited and intermediaries should 
perform their tasks with strict adherence to Shari’ah principles. In this regard, since money does 
not have time-value, Islamic financial institutions embrace the principle of profit and loss 
sharing. 206 Further, as Islamic economic doctrine is based on entrepreneurship and production, 
financial intermediation must allocate and mobilize funds to Shari’ah-compliant industries. 
Islamic finance industry like conventional industry presents three main institutions: Islamic 
banking, Islamic capital markets and takaful (insurance). 
    2.6.1 Islamic Banks 
 
 
    The basic investment concept in Islamic banking is the prohibition of making money’s time 
value in any loan with predetermined value.207 Although Islamic banks have different business 
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mechanisms and their operation is based on the principle of profit and loss sharing, they share 
common characteristics with conventional banks. For instance, in the UK banking system 
Islamic law is not the only functional part of Islamic banks.208 In the formation phase, Islamic 
and conventional banks in the UK take two legal forms: partnership; or company.209 Alongside 
company law requirements, they should fulfil banking and financial regulations, for instance 
banks in Europe are required to consider EU Directives over banking and financial issues. 
However, the structure of Islamic banking includes an extra element, a Shari’ah supervisory 
board, comprised of Shari’ah law and economics experts.210 This is for ensuring that banks 
activities in the mobilization and the allocation of funds are in line with the Shari’ah.211  
   The contemporary and the majority view of Shari’ah jurists against conventional banking is 
elucidated in the conclusions of the fourteenth session of Majlis Majma’ Al-Fiqh Al-Islami in 
2003:212  
 
 Conventional banks’ operation is based on creating credit through lending deposited 
funds with interest; 
 The relationship between banks and depositors is based on loan not agency; 
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 Interest on deposits is kind of interest on loan, thus is riba and forbidden; 
 Conventional banks’ guarantee of principal capital in any form is not allowed. 
 
   The Islamic banking principle of profit and loss sharing is implemented through two main 
banking contracts categories: intermediation contracts and transaction contracts. 213The main 
intermediation contract is Mudaraba.214 Mudaraba or trust contract is a two-tier partnership 
agreement in which bank plays ‘the middle-party’ role.215 Providers of funds are silent partners 
and bank acts an agent.216 The rate of profit in two agreements is based on previously agreed 
percentage.217 On the other hand, losses will be borne by: depositors, in the form of deduction in 
fund; by entrepreneurs in the form of not receiving any return; and by the bank by taking no fee. 
Also, the bank may lose its shareholders’ money. 218  Regarding credit risk management in 
banking, Islamic banks should not ask collateral, and only may be requested to help to reduce 
moral hazard, for instance for preventing entrepreneur to break the agreement.219 In this regard, 
it is argued that investing in debt instruments such as murabaha, ijara and tawarruq by banks 
may expose them to the same risks (credit risks, interest rate risk, liquidity risk and operational 
risk) as conventional banks.220  
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   Transaction contracts govern real economic activities including trade, exchange and 
finance. 221  The first type of transaction contracts is equity participation. Musharaka is a 
partnership contract, which is similar to a joint-venture agreement, by which capital owners 
(Islamic banks and depositors) enter into a partnership agreement to finance ‘a joint commercial 
enterprise’.222 Parties may contribute in capital in the form of physical or intangible assets, such 
as labour, share profits and losses at a predetermined ratio.223  
   The second category of transaction contracts encompasses asset-backed contracts. They are 
contracts with individual assets and subjects. Further, they are in contrast with conventional 
asset-backed contracts, as they are based on a claim against a pool of assets.224 The first type of 
this category are securities for trade finance, such as Murabaha, a form of mark-up financing, by 
which banks purchase goods on behalf of clients, then resell to clients for a predetermined profit 
(mark-up)225and with differed payment.226 In this context, risk management is a crucial issue for 
Islamic banks as they carry more risks such as deficiency and delivery with regard to the 
ownership of those assets.227 The second type of the asset-backed transactions are collateral 
securities. Ijara is the main contract in this category, and similar to conventional lease, 
associated with a separate contract (tamwyl) that transfers ownership.228 Istisna or commission 
to manufacture, is the other type in this category and refers to financing the production of 
non-existent items through paying the price in one or multiple instalments by buyer, and delivery 
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of the object in future by seller.229 This contract is commonly used with ijara, and creates a BOT 
(build, operate, transfer) structure to finance infrastructure development projects.230  
   The set of contracts discussed above also form the models of Islamic financial 
intermediations: ‘two-tier mudaraba’ and ‘two-windows’.231 In two-tier mudaraba both funds’ 
mobilization and utilization are based on profit and loss sharing among the investor, the bank and 
the entrepreneur.232 The first tier is between the depositor (rabul mal) and the bank (mudarib). 
This profit and loss sharing investment of deposits is a form of limited-term equity and capital is 
not guaranteed.233 The second tier is between the bank as supplier and the entrepreneur. In this 
model banks would accept demand deposits as liabilities alongside investment deposits.234 The 
function of this model is that by the integration of assets and liabilities sides of a bank’s balance 
sheet, the active asset or liability management would be minimized, and accordingly provides 
stability in economic shocks.235  
   The two-windows model refers to bank’s liabilities with two parts: demand and investment 
accounts. Investment windows are used for risk-bearing projects, and require banks to hold a 
zero present reserve.236 Since demand deposits are liabilities in the strict sense, banks should 
hold a 100 present reserve.237  
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   Theoretical expectations such as risk-sharing principle are neutralized by Islamic banks’ rate 
of payments on investment accounts based on market competitive rates and regardless of their 
actual performance.238Also, practical issues, such as asset allocation and exposure to liquidity 
risk on the liabilities side require Islamic banks to follow a risk averse policy in the modes of 
financing, for example, through adopting ijara and murabaha instead of mudaraba and 
musharaka modes.239 Further, another confusion concerns the safety of deposits with Islamic 
banks.240 In this regard, while investment accounts are not guaranteed by the banks, guaranteed 
deposit accounts do not effectively protect the real purchasing power of deposits against 
inflation.241Thus, ‘deposit protection emerges as a perfectly legitimate concern’.242  
   Moreover, it is argued that, since Islamic banks’ direct entrance into trade and business is 
expensive, it is against the maslehah of society. 243  In this regard, the essence of financial 
intermediation is the transfer of funds from owners to users, and entering into trade through 
contractual arrangements such as salam, istisna, ijara and bai bithaman al-ajal (credit-sale), 
which are originally the forms of direct finance, and expose banks to all kinds of business risks, 
which ultimately will be carried by depositors of investment accounts.244 However, the dominant 
culture in Islamic financial industry prefers a classical approach in financial intermediation.  
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    2.6.2 Islamic Capital Markets 
 
    Capital markets play crucial economic roles in risk allocation, supplying capital for those 
need them, and liquidity management.245 Islamic capital markets are part of international capital 
markets and accordingly, Islamic financial instruments tend to be listed on the same exchanges 
and being subject to the same set of regulatory rules as conventional financial instruments.246 
   The permissibility of shares’ transactions in stock exchanges has been subject to different 
opinions among Muslim scholars. The legal nature of a ‘share’ in common law has evolved 
alongside the evolution of corporation legal nature. It changed from a pro rata ownership of the 
assets of the company to a bundle of rights, or in other words, chose in action.247 In contrast to 
common law, a share in Islamic finance is regarded as the proof of a shareholder’s right to the 
company’s wealth. 248  While there are several types of stocks, such as common (based on 
principle of profit and loss sharing), preferred (based on profit at a pre-fixed rate) and loan 
(based on profit at a fixed rate of interest), only common stock is regarded permissible by the 
majority of jurists. 249 However, the affirmative decision of fiqh academy of the OIC over 
transactions of shares accelerated the development of Islamic equity markets.250 
   As said earlier, the transactions of shares and securities in Islamic equity markets are based on 
the principles of Shari’ah which are subject to various interpretations. Generally, all Islamic 
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equity markets are agreed on: a) prohibition on trading in the shares of companies in 
impermissible activities, such as alcohol and gambling; b) prohibition on equity investment in 
companies involved in riba and debt financing, except on: 1- if the capital structure of the 
company is mainly equity based (the total debt of the company is less than thirty three percent of 
its market capital); 2- receivables are less than fifty present of the company asset.251  
   The development of Islamic financial products is substantially the result of Shari’ah advice 
and methodological framework utilized by Shari’ah advisors in fatwa ruling.252 In this regard, 
structuring of Islamic securities requires a precise analysis concerning the nature of the 
securities, whether debt-based (like murabaha), asset-based (ijarah) or equity-based 
(musharakah).253However, it is argued that the analysis of instruments should be in accordance 
with the development objectives. For instance, regarding the national development program of 
Malaysia, Shari’ah advisors are required to propose structures in line with the Securities 
Commission and regulators’ preferences, and carrying out research for further development of 
Islamic capital market.254In this regard, for instance, Malaysia innovations in the securitization of 
cash flow receivables portfolios by using mudarabah sukuk, paved the way for a flourished debt 
market.255  
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   Despite the common regulatory challenges, such as transparency, liquidity, and monitoring in 
all securities markets, Shari’ah-compliance requirements are further barriers for the development 
of Islamic capital markets.256 Further, the existence of intense divergence in Shari’ah rulings 
impedes the integration of Islamic capital markets. In this regard, since religious approval for 
each issue, particularly for sukuk, requires extensive knowledge on legal and economic 
structures, there is considerable demands on the availability and expertise of Shari’ah scholars. 
In other words, the dearth of Shari’ah expertise and the availability of Shari’ah scholars act ‘as 
an impediment to the wider acceptance of the Islamic finance’.257  
    2.6.3 Islamic Insurance (Takaful) 
 
     The emphasise of takaful or Islamic insurance like other Islamic finance institutions is on 
welfare and wealth maximization too.258 Its operation is in a collective endeavour which aims for 
risk elimination whiting a given social group.259 In this regard, conventional insurance has been 
prohibited in the ninth declaration at the second session of the Fiqh Academy of the OIC.260The 
main objections against the conventional insurance are: first, the presence of chance (gharar) 
taken by the insurance company; the second, the presence of maisir (if the risk does not 
materialize the insured loses the premium, but if the risk materialized he will get much more than 
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the premium); the third, the presence of riba. Further, it is argued that the funds accumulated in 
insurance companies are invested mainly in interest-based instruments.261  
   takaful is based on the concepts of ta’awun (mutual assistance and compensation) and tabarru 
(donation). The modern forms of takaful are: mudaraba and wakala (agency). But, wakala is the 
dominant form. This is probably due to the Shari’ah Committee of the Islamic Development 
Bank’s opinion against taking undertaking surplus by takaful operator, because an underwriting 
surplus is not a profit and the operator is not permitted to take on underwriting risk.262In wakala 
or agency model, the operator acts as an agent and does not share any risk borne by takaful 
fund. 263  And also the operator is not liable for any deficit of the fund. 264 Regarding 
responsibilities of the operator, the IFSB has warned against the lack of a clear mechanism for 
controlling the takaful operator, and also agency problems resulting from the segregation of 
ownership and control.265  
  2.7 Conclusion 
 
   This chapter examined the development of Islamic finance industry with regard to the 
implications of the principles of Shari’ah for the development of Islamic finance industry. It 
explained that the concept of Shari’ah as the main source of Islamic finance may be different in 
different Islamic Schools of thoughts. In other words, its concept and scope depend on human 
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quality involved in the interpretation of revealed sources, namely the Quran and Sunnah. In fact, 
ijtihad as a process of extracting God’s will from the Quran and Sunnah by Shari’ah jurists bears 
an individualized or personal character. 
   In this regard, although the pluralism in Islamic finance reflects the richness of classical fiqh, 
as the result of the intense juristic divergence in the industry, it has generated difficulty for 
Islamic financial institutions to achieve Shari’ah objectives (economic well-being and wealth 
protection). The plurality of legal opinions has seemingly produced contradictory implications 
for the Islamic financial industry. In this regard, it led to an adaptable legal system to survive the 
test of time, but at the same time endangers the stability and the development of the system by 
Shari’ah risk. In fact, endeavours by international standard setting bodies, such as the IFSB and 
the AAOIFI in the harmonization of Islamic financial industry practices require more national 
supports. However, since Islamic financial industry shares the same characteristics with 
conventional financial system in terms of structure and governance, it must follow the same 
regulatory path established by national and international authorities. In other words, international 
regulations serve as soft laws and bear soft power in shaping the operation of Islamic financial 
institutions and also in the harmonisation of Shari’ah rulings in the industry. In fact, although 
Shari’ah is the main source of Islamic finance, it is not the only one as international financial 












The Significance of Shari’ah Boards in the Context of 
Islamic Finance 
 
  3.1 Introduction 
 
   Control is an essential concept in the good governance of financial institutions. It may take 
various forms such as legal and ethical. In this regard, the design and implementation of a control 
system addresses the goals of the financial institution and supports its governance in pursuing its 
economic or non-economic purposes according to the assumed principles. The operation of 
Islamic finance industry is based on conventional precepts, thus it shares common goals with 
conventional financial system. However, the religious feature of Islamic finance led to intense 
differences in terms of product engineering and the operation of Islamic financial institutions. In 
this regard, Shari’ah boards are considered as Shari’ah compliance gatekeepers as they provide 
the industry with legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders. This chapter examines the significance 
of Shari’ah boards in the context of Islamic finance industry in terms of the development of the 
industry. In this regard, its approach is mainly doctrinal and addresses the implications of 
Shari’ah boards and Shari’ah jurists’ divergence of opinions on the industry integration.  The 




regulatory systems may affect their functions. At the end, financial innovation is explained in 
terms of diversity in the opinions of Shari’ah boards.  
  3.2 The Historical Development of Shari’ah Boards 
 
  The development of Shari’ah boards is rooted in the economics’ views of Islamic scholars. In 
the early of the twentieth century Islamic economics was perceived as an antidote to socialism 
and capitalism. Its emphasis was on justice and freedom from colonial exploitation by a return to 
Islamic ideals such as elimination of poverty, decrease of inequalities and distribution of 
wealth.266 Despite the existence of prevailing Islamic movements, there were few references to 
the Shari’ah as a set of codified laws at a particular time and place (fiqh).267 In other words, 
objectives or maqasid al shari’ah were the main concerns, and there were no fundamental role 
for Shari’ah scholars.268  
   The issue of riba-free banking and finance can be traced back to the mid-twentieth century. 
In this regard, the first writings on interest-free banking were presented in the 1940s by Muslim 
economists, not by Shari’ah jurists trained in traditional Islamic schools.269 The flood of 
technical writings by Shari’ah scholars over the subject started in the mid-1970s.270  
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   Alongside informal endeavours in establishing Islamic finance institutions from the early 
1950s to the late 1960s271 the first two actual Islamic banks were founded in the mid-1960s in 
Dubai by Sheikh Saeed bin Luthah and in the early 1970s by the government of Egypt.272 
Contrary to the religious form and approach of the mentioned banks, there is no record of a 
formal effort to institutionalize a Shari’ah body for developing the riba-free banking and finance 
according to Islamic law.273 The first formal phase of alliance between Islamic finance industry 
and Shari’ah scholars traced back to the mid-1970s and the early 1980s. The sudden increase in 
oil revenues and the formal establishment of large-scale banking institutions such as the Dubai 
Islamic Bank, Kuwait Finance House, Dar Al-Maal Al Islami and Dallah Al-Baraka Group, 
necessitated searching for financial and legal cods based on Shari’ah.274 In this regard, Shari’ah 
experts mainly served as private advisors and most of their early fatwas discuss fundamental 
profit-and-loss sharing contracts like Mudarabah or Musharakah and accordingly there was no 
systemic effort to engineer Islamic financial products as substitutions for conventional 
products.275 However, need for credibility and legitimacy led newly established Islamic banks to 
form a formal Shari’ah body in their governance structure. The Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt in 
1976 established the first Shari’ah board and accordingly this tradition was continued by the 
Jordan Islamic Bank and the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan.276 In this regard, the establishment 
of Shari’ah boards in corporate governance of Islamic financial institutions in some countries 
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such as Malaysia, Jordan and Egypt got statutory mandate and in other jurisdictions it reflects a 
customary tradition. 
   Further, globalization and technology advances in the 1990s accelerated the growth of 
Islamic finance industry. As a consequence, competition in the market encouraged the managers 
of new international Islamic investment funds to get Shari’ah scholars on board to gain more 
acceptance from potential clients.277 Further, the new mandate in Islamic institutions also 
brought Shari’ah governance to international Islamic standards setting bodies’ attention and 
acknowledged some departures from the early practices in Shari’ah advisory role.278  
  3.3 The Function of Shari’ah Boards 
 
  The authoritative interpretation of the principles of Shari’ah in the context of commerce and 
finance is a multi-dimensional issue. In this regard, an efficient and effective ijtihad by Shari’ah 
scholars considers religion, economic, political and cultural facts together.279 It should regard 
the context of the given issue and rule according to expertise. In this regard, generally there has 
been no clear definition for Islamic financial institution, and in the case of Islamic banking, laws 
of jurisdictions with Islamic banking systems also present no definite concept.280 For example, 
Malaysia with a dual banking system in which Islamic financial institutions operate alongside 
conventional financial institutions, Islamic banking is defined as: ‘banking business whose aims 
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and operations do not involve any element which is not approved by the Religion of Islam.’281 
Also, other jurisdictions such as Iran with complete Islamic banking system, banking laws282do 
not present a clear-cut definition for Islamic banking.283  
   The legal nature of Islamic banking and finance operation shares the same characteristics and 
qualities with conventional finance. However, adherence to Islamic standards and mechanisms is 
the distinctive feature of the Islamic finance industry. In fact, Shari’ah certification is the most 
important distinction between conventional and Islamic financial industry.284 Although, Shari’ah 
boards are responsible to supervise the Shari’ah compliant operation of Islamic financial 
institutions, there is no standard definition for the Shari’ah supervision task,285and accordingly 
no standard definition for Shari’ah governance. However, it is generally defined as a process of 
review, investigation and analysis of the Islamic financial institution operation to ensure its 
compliance with Shari’ah.286 In this regard, Shari’ah certification reveals the main objective of 
Shari’ah supervision, namely ensuring that all activities of an Islamic financial institution are 
align with Shari’ah principles.287Further, Shari’ah boards play a crucial role in the development 
of Islamic finance industry. Shari’ah supervision is aimed at improving the efficiency of Islamic 
financial products and the enhancement of Islamic financial markets’ depth and breadth. In other 
                                                          
281 Malaysia Islamic Banking Act 1983, s 2. 
282 Iran has a complete Islamic financial system. 
283 The Law for usury-free banking (1983) defines objectives and duties of Islamic banking in Iran. 
284 Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, ‘Shari’ah Supervision in Modern Islamic Finance’ 
<https://www.guidanceresidential.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/shariah_supervision_in_modern
_islamic_finance.pdf> accessed 6 August 2015. 
285 Samy Nathan Garas and Chris Pierce, ‘Shari’a Supervision of Islamic Financial Institutions’ (2010) 18 
(4) Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 386.  
286 Abu Ghudda, ‘Shari'a Supervisory Boards: Establishment, Objectives, and Reality’ (Proceedings of 
the First Annual Conference of AAOIFI, Bahrain 2001) 1-24; Hussein Shehata, ‘Organizational 
Management, Administration and Responsibilities of the Shari'a Supervisory Board in Islamic Financial 
Institutions’ (1991) 116 Islamic Economic Journal 41-8; the role of Shari’ah boards in the governance of 
the Islamic financial institutions is discussed in the following chapters. 




words, efficient Shari’ah supervision assists Islamic financial institutions in engineering Shari’ah 
compliant products through efficient ijtihad and supervision. As a consequence, it enhances 
profitability of Islamic financial institutions288and accordingly results in development and 
integration of markets. 
   The role of Shari’ah supervision in Shari’ah certification and the development of Islamic 
financial markets reflect the nature of Shari’ah boards as legitimate control bodies289in the 
governance of Islamic financial institutions. They carry consultative and supervisory 
responsibilities to ensure conformity of Islamic financial institutions’ internal and external 
operations with Shari’ah. In this regard, Shari’ah scholars exercise ex ante and ex post religious 
audits by reviewing financial products’ structure and operations.290 According to the IFSB:  
‘The mechanism for obtaining ruling from Shari’ah scholars, applying fatwa and monitoring 
Shari’ah compliance shall cover: 
 Both ex ante and ex post aspects of all financial transactions carried out by IIFs-that is, to 
ensure Shari’ah compliance of the contracts, and later the performance of obligations 
under the contract; and 
 Operations of the IIFS, including aspects such as Shari’ah compliance review, investment 
policies, disposal of non-Shariah-compliant income, charitable activities, etc.’291  
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   In this regard, ex ante and ex post advisory and controlling functions of Shari’ah boards 
include: 
- Issuing fatwa according to enquiries submitted by board of directors or any other 
Interested party; 
- Reviewing and revising all the institution transactions;  
- Working with advisors in preparing contracts; 
- Participating in researches related to Shari’ah issues such as directing zakat (alms) 
resources and determining its rate or percentage;  
- Reviewing the institution’s operations.292   
 
   Further, Shari’ah boards control Islamic financial institutions’ operations and if they find any 
haram activity, Islamic financial institutions should purify generated revenue by donation to 
charity.293 With respect to Islamic financial institutions’ haram activities and financial crimes, 
theoretically, it is held that, since one of the responsibilities of Shari’ah boards is to ensure that 
Islamic financial institutions are not involved in any haram activity, thus prevention and control 
of financial crimes falls within the scope of their duties. In this regard, they discharge this 
responsibility as Amin through reviewing decisions and operations of the board of directors.294 
Watching others’ property as an Amin in Islam refers to: ’namely a person or governance body 
that occupies a position of trust’, and accordingly since Shari’ah boards should examine the 
rightfulness of decisions and operations of Islamic financial institution, they are considered Amin 
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in the industry.295 However, in practice, identifying and combating financial crimes require 
profound expertise and knowledge.296 Further, in line with the provision of the legal maxim, 
‘Adjudication of a case is an offshoot of its conception’ and concerning the formal 
responsibilities mentioned earlier for Shari’ah boards, it is hard to regard them responsible in this 
issue.297 In other words, the main function of Shari’ah boards should be considered in terms of 
Shari’ah compliance and Shari’ah supervision since their function is part of the internal Shari’ah 
control and is done by assistance of internal Shari’ah department (audit) as an internal committee 
and integral part of the institution governance.298 
   As discussed earlier, historically, the involvement of Shari’ah scholars in legal and non-legal 
issues has been through ijtihad and fatwa issuing. In this regard, their involvement in Islamic 
finance in the form of Shari’ah board’s membership or individual jurist still reflects the same 
techniques. However, it is worth noting that their functions now may be influenced by various 
factors such as financial regulations and politics. Particularly, at individual level their fatwas are 
mainly limited to specific financial institutions and more subject to regional variations.299At 
international level, Shari’ah boards’ engagement in Islamic finance takes a broader scope as they 
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involve in standard-setting in organizations such as AAOIFI and the International Islamic Fiqh 
Academy (IIFA). In this regard, adherence to the fatwas of these international organizations is 
voluntary and accordingly they only carry customary status through which Islamic financial 
institutions in different jurisdictions can achieve harmonization in Shari’ah boards’ 
responsibilities.300 Further, although the fatwa-issuing function of these influential organizations 
is in collective form, some members Shari’ah trends have more influence on the process and 
result of ijtihad. In other words, although these fatwa bodies endeavour to harmonize Shari’ah 
authority through consensus-building, some madahib are considered more prominent than the 
others. For instance, the International Islamic Fiqh Academy as an influential international 
organization is regarded a multi-Islamic legal school, in which opinions are supposed coming 
from all the Sunni and Shia schools of thought (Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, Shafei, Jafari, Zaydi 
and Zahiri). However, in practice opinions from the Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali are more 
pronounced in discussions of the organization.301 Although, this fact acknowledges the existence 
of different interpretive approaches in Islamic fiqh, the prominent place of some Schools hinders 
intellectual development of Islamic fiqh.  
   In this regard, the legalistic approach tries to review Islamic finance issues from the classical 
fiqh point of view and accordingly aims to implement classical fiqh al-muama’lat. In the other 
hand, the economic approach relies more on efficiency of the products and not full 
implementation of classical fiqh. It seeks to provide the industry with efficient interpretation for 
prohibition of riba, gharar and maisir. In the IIFA example, to discover sound opinion and also 
                                                          
300 Laurent L. Jacque, ’Financial Innovations and the Dynamics of Emerging Capital Markets’ in Laurent 
L. Jacque and Paul M. Vaaler (eds) Financial Innovations and the Welfare of Nations (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 2001) 35. 
301 Jean-Mathieu Potvin, ‘Shaping Interpretive Communities by Debating Irregular Opinions’ (Feb.2013) 




to eschew diversity of opinions, the Academy employs a conservative and hanbali-oriented 
practice through which irregular opinions have no legal effect.302 An irregular opinion is 
regarded ‘contrary to definitive and certain texts and those that have been subject to 
consensus’.303 This fact demonstrates the isolated status of innovative reasoning or ‘irregular’ 
opinions in the Academy resolutions.304 For instance, on interpretation of gharar and injunctions 
banning conventional commercial insurance, Mustafa al-Zarqa one of the founding members of 
the Academy, had been defending commercial insurance by presenting innovative interpretation 
over gharar and risk taking. In his view, insurance contracts as an institution minimize gharar 
and uncertainty. His opinion was rejected by the Academy members such as Wahab Zuhayli and 
regarded as positive lawyers approach.305  
   In this regard, the prevailing approach in the industry is also clear in definitions and 
requirements of Shari’ah boards’ membership provided by international standard-setting 
organizations. For instance, AAOIFI governance standards for Islamic financial institutions No 1 
on Appointment, composition and report of Shari’ah boards gives the following definition:306 ‘A 
Shari’a supervisory board is an independent body of specialised jurists in fiqh al-mu’amalat 
(Islamic commercial jurisprudence). However, the Shari’ah supervisory board may include a 
member other than those specialised in fiqh al-mu’amalat but who should be an expert in the 
field of Islamic financial institutions and with knowledge of fiqh al-mu’amalat. The Shari’ah 
supervisory board is entrusted with the duty of directing, reviewing and supervising the activities 
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of the Islamic financial institution that they are in compliance with Islamic Shari’ah rules and 
principles. The fatwas and rulings of the Board shall be binding on the Islamic financial 
institution.’ In this regard, the International Association of Islamic Banks describes general 
characteristics of the Shari’ah Board as follows: ‘It is formed of a number of members chosen 
from among Jurists and men of Islamic Jurisprudence and of comparative law who have 
conviction and firm belief in the idea of Islamic Banks. To ensure freedom of initiating their 
opinion the following are taken into account: (a) they must not be working as personnel in the 
bank. That means: they are not subject to the authority of the board of directors. (b) They are 
appointed by the general assembly as it is the case of the auditors of accounts. (c) The legitimate 
Control Body has the same means and jurisdictions as the auditors of accounts.’307  
   The provided definitions reveal common and the most fundamental characteristic of Shari’ah 
scholars, namely their knowledge in fiqh al-muamalat or Islamic commercial Jurisprudence. This 
is held mainly due to commercial nature of financial and banking issues. 308  However, 
interpretation and application of Shari’ah principles by Shari’ah boards in the context of Islamic 
finance is an ethical task and not legal.309 In other words, applying Shari’ah principles as legal 
rules in the form of modern state-enacted law requires codification.310 Legal validity of human 
acts in Shari’ah is categorized from valid (sahih) to null (batil). When Shari’ah principles are 
enacted as state law, they fall into this category and accordingly are regarded as law.311 In 
countries like Iran which legal system is Islamic (Following 1979 Islamic revolution) and 
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conventional laws in banking business have been changed and new Islamic codes are enacted, 
Shari’ah principles carry legal status as the result of state enactment and not based on individual 
interpretation of Shari’ah scholars. This fact could be the reason for non-existence of Shari’ah 
boards in Iran financial institutions.  
   The other category encompasses religious assessment, ranging from obligatory (wajib) to 
forbidden (haram). Shari’ah principles in the context of Islamic finance are only employed to 
discover permissibility or religious place of the transactions.312 In other words, ‘Islamic finance 
has the effect of reducing Islamic law to business ethics’313 and accordingly it has deep effect on 
divergence of opinions over permissibility of financial products. In this regard, further to 
plurality of Islamic schools of thought, cultural identity and local needs led to diversity of ijtihad 
in Islamic finance too. Despite the acceptance of the principle of permissibility (ibahah) in 
muma’mallat by all madahibin, Shari’ah scholars have dissimilar opinions about its conceptual 
scope.  
  3.4 The Regulation of Shari’ah Boards  
 
  The lawfulness of financial activities and products is a pre-requisite for sound operation of 
markets in both secular and religious sense.314 In the context of Islamic financial industry, 
Shari’ah is the crucial criterion for lawfulness and its implementation and assessment is done by 
Shari’ah boards of Islamic financial institutions. In other words, lawfulness in the Islamic 
finance industry carries a dual quality determined by religious and conventional institutions. In 
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addition, the religious role of Shari’ah scholars and Shari’ah boards (as guardians of ethics in the 
industry), their power, structure and function are derived from variety of sources such as national 
and international regulatory laws and standards315, the constitution and the internal policy of the 
Islamic financial institution and religious education of Shari’ah scholars.316 In this regard, 
Shari’ah framework in each jurisdiction is subject to the existence of Shari’ah supervision. Also, 
the form of regulatory collaboration between national authorities and individual Islamic financial 
institutions over Shari’ah supervision affects the Shari’ah framework.   
   As discussed before, since many Contemporary financial products have not been addressed 
in fiqh and the revealed sources of Shari’ah, the necessity of ijtihad is acknowledged in Islamic 
finance by all market players. 317  In jurisdictions with national regulatory authority with 
responsibility to lead and control the framework of ijtihad, Islamic finance industry has more 
harmonised structure. However, in comparison with decentralized regulatory approach, 
centralized regulation demonstrates a slow model in product development.318 For instance, due 
to lack of a centralized regulatory authority in the GCC region, Shari’ah boards can follow a 
market-based approach in product engineering, hence being faster in adopting new products. 
     3.4.1 Shari’ah Boards in Malaysia 
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  Shari’ah governance system in Malaysia follows a centralized and pro-active regulatory 
approach.319 Pursuing its development goals, Shari’ah governance pattern in Malaysia seeks to 
integrate and harmonize innovation in Islamic financial market. In this regard, there are two 
central Shari’ah Boards, one for securities commission (SC) and one for the Bank Negara 
Malaysia (SAC).320 the Shari’ah Advisory Council of the central bank is established under the 
Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 (amended in 2003 and the new one in 2009) to decide on 
Shari’ah matters relating to banking and financial business.321 The SAC and SC have presented 
resolutions and standards over Shari’ah compliance and governance issues which must be 
considered in operations of respective Islamic financial institutions. In this regard, regulatory 
authorities have power to monitor the operation of Islamic financial institutions and assess their 
adherence to standards. For instance, the appointment of Shari’ah boards’ members must be 
approved by SAC.322 Further, regarding Shari’ah boards responsibility in issuing fatwa over 
Shari’ah compliance aspects, SAC is responsible to validate Islamic financial products to ensure 
their Shari’ah compliance. This fact reflects the regulatory influence of SAC and SC standards 
on Shari’ah boards’ functions. 323  In other words, Shari’ah boards in Malaysia have 
complementary role 324 and endeavour to adapt their decisions to established regulatory 
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standards.325 Although, this approach slows down the process of product development, provides 
more stability, harmonization and security for innovative products, thus contributes to an 
effective and conductive Shari’ah framework for development of the Islamic finance industry.326  
    3.4.2 Shari’ah Boards in the GCC 
 
 
    The most of the GCC countries (with the exception of Oman and Saudi Arabia) follow a 
minimalist regulatory approach327 since regulatory authorities do not intervene in regulation of 
Shari’ah boards, and Islamic financial institutions individually are free to decide on Shari’ah 
compliance aspects of their operation. In this sense, each Shari’ah board has authority to dictate 
and follow particular fatwas and Shari’ah rules.328 This approach indicates the influence of 
some Shari’ah boards (generally more from the Hanbali School) such as Kuwait Finance House 
on engineering and operation of some products. For instance, since sell of debt is not permitted 
by most of Islamic schools of thought such as the Hanafi, Maleki and Hanbali, products based on 
bay al-inah are not accepted by Shari’ah boards in the GCC. In this regard, some scholars have 
the power to influence the market.329 For instance, the fatwa of Taqi Usmani, president of 
AAOIFI, in 2007 against Sukuk, launched a shockwave in the Middle East and caused a 
noticeable decline in Sukuk issuance. The contentious fatwa demonstrates the extra-economic 
power of religious and financial authority in Islamic finance and also non-financial incentives 
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driving investors in the Middle East.330 Although this approach helps the quick progress in 
development of products331, diversity of opinions, lack of harmonization, risk of non-recognition 
of products in other markets and high risk of fatwa shopping have exposed the industry to a 
non-uniform shape.   
 3.5 Divergence in the Interpretation of Shari’ah and Islamic 
Finance Products 
 
    Financial innovation is the cornerstone of financial industry development. The history of 
finance is a chronicle of innovations.332 Financial innovation is defined as any new development 
in a financial system to enhance the allocational efficiency of the financial intermediation 
process and also to improve the operational efficiency by reducing cost and risk of 
transactions.333 However, the term ‘new’ is not congruent with the innovation.334 In other 
words, it is important to separate the ‘the plain improvement’ from the true innovation.335 In this 
regard, a qualitative assessment is required to differentiate between a purely different (adaptive) 
and a truly innovative product or process.336 while true innovative products or processes 
reconfigure the relevant opportunity set to achieve new objectives and hence improve 
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profitability (model innovation), adaptive innovations are incremental ways of ‘bundling’ and 
unbundling the existing instruments and methods to achieve desired objectives in a more 
efficient way (process innovation).337  
   Islamic banking and finance provides an example of process innovation as endeavours to 
actualize the economic effects of conventional financial products by different mechanics.338 For 
instance, in banking salam has been developed into parallel salam to facilitate the financing of 
commodities, and accordingly is regarded as a potential contract in the future markets in the 
Bursa Malaysia.339 Another example is Musharakah contract has been developed to a new 
product (musharakah mutanaqisah) used in home financing.340 In this regard, as Dar says: 
‘Islamic financial innovation, the way it has been practiced, can be defined as the process of 
utilising Islamic legal contracts in new ways to develop financial products that are in compliance 
with Shari’ah and at the same time have the ability to replicate the economic effects of 
conventional financial products.’341 In other words, although financial innovation in Islamic 
finance should be understood within Shari’ah framework, it follows the same economic purposes 
supposed for conventional financial innovation. 
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   Shari’ah compliant is the distinguishing feature of Islamic financial engineering,342 and its 
conception is contingent upon the practice of individual or collective ijtihad resulted from a 
multitude of individual Shari’ah opinions. This practice of ijtihad has demonstrated a genuine 
adaptability quality in its applications to regional circumstances in terms of permissibility or 
non-permissibility of some Islamic financial contracts.343 In other words, Islamic finance is the 
manifestation of the unresolved relationship between traditional Islamic schools of thought and 
changing social and cultural practices. As Lawrence Rosen stresses on the influence of locality 
upon Shari’ah (Fiqh): ‘Islamic law, deferring to the local version of what facts mean to people’s 
relationships, allows facts to speak to their consequences through local custom, personnel and 
standards.’344 
   Although, locality is the sign of flexibility, might be viewed as the result of non-existence of 
a central legislative authority to regulate different groups of people with widely disparate 
backgrounds.345 It is of note here that, the practice of accommodating Shari’ah to fit social 
usage has been tempered by the doctrine of Taqlid (Imitation).346 However, in practice, the need 
for the coordination of the ideal of immutable Shari’ah with the social changes led to a legal 
system consisted of underground doctrines such as hiyal, maslaha and Istihsan.347 In this regard, 
the application of different methodologies in ijtihad in the context of different cultures and 
regions resulted in variations in opinions of Shari’ah boards over innovative financial products. 
In principle, the lack of harmonized approaches in interpretation of Shari’ah and also the 
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absence of firmly established market practices led to divergent trends in application of Shari’ah 
compliant products in Middle Eastern and South-east Asian markets.348 Variations in opinions 
are particularly more evident in permissibility or non-permissibility of some innovative Islamic 
financial products such as some types of derivatives (options and forwards) in currency 
exchanges. However, Islamic finance has gone beyond those regions in which Islam is the 
predominant religion.349 Initiatives in opening Islamic branches by conventional banks in the 
Europe and other regions, the existence of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index, FTSE Global 
Islamic Index Series (GIIS), and also globalization of business practices have a strong influence 
on Shari’ah boards opinions and accordingly on structure of Shari’ah compliant products. 
   3.5.1 Shari’ah Framework and financial innovation 
 
   Before embarking on the topic of Shari’ah framework in the context of Islamic finance, it is 
prerequisite to ponder on the role of interpretation and ijtihad. Contract law is the cornerstone of 
financial operations.350The principles of contracts are expression of normative concept in any 
legal system, and this concept might take various forms in the context of which is implemented. 
In the context of Islamic finance, it is generally asserted that Islamic fiqh knows no theory of 
contract, 351  and the system of Islamic contracts is developed by Shari’ah Jurists.352 Fiqh 
al’muamalay presents a non-systemised and non-codified legal order of contracts in which 
mutual consent is restricted by general principles of Shari’ah (prohibition of riba, gharar and 
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maiysir) in the form of classes of nominate contracts with distinctive rules.353 Thus, the doctrine 
of freedom of contract presents a narrow concept in fiqh al’muammalat contrary to what is 
perceived in the common law. 
   In this regard, the lack of a general theory of contract acknowledges the inevitability of 
interpretation. However, employing the variety of interpretive methods by different Islamic 
schools of thought on categorization and permissibility of contracts in the pre-modern juridical 
framework brought some implications for design and development of Islamic financial products. 
In other words, adherence to the classical approach in interpretation of Islamic contract law in 
the context of modern financial system led to a quasi-adaptive ijtihad. In Vogel words: ‘Islamic 
finance insists, on the one hand, on the application of classical law, but also, on the other hand, 
seeks to become a thoroughly modern industry meeting all the modern needs its participants.’354  
   The quasi-adaptive approach endeavours to reach objectives of law by employing a restricted 
and pre-defined category of contractual framework. Contrary to this approach, a constructive 
interpretation imposes objectives on financial practices to reach an integrative ijtihad which 
incorporates both underlying moral principles and social needs.355 The notion of ijtihad has a 
dynamic essence, and accordingly contradicts pre-existing classical interpretations. It expresses a 
plurality feature in which there is no pre-determined status before the intervention of faqih 
(Shari’ah jurist).356 In this regard, the reason for existence of plurality and variation in opinions 
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in Islamic law is ‘the revealed law is itself often undetermined and relative.’357 In other words, 
changing socioeconomic situations affect the object of ijtihad, hence make disagreement in 
ijtihad inevitable and the formulation of Shari’ah as toil.358  
   Uncertainty in the interpretation of Shari’ah ‘probable formulations of the law were 
expressions of jurists’ fallible opinions, and opinion could vary from one jurist to another, giving 
pluralism in the law.’359 Regarding relativism in Islamic fiqh and diversity of schools of thought, 
it is important to note, the authority of Shari’ah jurists in the context of Islamic finance is relative 
too. In principle, Ijtihad in Islamic finance is a product of intellectual effort of faqih bounded by 
rules and traditions of one of the schools of thought throough which presents its own interpretive 
approach. In other words, since faqih does not have a direct approach to interpretation of text 
(the Quran) and Sunnah (main sources of Shari’ah), his authority is relative. 360  As a 
consequence, the devotion for old classical fiqh and applying the conservative approach in 
interpretation of current rules and also in devising new rules has restricted innovation in financial 
products.361  
   The function of ijtihad in the context of Islamic finance is deeply influenced by regional 
diversity. Regarding geographical spread of Islam, main Sunni (Hannafi, Maliki, Shafei and 
Hanbali) and Shi’ah (Jafari) schools of thought are established in South East Asia and the 
Middle East. With such a variety in the contexts which Islamic finance is practicing, Shari’ah 
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Boards of institutions offering Islamic financial products show a diverse pattern in permissibility 
over the use of Islamic contracts.362 
   Diversity in the interpretation of Shari’ah has been a privileged quality and part of legal 
culture of Islamic fiqh. However, in the context of globalized financial markets aiming for more 
integration, it raises doubts about its functionality. In this regard, although Shari’ah jurists have 
been resistant to state regulation and defended autonomy of the madhhab strongly,363 the 
dematerialized and ever-changing international financial order necessitated the 
institutionalization of interpretations through collective ijtihad at national or transnational level. 
However, this task has not been done properly and Islamic finance industry developed separately 
in Southeast Asia and the Middle East364 and accordingly despite having common Shari’ah 
sources, Shari’ah scholars have presented divergent interpretations over Islamic financial 
products.365 For instance, whereas Islamic finance practice in Malaysia follows Mahathir’s call 
for innovative ijtihad, in the Middle East it has demonstrated a legalistic approach to ijtihad.  
   Generally, there are two ranges of products in Islamic finance: Shari’ah-based and 
Shari’ah-compliant. Shari’ah-based products are those products have been addressed and 
introduced in Islamic fiqh based on rules of primary or secondary sources of Shari’ah. 
Shari’ah-compliant products are conventionally based products with specific structures which are 
imported and converted into Islamic products.366 Concerning disagreements between Islamic 
schools of thought over the range and type of secondary sources, in practice all Shari’ah-based 
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contracts and products such as mudarabah, musharakah, bai bi thamin ajil, salam and istisna are 
not accepted by all Shari’ah scholars. In this regard, rules and conditions of each contract are 
clarified in books of Islamic fiqhs based on each madhab practice. Accordingly, development of 
some of those contracts will not change their nature and the same rules apply to the developed 
contracts.367 For example, all basic rules of salam govern parallel salam too.368 Generally, 
Shari’ah-based accepted contracts in Islamic finance are: mudarabah, musharakah, musharaka 
mutanaghisa, murabaha and istisna. However, even though these are universally accepted 
Shari’ah-based contracts, their application may be divergent. For instance, while mudarabah 
contract is broadly accepted across different markets for project financing, in the GCC it is 
especially applied to deposit accounts, and in Malaysia Wadiah contract has a corresponding 
function.369 Among Shari’ah-based contracts, bai’al dayn and bai al ina370 are only applicable 
in Malaysia. Generally, Malaysia market encompasses all Shari’ah contracts approved by 
AAOIFI, Fiqh Academy and those applied in the GCC market.  
   Despite of diversity in the practice of Islamic finance, the development policies in the two 
regions have embarked some interactions between financial institutions. Pursuing development 
policy by Islamic financial hubs required the harmonization of fatwas and innovative trends. In 
this respect, despite the belief that standardization of fatwas would go against the dynamic nature 
of Shari’ah as it requires precedence of one school of thought,371 the increasing need for foreign 
direct investment revealed the necessity of consistency in fatwas, standardization and 
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harmonization of ijtihad at national and international level.372 However, the consistency of 
opinions depends on the area of activity and aspect of the industry. For instance, risk 
management suffers from deep divergent opinions over permissibility of risk management 
products such as derivatives. Next sections examines the implications of divergent Shari’ah 
frameworks for Islamic finance industry with regard to derivatives instruments and money 
markets.  
    3.5.1.1 Shari’ah and Product Development 
 
 
    Product development is defined as: ‘creating business, suggesting means to it, keeping in 
mind the realities and business prospects for the future.’373 Product development in the context 
of Islamic finance refers to the process of developing assets in the form of products and services 
within the parameters of Shari’ah.374 Further, highly competitive financial markets require 
products in line with customers’ needs and at the same time adhering to respective national and 
international laws. In this regard, also ever-changing international financial markets bring 
necessity of engineering new products to the fore. For instance, the current financial crisis 
revealed the exigency of poor liquidity risk management and the need for an effective liquidity 
risk management policy and products. 
   In practice, Islamic product development mainly includes re-engineering of conventional 
products in accordance with Shari’ah principles.375 As mentioned before, Innovation in Islamic 
finance is an adaptive innovation and all development and innovative ideas must be introduced 
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and applied within the scope of classical fiqh al muammalat. In this regard, the involvement of 
Shari’ah boards in the process of product development is regarded as one of the requirements.376 
In this regard, they are responsible for giving fatwa on the products with the underlying 
supporting evidences to the Islamic investors.377  
   Since Shari’ah provides limited and vague principles, Shari’ah scholars must elucidate them 
with regard to the custom and contingencies of time. In this sense, Shari’ah paradigm in product 
development is subject to Shari’ah sources and mechanisms such as analogy, istishab and 
maslaha378 used by Shari’ah scholars within their relative school of thought to remove hardship 
and bring benefit to mankind. Further, as the concept of freedom of contract in the context of 
Islamic fiqh essentially is limited to the classical nominate contracts’379Shari’ah boards try to 
develop products by employing different techniques, such as modifying, amalgamation and 
enhancement of contracts. 380  However, the explanation of those techniques requires the 
examination of regulatory regimes and their impact on Shari’ah boards’ approaches in product 
development. In this regard, it is perceived that jurisdictions with dual financial systems (where 
the conventional and Islamic banking systems coexist) provide more competitive markets for 
financial institutions and accordingly for engineering of sophisticated products.381 For instance 
In Malaysia Shari’ah advisors beside their very advising role for product development, also are 
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responsible for development of Islamic capital markets by proposing structures in line with the 
SAC and SC preferences and also conducting research for further development of capital 
markets.382 In the UK although there is no special enactment or explicit responsibility for 
Shari’ah boards in developing capital markets, the competitive market of UK urges adopting 
flexible Shari’ah approach in product development. 
   In the development of Islamic financial products, modification and amalgamation have been 
the most popular techniques. By the modification, the structure of some Islamic nominate 
contracts are modified as they meet better modern financial needs.383 For instance, musharakah 
and mudarabah in classical fiqh are based on the concept of sharikah as an equity finance mode 
by which two or more parties in a project sharing the profit and loss of the joint venture.384 
musharakah is intended to be perpetual and there is no determination of ceiling profit rate.385 
However, in the context of Islamic finance industry, musharakah essentially is a bond under 
which shares of partners are to be redeemed at a particular of time and the entitlement of 
investors are kept to a certain rate.386 In other words, due to risky nature of the contract, issuers 
try to give the impression to the investors that their investment is secured.387  
   Another Islamic mode of innovation is combination of two or more nominate contracts. For 
instance, ijarah sukuk is comprised of ijarah and sale contracts. ijarah in fiqh mainly refers to 
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transferring the usufruct of a property in exchange for rent388 and in essence, in its modern form, 
is a lease-based bond by which the originator of the Sukuk will sell certain assets to the issuer 
and then lease it back from him for the duration of the Sukuk.389  
   The practice of combination of different contracts to form a particular mode of financing has 
been criticized for being incoherent as it emulates the substance of conventional financial 
products by using variations on contract forms that were approved by pre-modern Shari’ah 
scholars, and consequently increases transaction costs. 390  Furthermore, reductionism and 
form-based product development approach led to a kind of regulatory arbitrage, in which 
Shari’ah boards try to reengineer and endorse products applied in conventional markets.391 In 
this regard, divergent interpretations and implementations of Shari’ah principles in the form of  
Shari’ah-based and Shari’ah-compliant products in different regions and also the lack of 
standardization led to a practice of ‘fatwa shopping’, particularly in the GCC region with 
decentralized regulatory system. This innovation and product development approach is an 
established practice in all areas of Islamic finance, including risk management and liquidity 
management.392 In this regard, innovative derivatives are a crucial issue in the industry as 
Shari’ah boards must reconcile their conventional concepts to Shari’ah forms.  
    3.5.1.1.2 Derivatives in Islamic Finance  
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    Derivatives are the ultimate innovation of market economy. Changes in financial theory 
along with globalization, deregulation and advances in technology increased the flow of capital, 
consequently generated demand for new financial products.393 The competitive impulses of 
these innovative products have led to changes in function of financial intermediation, which 
expanded from more straightforward credit intermediation to risk intermediation.394  
   In this context, hedging and intermediation of risk in Shari’ah as a way of reducing any 
substantial losses are permissible tasks, but only through Shari’ah acceptable means.395 In this 
regard, speculative practice as the way of using available information to anticipate future price 
movements of securities and accordingly benefiting from price differences is not an acceptable 
practice under Shari’ah since it seeks no real business.396 As discussed before, regarding 
prohibition of riba and gharar in Shari’ah, the prohibited risk is a deliberate injection of 
avoidable uncertainty to material substances of the transaction, such as subject matter and 
price.397 Although most Shari’ah scholars have approved the necessity of risk management in 
the context of modern financial transactions, their legal argument is mainly structured based on 
maslaha and dharurah. In other words, fiqh al muammalat considers risk management as an 
exception to the transactions. In this regard, despite the difference between uncertainty (gharar 
and gambling) and hedging, Shari’ah scholars consider a strong gambling tendency in 
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derivatives transactions.398 Hence, the main challenge for Shari’ah scholars in risk management 
is to distinguish risk taking from gharar and gambling like transactions.399 In other word, the 
overarching requirements for sale under fiqh al-muammalat, (namely Existence of subject matter 
of contract, ownership of asset and delivery)400 and their interpretations are subject to profound 
disagreement between Shari’ah scholars.  
   As discussed before, innovation and product development in Islamic finance is an adaptive 
practice by which products are engineered based on nominate contracts. The type and range of 
basic nominate contracts in fiqh al-muamallat is contingent on the particular Islamic school of 
thought. Among them, only modarabah,  musharakah, ijarah, murabaha and istisna are 
universally accepted, and other nominate contracts such as salam, tawarrugh, kafalah, Bay al’ 
dayn and urbun are not applicable in product engineering of all Islamic financial institutions. As 
a consequence of such a diverse interpretive atmosphere in the industry, product development in 
terms of derivatives has demonstrated an inflexible pattern. 
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   In this regard, the structure of Islamic derivatives is the result of amalgamation of two or 
more nominate contracts with combination of promise (wa’d). In other words, Complexity of 
Islamic derivatives arises from two reasons: 1- diversity of opinions over the acceptability of 
components (nominate contracts) of the derivative contract; 2- contradictory and diverse 
opinions with regards to operational and technical issues. Regarding intense legal pluralism in 
Islamic law, regulatory system of the jurisdiction in which the Islamic financial institutions 
operate and local custom affect Shari’ah boards opinions over the permissibility of the 
derivatives. In this regard, Inflexibility and diversity of opinions adversely have affected 
competitiveness and integrity of the industry.  
  3.6 Conclusion 
 
   Shari’ah supervisory boards as Shari’ah compliance gatekeepers bear an influential role in 
the development of Islamic finance. In this regard, their approach in interpretation of Shari’ah 
(legalistic or economic oriented) reflects a continuing historical authority which forms the 
industry practice. This authority in the context of Islamic finance shows a rapid evolvement from 
pure endorsement to advisory and auditing as now Shari’ah board’s members from various 
schools of thought function as a legitimate control body in ex ante and ex post Shari’ah 
compliance auditing. However, there has been no agreed definition for Shari’ah supervision and 
this has had some negative implications for the industry in terms of integrity and development of 
markets. Fatwa as a historic tradition in fiqh has been regarded efficient when could solve the 
given problem according to exigencies of time. In the context of Islamic finance, an efficient 
fatwa requires attention to economic facts by Shari’ah board. In this regard, the current practice 




approach in ijtihad as Shari’ah boards main concern is adherence to the legal forms provided by 
classical fiqh. Although, some jurisdictions regulatory systems such as Malaysia their national 
development have affected this legalistic approach and changed it to more flexible Ijtihad, the 
practice of international standard setting organization still follows a conservative perception of 
Shari’ah. This approach particularly at national and individual levels of Shari’ah supervision 























   4.1 Introduction 
 
    The Rapid development of modern financial markets, advances in technology and 
accordingly in financial engineering led to convoluted legal relationships. Despite the complexity 
in financial contracts and differences in common law and civil law legal systems, globalization 
encouraged them to evolve into similar legal institutions. In this context, the increasing need for 
development in all markets reflects the importance of ‘welfare’. It bears an extensive concept as 
its ultimate support for individualism encourages freedom of contract, and accordingly supports 
sustainable development. Further, the modern notion of ‘welfare’, as an objective for the 
operation of corporates, persists on functions not persons. In this regard, since the ever-changing 
markets’ exigencies and preferences define new functions, legal institutions and Company laws 
evolve to keep pace with those changes. In this context, it is assumed that directors, employees 
and any person responsible for managing investors’ money is in the position of fiduciary and 
accordingly is required to be loyal and avoid any conflict situation. In the context of Islamic 
finance, although fiduciary duties established in common law and statutes cover directors and 




and other directors employed in conventional financial institutions), there have been no legal 
place for Shari’ah boards. This chapter examines Shari’ah boards’ legal relation with Islamic 
financial institutions. The first part explains the modern corporate law objectives and compares 
them with Shari’ah objectives. The next part studies the fiduciary position of Shari’ah boards in 
the context of English common law and at the end addresses their fiduciary duties with regard to 
Islamic financial institutions and investors.   
  4.2 Corporate Objectives and Its Implications for the Legal 
Relations of Corporate 
 
   The operation of modern corporations reflects an economic perception of law. Corporation, as 
a legal entity is an economic instrument and organization acts as a nexus of contracts between 
individual suppliers of various input (principals) and managers (agents) to generate economic 
profit. This view portrays the primacy of internal (private) relations in corporate law and its aim 
to maximize welfare of shareholders.401 The privatized view over corporation is mainly based on 
the freedom-of-contract as it supports individual economic innovations in market economy and 
accordingly reinforces primacy of shareholders’ welfare.402 In this regard, the aim of granting 
separate legal personality to a corporate is to maintain and improve efficiency. From an 
economic view point, efficiency is subject to shareholders’ interests. In the context of the UK 
law, the concept of the ‘interests of the company’ has been commonly equated with shareholders’ 
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wealth maximization.403 As stated in Brady v Brady404: ‘the interests of the company as an 
artificial person cannot be distinguished from the interests of the persons who are interested in 
it’. 
   The economic rationale and efficiency justification behind the predominance of shareholders’ 
interests in the UK corporate law is that as they are residual risk bearers contracted for a promise 
to maximize the value of their stock, their interest is allied with the solvent company. 405 
Further, as shareholders have the incentive to bear more risks so they are likely to foster 
economic efficiency. 406  In this regard, the economic objective has some implications for 
corporate legal relations as its contractarian nature persists on relations and functions, not on 
persons. Also, the individualism in the contractarian theory reveals its ‘instrumental effect in 
justifying the prevalence of default rules in pursuit of the ultimate goal of shareholders 
wealth’. 407  In this context, English Law considers shareholders as contractual parties and 
entitles every member to observe and claim a right over company’s articles.408  
   In line with contractarian, directors and persons entrusted with managing shareholders’ money 
and regarded as trusted agents to maximize shareholders’ value. Agency theory presupposes that 
agents are self-interested, thus divergence between their interests and the shareholders’ results in 
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agency costs (as residual costs) and as a consequence impedes wealth maximization.409 On this 
subject, the aim of corporate law is to provide mechanisms to reduce agency costs and to ensure 
an efficient alignment of agents and principles’ interests.410                     
   4.2.1 Shari’ah Objectives and Corporate Objectives: the Role of maslahah  
 
    As discussed earlier, the well-being of humanity is the ultimate objective of Shari’ah. The 
History of Islamic law acknowledges this fact as jurists have used different legal instruments to 
meet this objective. On this subject, maslaha has been considered as an instrument for legal 
reform to adjust and implement Shari’ah with regard to changes in human civilization. In other 
words, maslahah allows creativity and flexibility in terms of legal policies.411 Further, maslahah 
through the underlying purposes establishes a balance between Islamic fiqh and objectives of 
Shari’ah when it (Islamic fiqh) does not present any legal solution for new legal incidents.  
   The concept of maslahah has evolved over the centuries as its definition has been under the 
influence of different social and political contexts. Literally, maslahah means benefit or interest, 
and in English is rendered as public interest. In this regard, maslaha is considered as the purpose 
of law. Al-Ghazali believed that maslaha is God’s purpose in revealing the divine law to preserve 
essential elements of human mankind’s well-being (religion, life, intellect, offspring and 
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property) and whatever protects these elements and averts harm is maslaha.412 Al Ghazali theory 
of maslahah reconciled between rationalist objectivism of Muta’zil and theistic subjectivism of 
Ash’ari Schools of Islamic theology.413 In this regard, maslaha is regarded as the means of legal 
change and guidance as jurists use in their decisions, particularly in muamalat issues which there 
has been no clear rule (hokm) for them. However, some jurists such as Ibn Tymiyya although 
considered maslahah as the purpose of law, they believe the priority of maslahah is absolute and 
should be applied over any text or interpretation of the law that goes against the purpose of 
Shari’ah.414 In other words, the focus of maslahah here is on its role in guidance of decisions 
towards the objectives of Shari’ah.    
   Regarding the relation between the objectives of modern companies and Shari’ah, it is 
believed that Shari’ah presents a broader concept for corporate objectives as its ethical approach 
to social responsibility415 holds the common good of society as the main ground for business 
activities. Accordingly, it establishes a common responsibility to create wealth for all in a fair 
way, and as a consequence assumes a collective religious obligation (fard Kifayah) for Muslims 
and Islamic financial institutions to follow its social-religious principles.416 This approach is 
embedded in Islamic financial institutions articles of associations. In fact, the prohibitions of 
riba, ghara and maisar have a public good value which benefits capital providers and the society 
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as a whole. However, in practice interpretation and operation of these principles have not 
presented an identical or comparable pattern. In the context of Islamic finance, the authoritative 
interpretation of Shari’ah is entrusted to Shari’ah boards. They act as a control body to ensure 
the compliance of the Islamic financial institutions with provided fatwas and accordingly 
assessing their operation with regard to corporate goals.  
   In this regard, it is discussed since in Islamic fiqh a mufti legal opinion based on maslahah is 
usually concerned about a single case, should not be regarded as public interest. It refers to 
public interest when the political authorities issue rulings within the sphere of Shari’ah.417 
Although the history of Islamic law acknowledges the individual-oriented feature (in the process 
of ijtihad and implementation) of fatwas, Shari’ah boards’ fatwas in the context of international 
financial markets are not any more personal as they may have macro effects on their operation. 
Further, the modern corporation as an independent legal person has changed the perception over 
private property rights, and accordingly over the function of Shari’ah boards’ fatwas as they are 
not absolute anymore. In this regard, in the context of Islamic finance, human wellbeing and 
sanctity of property take public feature as Shari’ah boards are required to deal with money of 
people in a public form. Thus, maslaha and Shari’ah objectives give a public feature to fatwa and 
legal opinions of Shari’ah boards.   
  4.3 Shari’ah Boards as Fiduciaries 
 
    The examination of Shari’ah boards’ fiduciary relationship with Islamic financial institutions 
requires the clarification of what is meant by ‘fiduciary’ in English common law. The word 
                                                          




‘fiducia’ is regarded as the Latin root of the word, akin to a modern trust.418 However, this 
trust-like relationship does not have a universally accepted definition419and is profoundly subject 
to legal and social changes. Trust is defined as a reasonable belief that the other party will tell the 
truth and perform its promises.420 This definition of trust implies the non-contractual nature of 
fiduciary law since the violation of trust carries a ‘moral taint that is not appropriate to violation 
of contract.421  
   The Fiduciary position in the context of modern financial world is a form of power as it plays 
the significance role in promoting individual welfare and increasing efficiency of resource 
allocation.422 Although frequent attempts have been made to define fiduciary relationship, the 
open-textured423 nature of the relationship makes it difficult. In this regard, a distinction is drawn 
between status-based and fact-based approaches in identification of fiduciary relationships. The 
statute-based approach does not focus on the character of the fiduciary relationship and tries to 
determine sufficient similarities in the given relationship with trustee and beneficiary relationship 
(quasi-trust).424 As Worthington explains: ‘fiduciary Law evolved from Equity’s regulation of the 
relationship between trustees and beneficiaries. Over time, these rules were extended, with minor 
modifications, to cover other situations that seemed analogous. Now it is accepted that 
relationships between directors and their companies, agents and their principals, solicitors and 
their clients, and partners and their co-partners are all fiduciary. These are all statute-based 
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fiduciary relationships. The status itself inevitably attracts fiduciary impositions.’425 
   However, the narrow view of statute-based approach does not include new categories of 
fiduciary relationship. In this regard, it is required to consider the certain characteristics of 
fiduciary relationships to determine the nature of the relationship.426 in both Lac Minerals Ltd v 
International Corona Resources Ltd 427  and Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical 
Corp428 it is recognized that the presence of certain factors in non-fiduciary relationships such as 
discretion or power given by beneficiary to the fiduciary, vulnerability of the beneficiary,429 
trust, ascendancy and confidence 430 would result in fiduciary obligations. Consequently, a 
fact-based approach is considered more effective for definition of fiduciary relationship. For 
instance, In Justice Finn words: ‘fiduciary is someone who undertakes to act for or behalf of 
another in some particular matter or matters.’431 This definition has been followed in many cases 
such as in Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew.432 Based on this definition a fiduciary acts 
on behalf of a beneficiary and exercises discretion, whether in accordance or not, other’s (the 
beneficiary) instruction for the benefit of the beneficiary.  
   Regarding the discretionary power of fiduciary, it is noteworthy that the exercise of discretion 
in financial companies (although established based on the common fiduciary characteristics) is 
different. The difference lies in the perception of property or ‘critical resources’. Critical 
resources in the context of fiduciary relationships in financial corporations encompass a broader 
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concept than ‘property’ as they cover not only tangible and intangible properties, also anything 
could be a potential for opportunism such as non-commercial confidential information433and the 
reputation of the enterprise. Further, the exercise of discretionary power by fiduciaries with 
respect to a critical resource ‘connotes the power to use or work with the critical resource in a 
manner that exposes the beneficiary to harm that cannot reasonably be evaded though 
self-help.’434  
   From the economic point of view, the contractarian nature of the firm and agency theory 
implies a broad discretionary power for fiduciaries with regard to controlling investors’ money. 
Accordingly in the context of Islamic finance, the discretionary power of Shari’ah boards implies 
a broader meaning as their ex ante and ex post functions are based on Shari’ah. In other words 
the discretionary power of Shari’ah boards reflects its unpredictability as it bears religious and 
conventional characteristics together.  
   In Arklow Investments Ltd v Maclean the Privy Council held that: ‘fiduciary encaptures a 
situation where one person is in a relationship with another which gives rise to a legitimate 
expectation, which equity will recognise that the fiduciary will not utilise his or her position in 
such a way which is adverse to the interests of the principal.’435 Based on the aforementioned 
definitions, trust and confidence436are the main features of fiduciary relationships which require 
a self-denial437state from the fiduciary to manage property of principal efficiently. However, 
regarding the inevitable interrelation between an agent and information given by principal, the 
identification of another category of fiduciary relationship, namely the relationship of 
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confidentiality is crucial. In this regard, Lord Millett identifies the relationship of confidentiality 
whenever information is imparted in confidence.438 According to Hollander and Salzedo, the 
obligation to respect confidentiality ‘may be contractual or equitable. It may arise from the 
circumstances in which the information was imparted, or from the obviously confidential nature 
of the information.’439 The views of the Privy Council in Arklow Investments Ltd v Maclean over 
the relationship between confidentiality and fiduciary duties now must be the basis for Lord 
Millett’s view.440  
   Based on the foregoing analysis, there is some kind of dependence and influence in a 
fiduciary relationship upon information and advice.441 In this regard, however, it is discussed that 
the subject of advice should be ‘a matter which our society considers to be of importance to the 
adviser’s personal or financial well-being…’442 Further, a fiduciary relationship appears when 
the principal does not make his own evaluation of the information or advice given and ‘will not 
in consequence exercise an independent judgement in his own interests in the subject of 
decision…’443  
   However, fiduciary in the context of Angelo-American Law is an elusive concept and may 
take many forms in different circumstances. The lack of a clear concept for fiduciary relationship 
and the basis of fiduciary duties resulted in uncertainty and inconsistency in the authorities.444 
Accordingly, due to its applicability in a variety of contexts and situations, fiduciary law has 
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developed through a jurisprudence of analogy rather than principle. 445  In this regard, the 
fiduciary relationship is described as a ‘concept in search of a principle.’446  Regarding the 
contagion effects of bad financial decision-makings, the word fiduciary in the context of 
financial markets bears an inclusive concept and enjoys a deep public dimension as it affects not 
only the principal interest, also society’s as well. In this regard, the discretionary nature of the 
fiduciaries power over the others’ property cannot be easily subject to detailed standards and 
‘they require educated judgment about uncertain and problematic issues. In addition such 
decisions frequently require the use of specialised financial or business information….because 
fiduciaries manage or have some control over very substantial property interests of others, they 
have the potential power to inflict great losses on those property owners.’447 
   Regarding the legal relation of Shari’ah boards with Islamic financial institutions, based on 
the established perception over the concept of fiduciary in the Anglo-American Law we can 
consider Shari’ah boards as fiduciaries. Their ex ante and ex post functions such as Financial 
product engineering, auditing and advising all imply the concepts of trust and confidence. 
Further, since the reliance of Islamic financial institutions and Shari’ah-sensitive investors 
(shareholders and debtors) on Shari’ah boards’ instructions is faith-based, the concepts of trust 
and confidence bear a non-financial essence (although with financial implications). In other 
words, the religious nature of Shari’ah boards’ functions may define a moral root for fiduciary 
duties. Further, in theory, as Islamic financial institutions follow a different economic and legal 
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perception over financial investment448 , fiduciary duties get broader meaning. This issue is 
important due to the relations between the fiduciary duties of Shari’ah boards and directors’ duty 
to promote the success of the company under the Companies Act 2006. In this regard, Shari’ah 
boards’ fiduciary duties do not always increase company’s financial interests as financial 
interests must be followed according to Shari’ah principles. In fact, Shari’ah scholars act as 
Mujtahid, and accordingly their fatwas, interpretations and views over the Shari’ah compliance 
aspects of financial products and operation affect the profitability of financial institutions and the 
integrity of markets. In this manner, Shari’ah scholars are responsible to align the interests of 
financial institutions and investors with Shari’ah principles in a moderate way.  
 
  4.3.1 Fiduciary Relationship in the Context of Modern Corporate Law   
 
   The economic-oriented perception towards corporate law has affected legal theories, and 
accordingly the concept of fiduciary relationships and duties. In this regard, since law is the 
result of the constant evolution of the economic and market circumstances, the concept and 
scope of fiduciary duties are not excepted. In the context of financial markets, although legal 
traditions seek to define the concept of fiduciary based on the reasonable behaviour, the 
economic tradition pull it to rational behaviour.449 The emphasis of modern portfolio theory is on 
rational (self-interest) behaviour and accordingly its approach has deemphasized the conception 
of fiduciary based on prudence characterized by wisdom to regard effects of investment on 
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others.450 While reasonableness requires respect for society’s interest and avoiding speculation, 
rationality requires a utilitarian approach toward corporation. The former resembles the 
shareholders primacy theory and latter stakeholder theory of the modern corporation. 
   However, an efficient approach requires the combination of both theories, as rationale 
viewpoint helps in directing fiduciaries attention to the maximization of shareholders and keeps 
their decisions free from personal conflict of interests,451 and accordingly reasonable view is 
concerned about the long-term effects of financial decisions on the society. In this regard, 
according to the Companies Act 2006, the primacy of shareholders’ value and the responsibility 
of directors to act in the best interests of the company reflect a more inclusive approach to value 
since it regards long-term relationships and seeks to balance the different interests of 
stakeholders.452 It establishes the concept of Enlightened Shareholder Value in s 172(1) with 
regard to the duty of directors to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole.453  
   regarding the fiduciary duties of Shari’ah boards to Islamic financial institutions, since the 
UK financial system is based on market economy with no privilege for Islamic finance, its laws 
encompass no religious characteristic and accordingly principles of Shari’ah are regarded ethical 
not legal. However, the operation of Islamic financial institutions based on both conventional 
laws and Shari’ah principles has some implications for Shari’ah boards. In other words, despite 
the lack of statutory place for Shari’ah boards in the UK corporate law, since directors are 
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responsible for the ultimate direction and management of the corporate the fiduciary relation of 
Shari’ah boards with Islamic financial institutions should be analysed with regard to their 
fiduciary duties defined in the Companies Act 2006. Further, the Law Commission consultation 
paper No. 124 explains that when there is no status-based fiduciary relationship which it falls 
within an existing category such as trustee and beneficiary, the recognition of fiduciary 
relationship should be based on facts and the test is based on discretion to act for another and 
vulnerability.454  
   Vulnerability in the context of investment decisions arises when investors lack knowledge or 
expertise with regard to financial decisions. In other words, as professor kay says: ‘vulnerability 
is closely associated with information asymmetry.’455 Vulnerability in the context of Islamic 
finance encompasses a dual characteristic as it implies religious and conventional aspects 
together. Regarding implications of the UK corporate law for Shari’ah boards as fiduciaries, s. 
172 contains the duty of directors to promote the success of the company and this ‘core duty’ is 
regarded as a successor to the duty to act bona fide in the best interest of the company which was 
the predominant duty before the codification of the duties.456 In the case of Aberdeen Railway 
Co v Blaikie Brothers, Lord Cranworth said that: ‘a corporate body can only act by agents, and it 
is of course the duty of those agents so to act as best to promote the interests of the corporation 
whose affairs they are conducting.’457 Also in Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v 
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Meyer, Lord Denning said the duty of directors ‘was to do their best to promote its business..’458  
   In this regard, the fiduciary duties of Shari’ah boards, although religious and based on 
principles of Shari’ah, should be interpreted and carried out by reference to general objectives of 
Islamic financial institutions established based on the UK laws. On this subject, the consistency 
between Shari’ah and fiduciary duties of Shari’ah boards in Anglo-American Corporate Law 
system requires an enabling and inclusive interpretation of Shari’ah. This argument is concerned 
with ex ante and ex post issues such as product engineering (Shari’ah-compliant products) and 
auditing to assess the Shari’ah compliance of Islamic financial institutions operation. In this 
regard, as board of directors is the ultimate responsible body to shareholders, it is imperative to 
analyse the fiduciary duties of Shari’ah boards with regard to directors’ duties. This argument in 
the context of post-financial crisis environment requires paying heed to macro-economic 
policies. In other words, micro-economic policies (accordingly, fiduciary relationships between 
director and financial institution, and Shari’ah board and the institution) must regard 
macro-economic concerns such as stability. This policy revolves around two aims: the first is to 
encourage long-term value creation over short-term profits; and the second is to restore trust and 
confidence in the investment chain.459 Accordingly, Shari’ah boards as fiduciaries like directors 
should consider macro-economic goals in their rulings and reports. This implies a broad 
responsibility for Shari’ah boards to improve living standard and widening economic opportunity 
for the many by a flexible and inclusive interpretation of Shari’ah.460  
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4.3.2 The Fiduciary Obligations of Shari’ah Boards 
 
   The dominant legal approach in the analysis of fiduciary relationship follows a syllogistic 
examination and clarification form.461 This syllogistic approach reveals diversity of fiduciary 
obligations462 which definition of their scope is not a simple task.463 Particularly, development in 
judicial concepts over the time led to significant changes in the modern content of fiduciary 
duties over the last decade. 464  For instance, in Lac Minerals Ltd v. International Corona 
Resources Ltd, La Forest stated that: ‘not every legal claim arising out of a relationship with 
fiduciary incidents will give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty’.465 in this regard, Millett 
LJ in Bristol & West Building Society v. Mothew stated that: ‘the expression ‘fiduciary duty’ is 
properly confined to those duties which are peculiar to fiduciaries and the breach of which 
attracts legal consequences differing from those consequent upon the breach of other duties. 
Unless the expression is so limited it is lacking in practical utility. In this sense it is obvious that 
not every breach of duty by a fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary duty.’466 Further, ‘the concern of 
the law in a fiduciary relationship is not negligence or breach of contract’467, but loyalty.468 
Millett statement acknowledges the distinctive nature of fiduciary obligations as he says: 
‘distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty.’469 
   According to Oxford English dictionary, ‘loyalty’ refers to the quality of faithful adherence to 
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one’s obligations.470 Although, the dictionary definition reveals the essence of the concept of 
loyalty (faithful adherence to obligations), the examination of the real meaning is related to the 
functions of fiduciaries.471 In other words, ‘the fiduciary concept of loyalty is best explicated by 
reference to duties that are peculiar to fiduciaries.’ 472  ‘Loyalty’ in the context of financial 
relations implies an economic feature. In other words, the duty of ‘Loyalty’ (although with 
undefined scope) as the cornerstone of other fiduciary obligations primarily is used to protect 
economic interests.473 In this regard, loyalty implies the concept of stewardship based on trust 
and respect474which its promotion requires clarity in the concept and scope of the responsibilities 
of fiduciary.  
   Pursuing the ‘economic interests’ of beneficiary in the context of Islamic finance does not 
carry a straightforward content and accordingly techniques. Although, economic prosperity 
(falah) is one of the main objectives of Shari’ah, the existence of intense Legal pluralism in fiqh 
al-muamalat and accordingly different interpretations over the Shari’ah compliance structure and 
operation of Islamic financial institutions resulted in non-harmonized practice in the engineering 
and regulation of Islamic finance products. In this regard, the economic theme of ‘loyalty’ in the 
context of Shari’ah boards’ religious functions due to divergent interpretations presents a vague 
connotation. For instance, the recognition and expenditure of non-Shari’ah compliant incomes of 
the Islamic financial institutions by Shari’ah board bears a discretionary feature as may lead to 
abuse of position. According to this argument, due to the existence of pluralism in the 
interpretations of riba and gharar, the definition and scope of ‘loyalty’ and accordingly 
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‘economic interest’ with regard to the non-fiduciary duties of Shari’ah boards suffers from 
ambiguity. This fact affects the prophylactic feature of ‘loyalty’ as it disturbs the object of 
fiduciary duties, namely protecting the fiduciary from ‘influences that are likely to interfere with 
proper performance of the fiduciary’s non-fiduciary duties.’475  
   In this regard, the protective nature of ‘loyalty’ implies other fiduciary duties which are 
mainly negative in nature. In other words, the core duty of ‘loyalty’ requires a set of duties which 
are proscriptive rather than prescriptive as they maintain fidelity to the principal476by removing 
temptations ‘which have a tendency to sway the fiduciary away from proper performance of 
those non-fiduciary duties.’477 In the context of Islamic finance markets, those duties enhance 
investors’ confidence over structure and operation of Shari’ah compliant products as well. In this 
regard, two basic fiduciary duties, namely no conflict (interest and duty) and no profit rules have 
been recognized as the core proscriptive duties in all fiduciary relationships.478 In other words, 
this argument reveals the function of fiduciary rules, namely controlling opportunism. 479 
Opportunism generally, in the context of finance bears a strong pecuniary characteristic, and also 
implies a moral (or somehow reputational) aspect in the context of Islamic finance as Shari’ah 
scholars are highly regarded individuals and their conducts connote their actual level of 
adherence to Shari’ah moral principles such as honesty and integrity. 
   In this regard, as Johnson says: ‘fiduciary principle is a principle of natural law that has been 
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incorporated into the Anglo-American legal tradition’,480 and its natural law root is evident as 
‘many cultures repeatedly articulate the same rule.’481 However, it is worth noting that there is a 
distinction between the western notion of natural law as an epistemological rationalism which is 
known ‘as principles about nature that are logically unavoidable’ and the God-given (divinely 
dictated) perception of natural law in Islam.482 Shari’ah presents a tawhidi view over natural law 
and its emphasis is on God’s will rather than the unavoidable nature of material reality in 
existence of natural law.483 Further, although the Shi’a School and Maturidi branch of the Hanafi 
School recognize the capability of reason to discern the law, both believe that God binds 
nature.484  
   Islam as an obligation-orientated religion regards no contradiction between moral and legal 
obligations as they both are the essential parts of one system and accordingly the lack or 
deficiency of each of them results in adverse consequences for other one. Further, in Islam the 
main obligation is to God: ‘I have not created mankind and jinn except to worship me’.485 The 
tawhidi root of obligation is in the Quran gives the quality of sanctity to obligation as the 
primary responsibility is before God and he is the ultimate owner of the universe. Thus, human is 
only the trustee (fiduciary) and is obliged to serve his master properly. 
   In this regard, as explained before Shari’ah boards can be subject to the notion of Amin in 
Islamic law as they are entrusted with people property and their functions deal with advising 
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financial institutions over the Shari’ah aspects of investors’ money management. Regarding 
duties of Amin the Surah Albagharah says: ‘…then if one of you entrusts the other, let the one 
who is entrusted discharge his trust [faithfully] and let him be afraid of Allah, his Lord…’486 
However, the notion of trust or Amanah bears a general essence and its implications can be 
identified only in the particular aspects of legal relationships with the help of the modern notion 
of trust or fiduciary duties as they help to measure the strictness of liability and the enforceability 
of remedies and assess the degree of efficiency with regard to the breach of fiduciary duties.  
   In Islam, the breach of trust and confidence is regarded as khianah (betray of trust), which is 
the ultimate violation of right and justice. From the moral point of view, there have been strong 
condemnations for khianah as one of the greatest sins in Islam. As the Quran says: ‘O you who 
believe! Betray not Allah and His Messenger (pbuh), nor betray knowingly your Amanat [the 
things entrusted to you]…’.487 Also, with regard to the importance of trust and confidence the 
Quran says: ‘Verily, Allah commands that you should render back the trusts to those, to whom 
they are due’.488  
   However, the modern legal system requires the specificity and the rigorous application of 
these commands. 489  An efficient legal system is effective in compensating the injured and 
deterring potential injurer. 490  The notion of ‘liability’ in Islamic jurisprudence is about 
prohibition or lawfulness of acts, as its aim alongside regulating people social relationships 
covers relationship between man and God. Thus, earthly and afterlife provisions in Shari’ah 
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reveals the distinction between legal and moral liabilities in Islam. However, since the Quran and 
Sunnah do not present any theory over liability, Islamic jurists too have not theorized their ideas 
over civil and criminal liabilities and study each type of liability separately. Before the 
codification of civil law of Islamic countries in the twentieth century, Mejellah was the only 
source of civil law and it did not present a complete ranges of liabilities same as common law.491 
Accordingly, from a common law jurist point of view Islamic fiqh in the context of Islamic 
finance lacks specificity and enforceability mechanisms over the breach of duties and 
accordingly over the legal liabilities.        
 4.3.2.1 No Conflict of Interest  
 
    No conflict rule is the inflexible rule of equity which does not allow a fiduciary ‘to put 
himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict.’492 Similarly, in Aberdeen Railway Co 
v. Blaikie Brothers,493 Lord Cranworth L.C. said: ‘[a fiduciary will not be permitted] to enter into 
engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may 
conflict, with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect.’494 According to Pennington 
‘the underlying principle of equity is that a person who acts as representative of another is in a 
conflict of interest situation if, either at the time when he accepts appointment or subsequently 
while he acts as a representative, there is a material interest of his own… and the pursuit or 
protection of that interest would create a substantial risk that he might not act in the best way to 
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pursue or protect the interest of the person he represents’.495  
   The foregoing accounts indicate the preventive objectives of conflicts of duty and interest: the 
first is to prevent the fiduciary from ‘allowing any undisclosed personal interest to sway him 
from the proper performance of the undertaking’.496 The second is to prevent the fiduciary from 
abusing his position to further his own interest.497 In this regard, the conflict of interest occurs 
‘where a person willingly or otherwise, is placed in a position where the proper or, at least 
satisfactory discharge of a duty to another, he has assumed or been given, conflicts with his own 
interests, in terms of either his own self-advancement or in the protection of some interest’.498 
The word ‘interest’ in this context signifies a personal concern ‘of possible significant pecuniary 
value’499 which ‘may take the form of an actual, prospective, or possible profit to be made in, or 
as a result of decision he takes or the transaction he effects. Or it may take the form of an actual, 
prospective, or possible saving, or a diminution of a personal liability.’500 
   In this regard, although this rule is critically based on human nature and not founded upon 
principles of morality501, ‘fiduciary’ is regarded as a means by which law conveys its ethical 
essence to resolve human interactions502. Hence it establishes a moral essence for fiduciary 
duties such as the conflict rule as well. Further, the development of fiduciary principles reveals 
their moral root as fiduciary’s functions associated with the roles of stewards in the history of 
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early religions and businesses.503 Stewardship is described as moral agency or representative of 
God504 and the King as God’s representative was responsible for supervising people’s accords 
‘and who must avoid preoccupation with the trappings of office while observing the law.’505 In 
this context, the modern fiduciary rules are secularized religious traditions applied to commercial 
undertaking.506 Thus, despite the lack of moral approach to modern fiduciary law, fiduciary 
duties require ‘selflessness and a willingness to subordinate the fiduciary’s interests to that of 
another.’507 This argument is consistent with Islamic ethics simce loyalty and trust (amanah), 
with centrality of monotheism, are applicable principles to all aspects of human’s life (ebadiat 
and muamalat).  
   In this regard, one category of conflict of interest and duty could be unauthorised 
remuneration within which a fiduciary obtains financial benefits beyond what is authorised.508as 
Lord Normand signified: ‘some who are subject to the [fiduciary] duty are never entitled to 
remuneration; some are ex lege entitled to payment for their services; some are entitled to 
payment ex conventione, and some are entitled to payment if the settlor or testator so directs. The 
rule is the same for all: it is not that reward for services is repugnant to the fiduciary duty but that 
he who has the duty shall not take any secret remuneration or any financial benefit not authorised 
by the law, or by his contract, or by the trust deed under which he acts, as the case may be.’509 
Therefore, the purpose of the rule is to prevent unauthorised profits being made through bribes or 
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   In the context of Islamic finance, the concern over the possibility of Shari’ah boards being 
influenced by financial inducement lacks a solid ground as their consultancy fees are irrelevant 
to the outcome of their decisions and payments to them by Islamic financial institutions are for 
their efforts in analysing financial documentation.510 In this regard, it is possible that the interest 
of Shari’ah boards’ members as shareholders in another competitor financial institution such as a 
bank conflicts with their duty. For example, their announcement on a new financial product may 
affect their interest in another financial institution where they are shareholders. However, this 
argument lacks a concrete ground for unauthorised remuneration as there is no possibility and 
record for bribing or getting secret commission by the relevant financial institution. Further, the 
nature of the relationship does not let Shari’ah scholars like a financial advisor or an agent to get 
unauthorised remuneration.511 Thus, due to the lack of a ‘real sensible possibility of conflict’512, 
there is no room for further argument in this category with regard to Shari’ah boards’ relationship 
with financial institutions. 
   As said before, the word ‘fiduciary’ in the context of Islamic finance bears a strong religious 
aspect as the main desire of Shari’ah sensitive investors is to gain halal earnings and financial 
services. In this context the conflict of interest may occur when Shari’ah boards do not discharge 
their duties impartially as they ‘assist financial institutions in coming up with as many 
Shari’ah-compliant products and services as possible’513 and ignore their non-Shari’ah compliant 
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operations. In other words, although from the financial point of view they may regard the 
economic interest of investors properly, they may disregard Shari’ah (or religious) aspects of 
their interest. This argument particularly is worthy of attention as the current practice in the 
industry shows high payments to Shari’ah boards’ members without any formal supervision from 
financial industry.  
  4.3.2.2 Conflict of Duties 
 
    Loyalty and integrity construct the moral root of fiduciary as they prevent any opportunistic 
behaviour and accordingly protect interests of the principal. This argument in the context of 
commercial relations reflects the aim of fiduciary rules to provide certainty and security in 
transactions. Same as the conflict of interest, the conflict of duties involves the breach of 
undivided loyalty as multiple fiduciary engagements prevent the adequate discharge of 
obligations without conflicting with another.514 Similarly, Millett L.J. said: ‘a fiduciary who acts 
for two principals with potentially conflicting interests…is in breach of the obligation of 
undivided loyalty; he puts himself in a position where his duty to one principal may conflict with 
his duty to the other…515 Further, conflict of duties arises ‘where a person finds himself in the 
position of owing duties to two or more persons, the satisfactory discharge or execution of which 
would neither fully account for, nor possibly satisfy the due expectations of one or, indeed, 
both.’ 516  In Fullwood v Hurley the inconsistency of serving two or more masters is 
acknowledged by Scrutton L.J as he says: ‘No agent who has accepted an employment from one 
principal can in law accept an engagement inconsistent with his duty to the first principal from a 
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second principal…’517  
   However, multiple employments are not offensive in itself and does not contribute to the 
breach of fiduciary duty.518 The breach of duty arises where there is an actual or potential 
conflict or conflicts between duties owed in each relationship 519 which is reasonably 
foreseeable520 and can be realized according to the relevant circumstances in each relationship. 
This subjective approach requires looking at specific characteristics of each client in each 
relationship to find ‘a real conflict of duty and interest and not to some theoretical or rhetorical 
conflict.’521 Regarding the multiple employments of Shari’ah scholars by financial institutions 
and the possibility of the breach of their duties related to their different fiduciary relationships, it 
is now clear that the mere multiple employments by various financial institutions cannot be 
considered the breach of conflict rule. However, the possibility of actual conflicts requires us to 
consider and examine the characteristics of Shari’ah scholars’ duties. 
   As explained before, the function of Shari’ah scholars in the context of Islamic finance is 
mainly to advise522over Shari’ah issues and also audit the Shari’ah compliance operation of 
Islamic financial institutions. In this regard, Shari’ah boards do not advise like a financial advisor 
or solicitor about gain and loss of transactions. 523  Although their advisory function covers 
Shari’ah activities of financial institutions, it necessitates the study and analyse of several pages 
of financial reports and plans. Accordingly, this laborious duty requires a lot of time and efforts 
as Shari’ah scholars should be aware over each issue and give advice whenever is needed. 
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   In this context, since the power of human in carrying out several tasks properly at the same 
time is restricted, it is hard to assume, Shari’ah scholars are able to come up with their functions 
properly according to their clients’ interests as well. Another possibility of the conflict of duty in 
Shari’ah boards multiple functions and employments may arise when they get confidential 
information about new financial products from their competitor clients (financial institutions). As 
discussed before, the breach of confidence and trust in Islam is regarded as khianah (betray of 
the trust) as the ultimate violation of justice and right. As Ali ibn-Abitalib says: ‘every person 
discloses a secret which was entrusted to him, definitely he has betrayed.’524  
   This issue is the context of competitive markets is more important as the confidentiality of 
information about the structure of new products are more crucial. The importance of 
confidentiality is acknowledged by the IFSB too. According to its principles: ‘Shari`ah board 
members should ensure that internal information obtained in the course of their duties is kept 
confidential’ and ‘Where a member of the Shari’ah board or Shari’ah advisory firm serves 
several IIFS simultaneously, the issue arises as to how they handle confidential or commercially 
sensitive information obtained in the course of performing their duties. It is a key concern of 
professional ethics that confidential or sensitive information obtained by a member of the 
Shari`ah board or Shari`ah advisory firm while serving an IIFS should not be used by them in 
ways that could be detrimental to that IIFS, particularly in ways that might give a competitive 
advantage to its competitors.’525 This approach by the IFSB is consistent with Loyalty and good 
faith as the ethical root of fiduciary law and accordingly implies the risk of liability for Shari’ah 
scholars in any conflicting situation in their fiduciary relationships. This issue may be more 
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convoluted when the obtained confidential information is relevant to subsequent matter and 
disclosure of it to the latter client is the breach of duty to the former and not to the latter client.526 
Particularly, it may arise when there is a contractual responsibility as the observance of 
confidentiality is in the terms of the contract for service of Shari’ah board. In this regard, IFSB 
principles says: ‘to facilitate observance of confidentiality, an IIFS shall ensure that the terms of 
reference in the contract for service of the Shari`ah board or its members expressly set out that 
they shall preserve and secure the confidentiality and secrecy of business and market-sensitive 
information shared with them by the IIFS. An arrangement should be made to brief and/or clarify 
to the Shari`ah board or its members the importance of careful preservation of confidential and 
market-sensitive information. Every member of the Shari`ah board should sign a non-disclosure 
agreement or a letter of undertaking affirming their obligation to observe confidentiality and 
secrecy in respect of business and market-sensitive information shared with them by the IIFS.’527  
   However, by fiduciary law it is possible through complete disclosure about conflicts and 
getting consent of clients to avoid breaching this duty.528 This requires disclosure about all facts 
that may affect the interest of clients.529 In the context of Islamic finance, due to the existence of 
multiple employments and conflicting interests in Shari’ah boards’ functions, the disclosure of 
conflicts could be impractical solution.530 Further, the dearth of Shari’ah scholars531 and the 
multiple employments of Shari’ah scholars imply a kind of consciousness and intention in the 
industry. In other words, practically financial institutions surrender their rights to Shari’ah 
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boards.    
   4.3.2.2.1 No Profit Rule 
 
    The profit rule like the other fiduciary rules is based on moral concerns and aims to prevent 
the abuse of a fiduciary’s position. 532                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
It ‘prohibits a fiduciary from taking decisions with the principal purpose in mind of furthering 
his own interests.’533 in this regard, numerous authorities treat the profit rule as the subset of 
conflict rule. for example Lord Upjohn in Boardman v Phipps says: ’the relevant rule for the 
decision of this case is the fundamental rule of equity that a person in a fiduciary capacity must 
not make a profit out of his trust which is part of the wider rule that a trustee must not place 
himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict.’534 However, English case law 
considers these rules separate. Morritt LJ in Don King Productions v Warren says: ‘it is 
appropriate to consider separately each of the standards’535 and ‘would be superfluous if analysis 
of one necessarily captured whatever results the other might reveal.’536 the strict rule of no profit 
is acknowledged by Lord Russell of Killowen in Regal (Hasting) Ltd. v Gulliver: ‘The rule of 
equity which insists on those, who by the use of a fiduciary position make a profit, being liable to 
account for that profit, in no way depends on fraud, or absence of bona fides; or upon such 
questions or considerations as whether the profit would or should otherwise have gone to the 
plaintiff, or whether the profiteer was under a duty to obtain the source of the profit for the 
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plaintiff, or whether he took a risk or acted as he did for the benefit of the plaintiff, or whether 
the plaintiff has in fact been damaged or benefited by his action. The liability arises from the 
mere fact of the profit having, in the stated circumstances, been made. The profiteer, although, 
honest and well intentioned, cannot escape the risk of being called to account.’537 In the context 
of Islamic finance, Shari’ah scholars are obliged to avoid using confidential information to 
accumulate wealth or following a self-dealing approach in doing their duties without the consent 
of financial institutions.  
  4.4 Confidentiality 
 
   The nature of fiduciary relationship carries a strict duty of good faith for the fiduciary as 
requires him to act in the best interest of the beneficiary. In this regard, one of the most crucial 
aspects of good faith in the context of financial relationships is confidentiality. According to Sir 
John Donaldson MR: ‘there is an inherent public interest in individual citizens and the state 
having an enforceable right to the maintenance confidence.’538 The importance of confidentiality 
rests on the idea of the protection of competitive power of a business over its rivals.539 In fact, 
economic justifications and commercial ethics build the analytical basis of the law of confidence 
and accordingly remedies for the unauthorised disclosure of the information.540 On this subject, 
although ‘the relationship of the parties never extended beyond one created by and limited to the 
giving and receipt of confidential information’541and fiduciary duties has been kept distinct from 
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the duty to respect confidentiality, the protection of confidential information is recognised as an 
integral part of a fiduciary relationship.542  
    In this regard, the importance of the protection of information in a confidential relationship 
reflects the juridical justification for a relation known as confidential. According to equity and 
contract law a confidential relation must have ‘necessary quality of confidence.’ 543  In this 
regard, the relationship between a Shari’ah board and an Islamic financial institution 
demonstrates a deep confidential quality as information given by the Islamic financial institution 
to Shari’ah scholars carries a non-public characteristic as bears high potentiality to affect the 
competitive power of the institution. In the context of Islamic finance, confidential information 
may be addressed in two parts: 1- information given by the Islamic financial institution with 
regard to its financial condition such as problems, challenges and abilities; 2-Information related 
to the structure of Shari’ah-compliant products and related fatwas. In this regard, the clarification 
of confidential information in Islamic financial institutions requires the definition of 
‘confidential information’ in English Law. There are plenty of references in various cases over 
the definition of confidential information. However, there has been no identical definition and it 
is possible that ‘… no general definition can be given of confidential information-secrecy in this 
context is a chameleon”.544 As mentioned before having the quality of confidentiality is the main 
feature of confidential information. 545  Lord Green in Saltman declared that:’ confidential 
information must not be something which is public knowledge.’546 Also, Lord Denning Believes 
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confidential information should be out of ‘public domain’ 547  and it depends upon the 
circumstance of the case.548 this subjective approach is confirmed by Megarry V. C. in Thomas 
Marshall (Exports) Ltd v. Guinle case: ‘If one turns from the authorities and looks at the matter 
as a question of principle, I think (and I say this very tentatively because the principle has not 
been argued out) that four elements may be discerned which may be of some assistance in 
identifying confidential information or trade secrets which the court will protect……..Secondly, I 
think the owner must believe that the information is confidential or secret, i.e. that it is not 
already in the public domain.’549  
   In this regard, the specific form of information is not considered as a requirement and 
accordingly may take any form, such as being communicated orally.550 However, it must have 
commercial potential 551 and also ability to affect the competition power of the confider. In 
assessing the confidentiality of information given by the Islamic financial institution to its 
Shari’ah board with regard to its functions such as giving advice on engineering of new 
Shari’ah-compliant financial instrument and the operation of the institution (Shari’ah audit), 
since the given information is not in public domain and carries commercial essence can be 
regarded as confidential. Accordingly, it gives the Islamic financial institution ‘a right to pursue a 
breach of confidence action to remedy any unauthorised use or disclosure of information by the 
Shari’ah boars.’552  
   In this regard, the second requirement for confidential information is the establishment of a 
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reasonable confidential relationship in which the information had been imparted in confidence 
and ‘the confidant ought reasonably to have known that the information had been imparted in 
confidence.’ 553  In the context of fiduciary relationships carrying financial characters, the 
existence of the relationship of confidence is relatively straightforward, as confidentiality has 
been a recognised feature.554 Further, its existence is not dependent on any specific form of 
relationship such as contractual or equitable. In this regard, the examination of the purpose of 
disclosed information, whether it is disclosed for a limited purpose or not, is considered as a test 
for the existence of information. 555  This objective approach has been approved in several 
cases.556  
   In the context of Islamic finance, for instance a non-public information given by the Islamic 
financial institution to its Shari’ah board to develop a new financial product with regard to its 
client’s specific needs, reflects a ‘limited purpose’ under which the confidential relationship is 
established. The application of limited purpose test is an objective evaluation and applicable to 
contractual and equitable relationships. The relationship of Shari’ah board’s members with the 
Islamic finance basically is contractual and implies a promise to use disclosed information with 
good faith and fidelity. However, as mentioned earlier, the establishment of confidential 
relationship is not contingent on a contractual relationship. In other words, confidentiality is a 
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general and broad-based obligation, even where the parties are contractually linked.557 Hence, 
the concepts of conscience and good faith as the broad equitable obligations 558  present 
confidentiality a presupposed state between the members of Shari’ah board and the Islamic 
financial institution.   
  4.5 Accountability 
 
    In common law it is the Fiduciary law that imposes the most significant duties of 
stewardship.559 In the context of corporate law, the main objective of those duties is to deter and 
control opportunitism and accordingly the conflict of interest or agency problems. However, it is 
not clear how conflicting duties and interests might be effectively dealt with. In this regard, 
accountability is an essential concept in the efficient governance of legal relations. It generally 
refers to a relationship between a fiduciary and a forum based on established legal rules, 
traditions (civil or criminal) and procedures upon which a fiduciary is obliged to explain his 
decisions and the forum can pronounce judgement. In other words, justification and enforcement 
are the main elements of an effective accountability. In the context of Islamic finance, directors 
and investors give Shari’ah boards a stewardship position to control the Shari’ah compliance of 
products and operations and accordingly expect punishment not a simple answerability when 
they fail to meet their duties. As Porter points out accountability ‘implicitly embodies the notion 
of exposure to punishment in the event of unsatisfactory discharge of duties.’ 560  In fact, 
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deterrence as the characteristic of accountability provides assurance about the legitimacy of 
governance process561 as reduces risk of misconduct and enhances investor’s confidence. In the 
context of Islamic law, the obligation to look after others property with loyalty and care bears 
religious and moral characteristics rather than a legal obligation in modern sense. The concept of 
fiduciary in Islamic law is not expressed and strict as in common law562 , and accordingly 
Shari’ah scholars have not reached to a uniform idea over their fiduciary duties in the context of 
Islamic finance. Further, due to the lack of contractual and non-contractual perception over 
fiduciary duties in Islamic law, it is not clear how a Shari’ah court would impose liability for 
breach of them.563In this regard, uncertainty in the interpretation and application of Shari’ah led 
to ambiguity in Shari’ah boards’ scope of fiduciary duties and accordingly uncertainty in their 
accountability. In this regard, It is assumed that law as ‘one of society’s most important tool for 
directing behaviour’ to enhance efficiency, autonomy and distributive justice564 as its uncertainty 
destabilises not only predictability in decisions, also welfare of people. In the context of Islamic 
finance, this uncertainty would weaken the possibility of establishing an effective forum (internal 
or external) for controlling the efficiency of Shari’ah boards’ rulings and their royalty in doing 
their duties.    
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  4.6 Conclusion 
 
   This chapter examined the legal relation between Shari’ah boards and Islamic financial 
institutions in the context of UK laws. It found that since the Companies Act 2006 and common 
law define no legal place for Shari’ah boards, we should examine their position with regard to 
fiduciary law concepts established in common law. In this regard, the recognition of a fiduciary 
relationship according to the fact-based approach is based on some factors. As in Lac Minerals 
Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd and Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical 
Corp is explained, the existence of trust, vulnerability, discretion or confidentiality factors in a 
relationship indicate its fiduciary quality. In the context of Islamic finance, the nature of their 
function implies a kind of trust as Islamic financial institutions and investors expect them to 
provide legitimacy of the industry. Further, the vulnerability of investors and Islamic financial 
institutions in terms of lack of Shari’ah knowledge establishes a fiduciary position for Shari’ah 
boards. Also, the discretionary power of Shari’ah boards to control the Shari’ah compliance 
operation of Islamic financial institutions is explicit in their fatwas. In this regard, the main 
concern in Shari’ah boards’ fiduciary relationships is loyalty as it protects economic and 
religious interests of investors and other beneficiaries. However, the lack of consensus over the 
concept and scope of Shari’ah led to inconsistency in expectations over their fiduciary duties.   
   Regarding fiduciary rules in the context of Islamic finance, Shari’ah boards as fiduciaries are 
required to observe the no conflict of interest, conflict of duties and no benefit rules. The no 
conflict of interest rule as the inflexible rule of equity requires Shari’ah boards’ members to not 
put themselves in a position where their interests conflict. In this regard, they must discharge 




non-Shari’ah compliant products or ignore their non-Shari’ah compliant operation. The conflict 
of duties in the context of Shari’ah boards’ functions addresses their multiple employments. In 
this context, the confidentiality of information may be violated by using them in a way that is 
detrimental to the competitive power of the Islamic financial institution which is the owner of 
information. Further, the ability of Shari’ah boards’ members in carrying out several functions at 
same time in different Islamic financial institution has raised questions over the quality of their 
practice. The no benefit rule prohibits Shari’ah boards’ members from taking decisions with the 
principal purpose of furthering their own interests. In this regard, for instance, they must not use 




























  5.1 Introduction 
 
   The discussion over the duties of Shari’ah boards in the context of modern Islamic finance is 
the continuation of the authority of Shari’ah jurist (faqih) in Islamic law. The term ‘authority’ 
implies a kind of power to influence the structure and operation of an institution. In the context 
of Islamic finance it implies a religious power to influence the form and operation of Islamic 
financial products and institutions. Historically, the authority of Shari’ah jurists has not reflected 
a regulated and defined concept and as a consequence resulted in ambiguity over the duties of 
Shari’ah boards. Shari’ah authority and compliance have been known as the reflection of the 
authority of a specific madhab. Thus, the concept and the scope of law may differ according to 
each madhab. Further, the notion of ‘authority’ reflects a functional nature as historically, 
Shari’ah jurists and governmental authorities have been responsible for the well-being of people 
and discharged those duties through issuing fatwa and the institution of Hisbah as the monitoring 
and enforcement mechanism. In this regard, the main function of Shari’ah boards is conceived to 
be Shari’ah compliance auditing. However, their non-defined functions and also the lack of a 




the financial institutions. This chapter examines the concept of authority and duties of Shari’ah 
boards from this point of view. The first part deliberates on the concept of ‘authority’ in the 
context of Islamic law and positivism. The next parts address the practical duties of Shari’ah 
boards and examine their implications for risk mitigation in the industry. 
  5.2 Authority and Shari’ah Ruling in Islamic Finance 
 
   In the legal arguments the notion of ‘authority’ is a complex concept. Its essential role in any 
discussion over the legitimacy of authorities’ actions reflects its crucial role in the development 
of a legal system. In the context of Islamic finance, legal authority bears a dual concept as its 
legality is subject to religious factors. In this regard, the discussion over the authority of 
Shari’ah boards with regard to their duties such as auditing Shari’ah compliance (as the main 
and distinctive feature of the Islamic finance industry) of Islamic financial institutions, presents 
a pivotal concept. The power of Shari’ah boards reflects the alleged incompatibility of authority 
with reason, ‘for reason requires that one should always act on the balance of reasons of which 
one is aware’ and in contrast ‘it is of the nature of authority that it requires submission even 
when one thinks that what is required is against reason.’565 In this context, authority in the form 
of taghlid (imitation) in Islamic law is seen as a complete acquiescence to the opinions of 
Shari’ah jurists. In this regard, Shari’ah boards’ rulings as the expression of authority indicate a 
kind of power over Islamic financial institutions since they provide legality and legitimacy of 
their operation. To illustrate the authority of Shari’ah boards in the context of Islamic finance 
industry, it is necessary to study concept of authority in positivism. 
 
                                                          





   5.2.1 The Nature of Authority in the Context of Positivism 
 
   Authority is a practical concept in positive Law and rests on a non-relativized sense.566 in 
Finnis words: ‘a person treats something as authoritative if and only if he treats it as giving him 
sufficient reason for believing or acting in accordance with it notwithstanding that he himself 
cannot otherwise see good reason for so believing or acting, or cannot evaluate the reasons he 
can see, or sees some countervailing reasons, or would himself otherwise (i.e. in the absence of 
what it is that he is treating as authoritative) have preferred not so to believe or act.’567 Authority 
is an ability to change the normative situation568 such as creating obligations and rights on the 
part of others. This ability acknowledges a close relation between normative power and 
authority.569 Further, authority as a kind of power over others is the ability to change reasons for 
actions.570 This power is not only about the orders and laying down rules, but it can be a kind of 
influence over others actions. In other words, the power of authority can be derived from 
external (such as office and legal system) or internal (the charismatic influence of religious 
leaders) sources. 
   In the context of positivism, authority reflects a more functional than personal nature. In this 
regard, the concept of authority is rooted in human intellectual experience, as the identification 
of law and its moral value comes from a legal system established by human logic and mainly 
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supported by state and courts.571 This argument expresses the nature of legal positivism as ‘the 
legal positivist proceeds from the assumption that the law is a constituent element of social 
reality, in other words, that is exists as an institutional fact which is to be grasped and explained 
by legal science. Cognition of law is conceived of as cognition of a social reality. Accordingly it 
is a form of cognition which is dependent on experience….the legal positivist does not assume 
any a priori criteria of rightness of law which would be valid independently of human volition 
and of human institutions.’572 Hence, reasoning in legal positivism is a sub-species of practical 
reasoning since the modern and actual positive law is the result of state’s economic and financial 
policies.573 Also, the methods of interpretation belong to the positive institutionalised elements 
of law as social reality.574 Accordingly, the establishment and the content of law are based on the 
legal structure built by state as the ultimate national authority, and in the context of international 
financial law by governmental or non-governmental international standard and policy setting 
organizations. 
   This argument justifies the economic approach to law as the functional efficiency of authority 
in the context of financial and commercial markets is related to the economic efficiency of 
decisions. This reveals wealth maximization as the underlying ethical foundation of law in 
positivism. In this regard, the contractarian nature of firm requires agents (managers and board of 
directors) to interpret and perform their functions according to the normative essence of wealth 
maximization. As a consequence, the direct and indirect social functions (the actual social 
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consequences of the law)575 of financial institutions are the expression of economic and legal 
policy of the legal system which secures their fulfilment. 
   The normative function of wealth maximization in the context of global financial markets 
bears a dual essence: micro as the expression of individualism and liberalism (such as freedom of 
contract); macro as the expression of social concerns of national and international legal orders. 
Wealth maximization in the context of corporate law establishes a normative foundation for the 
functions of authority (board of directors and other agents). For instance, corporate law Acts as 
the enabling means allow managers to establish the systems of governance without close 
examination from regulatory authorities. 576  In this regard, for instance the institution of 
‘business judgement rule’ in the US legal system reflects a lenient approach by which US courts 
approve and acknowledge freehand managers authority over corporate resources and 
shareholders' investment.577 In the UK, section 174 of the UK companies Act 2006 indicates the 
duties of directors (subjective and objective) with no reference to the business judgement rule. 
Although it requires a general knowledge and skill with regard to their functions, they should be 
considered in connection with the duty to promote the success of the company mentioned in 
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section 172.578 In other words, the centralized decision-making and authority, as the essential 
attribute of an efficient corporate governance system, implies a central goal for all who are 
involved in corporate business (such as auditors, lawyers and advisers) which should be 
considered in their functions. 
   The concept of authority in the context of international financial order is established based on 
rules which do not come from the force of state, but from the social acceptance of legal 
obligations. 579  As discussed before, international financial and commercial laws are the 
productions of non-state actors. In fact, globalization has led to the transformation of economic 
and legal rules, and accordingly policy making processes in different aspects particularly in 
finance. In this regard, traditional rule-making and governance processes (with central role of 
government) reciprocally compete with an increasing number of non-state actors in the 
international financial governance system.580 In this regard, the concept of authority in the 
context of transnational legal order reflects a pervasive and non-restricted nature in producing a 
certain kind of order that solve problems.581 In this regard, authority encompasses the associated 
public and private actors (such as international organizations and academic sources) that order 
behaviour without any direct force from states.582  In other words, the concept of law in the 
context of transnational legal order is a social construct with a normative characteristic within a 
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normative group. In the context of transnational legal order, law presents a cosmopolitan 
characteristic in which authoritative power comes from normative community and is not 
surrounded by state boundaries.583 In this normative community (such as IMF and world bank) 
‘the internal reflective attitude exists in both norm givers and norm users’ towards rules, hence 
there is a more binding meaning for the concept of ‘in force’ than one is applied to municipal 
legal systems.584 In other words, although these transnational legal norms are not formally 
binding in themselves, ‘they are intended to stimulate law-making in nation-states’.585 Further, 
the authority of a normative grouping like International finance and commerce is mainly 
non-hierarchical and lacks a formal top-down authority with regard to distribution of 
functions. 586  The authority of the normative group is recognisable from its normative 
consequences. In other words, opting out the normative rules raises negative attitudes of other 
group members.587    
   Norms, values and accordingly, the functions’ of authority in the context of legal positivism 
depends on experience and cannot be justified purely cognitively.588 Further, the functional 
notion of authority is attributed to the function of one’s position or office (in authority) with 
established professional rules and expectations which experience changes according to the 
requirements of new state and environment.    
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  5.2.2 The Nature of Authority in Islamic Law 
 
   The Concept of authority in Islamic law carries a dynamic nature. As professor Hallaq 
explains: ‘in Islamic law, authority-which is at once religious and moral but mostly epistemic in 
nature-has always encompassed the power to set in motion the inherent processes of continuity 
and change.’589 Further, it has experienced various stages and process of change, from absolute 
ijtihad to a relatively limited set of doctrines based on school’s (madhab) doctrinal structure.590 
In this context, taqlid (imitation) is regarded as the path of continuity in Islamic law. It 
encompasses the general acceptance of the doctrines and the intellectual authority of past 
jurists.591 Further, taqlid is a process by which mughalid scholar accepts the methodology and 
knowledge of the eponym to achieve authority (not necessary intellectual) that could act as the 
force.592 In other words, while the approach of early scholars was purely ijtihadic by which they 
were able to establish the authority of their intellectual endeavour in its content completely, those 
in the regime of taqlid establish such an authority in a school or an individual to validate his 
legal opinions.593 In fact, the authority in the regime of taqlid is based on the legal tradition of 
the associated school and its established doctrines rather to the primary sources of authority 
(scripture).594  In the context of modern Islamic finance, this statement reveals the essentiality 
of another element in the process of taqlid, namely positivism. 
   Science is an important part of the modern legal reasoning. Particularly in the area of finance 
its interdisciplinary nature requires the knowledge of finance and economics too. As discussed 
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before, the significance of economic value and the efficiency of financial products necessitates 
revisiting the idea of ijtihad and taghlid in Islamic finance.  In this regard, to facilitate 
internationalisation of Islamic finance and to enhance its value proposition for the global 
economy, it is imperative to evolve fiqh to provide an effective legal framework.595  
   In Islamic fiqh, the ultimate authority belongs to the founder of a school (absolute mujtahid) 
as the originator and the creator of legal methodology (usul al-fiqh).596 In this regard, the 
hermeneutic of founding jurist ‘is thoroughly grounded in the revealed text’597 and accordingly 
his doctrine and principles are derived from those sources.598 In this manner, the imams (leaders) 
of schools found the structure of methodology, principles and accordingly legal reasoning within 
the schools' definitions. Although, the doctrines of some later mujtahids are regarded 
authoritative, they are deemed second in Islamic law.599 For example, in the Hanafi School, the 
doctrine of Abu Hanifa, as the founder of Hanafism and his immediate followers Abu Yusuf and 
Shaybani stand at the top and no later mujtahid is permitted to diverge from them.600 As Khan 
asserts: ‘Islamic fiqh permits no interpretive revolution.....precedent provides continuity and 
prevents normative shocks to the enterprise of Islamic fiqh. While each generation of jurists may 
freely interpret the Basic Code, no generation is allowed to subvert prior interpretive series by 
lifting all methodological constraints and completely discarding all previous entries. A strong 
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presumption of continuity applies to fiqh.”601 As a result of this continuum, tradition has got 
decisive place in fiqh and accordingly in the formation of different modes of authority as it has 
transformed pure ijtihad into the taqlid regime.602 
   The significance of the authority of madhhab is to the extent that a denial or any attempt to 
step outside of the boundaries of school is not acceptable and in a technical language is called 
tafarrudat or gharib to show the divergence from authoritative doctrine.603  However, the 
concept of authority and taqlid is not restricted to the doctrines and encompasses the established 
principles of School with regard to different cases.604 In this regard, unlike the case-by-case 
style of founders with regard to questions through the istifta, later works shows a hierarchical 
structure, wherein general principles are presented for solving future problems.605 This transition 
from strict casuistry to a generalization illustrates the development of taqlid within the fiqh.606 
As a consequence ‘the preoccupation of the authors is not with textual attestations from the 
Quran or the Sunna, but rather with authoritative principles that have dominated the school.’607 
In this regard, the concept of 'legality' within the context of taqlid reveals its two related aspects: 
one part is considered from the layman point of view and another one is considered from the 
authorities of Schools. While in the latter, jurists and Shari'ah experts examine the level of 
loyalty to the principles and methodology of school, the former encompasses the extent of 
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acceptance of the given opinion (without any technical study) by layman. In other words, in 
compare to the jurists of schools, the authority in fiqh from a layman point of view is purely 
individual. Further, the institutionalization of taqlid is believed  was mainly for limiting the 
discretionary power of lower legal officials as they were obliged to adhere to a particular 
school.608 In this regard, it is discussed that institutionalization of taqlid by collecting and 
organizing cases and fatwas enhances predictability, prevents Muslims to obtain legal rulings 
from other schools or adhere to isolated opinions, and at the same time compels scholars to 
adhere to school's established principles and methodology.609 However, due to inflexibilities in 
sole adherence to one school and applying the rigid system of taqlid, the most of scholars from 
all schools did accept the practice of talfiq to validate an act whose individual parts would not be 
recognized as valid.610         
  5.3 Legality in Positivism 
 
   The Perception of legality requires an exploration over the concept of Law in positivism. 
The Concept of Law in positivism is discussed in the context of legal system as laws have some 
common qualities. In this regard, various scholars have presented different definitions. For 
example, while Austin regards Law as a command of sovereign upheld by the threat of a 
sanction, Kelsen considers a law as a norm directing officials on imposing sanctions within a 
legal system. In this regard, the concept of legal system in a broad sense is not only comprised 
of laws, also all of other legal rules with no necessity for applicability of those laws or legal 
                                                          






rulings.611 As Kelsen explains: ‘this dynamic concept differs from the concept of law defined as 
a coercive norm. According to this concept, law is something that is created by a certain process, 
and everything created this way is law. This dynamic concept, however, is only apparently a 
concept of law. It contains no answer to the question of what is the essence of law, what is the 
criterion by which law can be distinguished from other social norms. This dynamic concept 
furnishes an answer only to the question whether or not and why a certain norm belongs to a 
system of valid legal norms, forms a part of a certain legal order.’612 However, some scholars, 
such as Hart illustrates that the legal characteristic of rules can be derived only from their 
connection with a legal system. He argues that since the norms of any legal system are products 
of officials (human agents), it is possible that legal norms have no essence since their place is 
derived from actions of agents in a specific social environment.613 In other words, the external 
applicability of rules by legal institutions such as courts and academics illustrates the 
effectiveness of those rules in the context of a legal system.   
   Legal norms refer to human behaviour in a given time and place and accordingly, their 
applicability and effectiveness are contingent on agents (courts or other formal and informal 
judicial authorities) behaviour. 614  In this regard, the qualification and modification of the 
conditions of applicability of norms in a legal system is an individualized process done by 
agents. Also, their effectiveness is ‘a function to the extent to which it is compiled with by the 
agents to whom it applies.’615 Practically, the interactive nature of the norms of a legal system 
has some effects on the applicability of the concept of illegality. In this context, the notion of 
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illegality rests on the function of Law and agents.616 In the context of Islamic finance, the scope 
and the application of notions, law, legality and compliance depends on the function of the 
authority of Shari’ah scholars. In other words, since Shari’ah as the ultimate law in Islamic 
finance is only comprised of general principles, Islamic fiqh explains and sheds light on those 
principles through various interpretations provided by Shari’ah jurists. Further, the opinions of 
Shari’ah jurists in terms of content and process differ from the concept of law in positivism. In 
this regard, it is hard to consider Shari’ah opinions as law in its modern sense since they are not 
the result of a system presenting an official procedure for law making. Although, the 
constitutions of some Muslim majority jurisdictions such as Saudi Arabia establish a legal place 
for Shari’ah, they are subject to various regulatory and statutory provisions. Further, although 
the influence of Islamic fiqh in explanation of legal rules is undeniable, this is the power of state 
which gives them legal place in the given legal system. 
 
  5.4 The Implications of Economic and Financial Policy for the 
Functions of Shari'ah Boards  
 
   It is assumed that successful development is the result of long-term inclusive economic and 
financial policy. In this regard, the ability to raise the rates of accumulation of physical and 
human capital and the efficient use of the resulting assets depends on the existence of an efficient 
financial intermediation which backs ‘the establishment and expansion of institution, instruments 
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and markets that support this investment and growth process’.617 In fact, the quality of the 
functions of a financial system and its impacts on economic growth is determined by: (i) the 
level of financial intermediation; (ii) the efficiency of financial intermediation; (iii) the 
composition of financial intermediation.618  In this regards, the size of a financial system is 
important for economic growth as it affects all functions of financial intermediation. A large 
financial system reflects a progressive flexibility with regard to available credit, firms' borrowing 
power, and accordingly more investment opportunities619 as they increase the resilience of the 
economy to external shocks by effective risk diversification between different sections which 
results in more investment and economic growth.620 
   In this regard, the efficient financial intermediation addresses market imperfections such as 
externalities and asymmetric information by long-time legal and institutional policy to further 
and ease its participation and integration into international economic. In fact, the functional 
perspective towards financial intermediation approves the mentioned functions. In this regard, 
the emphasise of functional approach is on the economic functions performed by financial 
intermediaries and accordingly its structure rests on two premises: ‘1) functions change less over 
time and vary less across geopolitical boundaries; and 2) competition will cause the changes in 
institutional structure to evolve toward greater efficiency in the performance of the financial 
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system.’621 Notwithstanding, as the basic functions of all financial systems are essentially the 
same, a functional approach provides a more realistic perception over the functions of Islamic 
intermediaries as well. In this regard, to meet efficiency, intermediaries need a dynamic product 
development, interacting between them and markets through innovation. 622  In other words, 
markets and intermediaries have a complementary relation in which intermediaries reinforce 
markets by new products and in turn, markets support intermediaries to innovate more low-cost 
products.623 According to this view, a functional approach to innovation in financial policy 
making and its implications for the development of markets is more reliable as it addresses 
deficiencies and try to present functional solutions for them.  
   Generally, different functions are recognised for innovation but among them reallocating risk, 
reducing agency costs and increasing liquidity are more common.624 Although, the focus of the 
Bank for International Settlements is on the transfer of risk, the enhancement of liquidity and the 
generation of funds, the addressed functions share similar characteristics and goals.625 However 
ensuring market integrity and improving the economic performance of financial intermediaries 
require government policy and regulation. In this regard, a holistic approach over innovative 
products and institutions is considered plausible for an effective regulatory policy. In other 
words, an effective innovation policy considers financial products and infrastructure together, 
‘that is the institutional interfaces between intermediaries and financial markets, regulatory 
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practices, organization of trading and clearing facilities...’626  on this subject, regulation and 
policy shape and also are shaped by the time path of innovation. 627  As Kane identified 
regulatory dialectic is a source of innovation since it lets markets and financial institutions 
respond to their needs efficiently.628 
   However, innovation regime is affected by court decisions and also by legal system as they 
affect the nature of contracts and the amount of innovation.629 As discussed before, financial 
policy and innovation regime have a broad impact over financial institutions and their 
governance bodies in terms of policy. In this regard, although the underlying principles of 
Islamic finance are different, in practice their operation and function are within and according to 
conventional system. This fact is true in both jurisdictions with complete conventional system 
and jurisdictions with dual financial systems such as Malaysia. 
   In this regard, at macro level, globalization, financial crisis and economic integration push 
financial systems to more similar financial policies. In this context, the established goal in all 
financial systems is stability along with an innovative financial regime.630 In the context of 
Islamic finance, although the industry is governed by Shari'ah law Meta-rules which over-ride 
conventional codes, the operation and function of Islamic products should be according to the 
conventional rules and policies. An empirical example is the operation of Islamic finance 
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industry in Malaysia. To improve its financial system and meet development goals, Malaysia has 
experienced a series of financial programs, including the new economic policy, the national 
development policy and the third outline perspective plan. With these development policies, 
Malaysia gradually liberalized its financial system and has successfully shifted the structure of 
its economy from agricultural to manufacturing. In this regard, Malaysia Islamic finance industry 
has benefited from a facilitative business environment as it has supported liberalization and 
accordingly the investment of foreign financial institutions on its banking and capital markets 
sectors. The development strategy of Malaysia encourages innovation in product development 
and also in restructuring financial regulation. Thus, Malaysia development policy and 
internationalization of Islamic finance has contributed to the more efficient allocation of funds 
through introducing facilitative legal framework for market and the industry. In this regard, to 
meet development goals and ensure alignment with new market development Shari'ah boards are 
responsible to innovative more facilitative Shari'ah compliant products. In this context, Malaysia 
financial authorities endeavour to shift legality approach in the engineering of Islamic financial 
products to economic efficiency approach through innovative and flexible interpretation of 
Islamic fiqh.631 
  5.5 The Duties of Shari’ah Boards 
 
   As discussed before, Shari'ah is the backbone of the Islamic finance industry and accordingly 
the role of Shari’ah boards as Shari’ah compliance gatekeepers ‘is very pertinent to ensure that 
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the credibility and integrity of the industry are maintained.’632 In this regard, it is believed that 
one of the main reasons for the fast development of Islamic finance is the dynamic role of 
Shari'ah supervisory boards in facilitating, monitoring and ensuring stakeholders over Shari'ah 
compliance of financial products and operation. In other words, Shari'ah compliance is the main 
concern of the industry, as it preserves the industry's reputation and stakeholders' confidence. 
   Shari'ah compliance risk management as the distinguished characteristic of Islamic finance is 
an ambiguous task. Its scope may encompass a wide range of tasks with no agreement over their 
concepts and contexts. In this regard, the primary roles of Shari'ah boards at the initial stage of 
modern Islamic finance were basically endorsement ones.633However, since globalization and 
technology advances have changed the needs of markets and accordingly necessitated 
innovative and inclusive financial policies, the roles of Shari'ah board have been expanded. 
Generally, to preserve the integrity of Islamic finance industry, they are responsible to supervise 
the application of Shari'ah principles and rules in the industry developed by local or 
international authorities. Further, the fast development of markets requires the permanent and 
regular training of Islamic financial institutions’ employees by Shari’ah boards as they assist 
them to monitor the operation of financial products and the governance of Islamic financial 
institution. Moreover, to ensure productivity of financial products, Shari'ah scholars should have 
full knowledge of the purpose of financial products used in the markets to assess them according 
                                                          
632 Mohamad Akram Laldin, ‘Duties and Responsibilities of Shari'ah Boards from a Legal and Regulatory 
Perspective’ 
<http://www.amanie-iconnect.com/component/k2/item/31-duties-and-responsibilities-of-shari%E2%80%
99ah-boards-from-a-legal-and-regulatory-> accessed 22 July 2014. 
633 Laldin, ‘Roles and Responsibilities of Shari'a Scholars in Shari'a Advisory Services’ in Ali Khorshid 




to Shari'ah objectives.634 In other words, Shari'ah boards should concern about the prosperity of 
ummah and support facilitative initiations.635 
   However, differences in regulatory systems have some effects on Shari'ah boards’ duties. For 
instance, jurisdictions with central Shari'ah council like Malaysia provide more effective and 
harmonised ground for the functions of Shari'ah boards as they should work closely with 
regulators to implement their Shari'ah decisions.636 Generally, Auditing (ex ante and ex post) 
and advising over Shari'ah-compliant products and the governance of Islamic financial 
institutions are the main duties of Shari’ah boards. In this regard, the legality of Islamic 
financial products is provided by Shari'ah boards’ endorsement through issuing fatwa, and 
accordingly the legitimacy of the operational aspects of financial products and the governance 
of the Islamic financial institutions are provided by auditing or Shari'ah review. In other words, 
the main duty of Shari'ah boards is auditing and supervision of Shari’ah compliance in the 
industry. The next part discusses the mentioned roles in terms of Shari'ah compliance risk 
management. 
  5.5.1 Operational Risk in Islamic Finance: the Role of Shari’ah Boards in 
Shari’ah Compliance Risk Management 
 
   In compare with conventional financial intermediaries, Islamic financial institutions in their 
operation carry the same task in managing the various risks such as credit, market and 
investment. Their common goal in risk management is to prevent and control losses arising from 
unforeseen events. Particularly, financial crises over the years revealed the importance of a 







holistic risk management approach, through which all classes of risks are regarded important. In 
this regard, operational risk as ‘the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events’637 got a crucial place in 
risk management policies and operations. 
   Before its manifestation, operational risk was considered as a residual category for other risks 
not covered by credit and market risks. 638 Regarding the importance of the definition of 
operational risk, it is argued that since definitions ‘delimit the jurisdiction of practices in the 
system of professional knowledge’,639 the lack of an agreed definition in an organization may 
result in unclear functioning of the relevant profession. Accordingly, the definition of operational 
risk captured a significant place between scholars as its delimitation illustrates more potential 
sources of loss. Also, operational risk is considered as a basis for connecting different functions 
in the organization, as a result is so political.640 In this regard, to provide more explicit boundary 
for operational risk, some distinguishing features have been defined for it. In this regard, the first 
feature is diversity. Operational risk is highly varied in terms of its origins, forms and effects.641 
Further, ‘it can occur in any activity, function, or unit of the institution.’642 Another feature of 
operational risk is the lack of concept of risk exposure as it is not related closely to any financial 
indicator643 as is more related to the culture of the business and management.644  
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   The main goal of risk management is to prevent and control loss in corporate business. This 
goal is the manifestation of directors' duty to maximize shareholders value. Further, the nature of 
loss in risk management is mainly a pecuniary one which decreases, obstacles or destroys the 
current or potential value of the organization.645 In this regard, the cause of the loss may be 
internal or external. In the context of operational risk for instance, the lack of a sound and robust 
internal compliance plan may result in the violation of regulations, accordingly loss.   
   It may be discussed that although some losses such as reputational damage resulted from 
operational risk do not have pecuniary appearance, may lead to unpredicted pecuniary losses. In 
the context of Islamic finance, there is a special risk in the products and the operation of Islamic 
financial institutions related to their Shari'ah compliance operation. The concept of Shari'ah here 
refers to ‘fatwas, rulings, guidelines issued by Shari'ah supervisory board of the Islamic financial 
institutions and the accounting standards of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI).’646 Shari'ah non-compliance risk is regarded as a kind 
of operational risk in Islamic finance. In this regard, the Guiding principles of Risk Management 
for Institutions (other than insurance institutions) operational risk is part of the risk management 
in Islamic financial institutions.647 According to the Guiding Principles, risk management steps 
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and process should be in accordance with Shari'ah principles and accordingly Shari'ah 
supervisory board is responsible to review the relevant reports.648 
   In this regard, although operational risk is identified as an independent risk, the content of the 
Guiding Principles reveals the operation of risk management department is completely related to 
the opinions of Shari'ah supervisory board. In other words, Shari'ah non-compliance risk is an 
inherent risk in all other risks. For instance, in managing credit risk, Islamic financial institutions 
should have a strategy for financing which applies Shari'ah-compliant instruments and 
accordingly to mitigate credit risk they ‘shall have in place Shariah-compliant credit risk 
mitigation techniques...’ 649  Regarding investment risk management, the guiding principles 
require the approval of Shari'ah supervisory board on equity investment activities such as 
mudarabah and musharakah.650 The operational risk management as the last part of the guiding 
principles is based on the establishment of Shari'ah supervisory board as a control mechanism to 
ensure Shari'ah compliance in all Islamic financial institution’s operations.651 
   Regarding the importance of the implementation of a Shari'ah auditing mechanism like 
Shari'ah supervisory board we can present two reasons: the first one arose from a pure religious 
belief that although there is no material punishment in this world for Shari'ah non-compliant 
activities, we are all responsible before God. The second reason carries economic nature. In this 
regard, since Shari'ah-compliant is the cornerstone and the base of Islamic finance reputation, 
Shari’ah non-compliance operation of Islamic financial institution results in reputational risk and 
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accordingly may affect stakeholders’ confidence negatively and leads to economic difficulties in 
all parts.  
   Shari'ah boards are regarded as the main body of compliance control. However their extent of 
responsibility depends on the regulatory system. In other words, some regulatory systems such as 
Malaysia provide a defined interpretive boarder for Shari'ah to lend more predictability and 
coordination to Shari'ah compliance. Due to the importance of reputational effects of Shari'ah 
compliance652on the development of Islamic finance industry we shall consider it in the next 
part, and then discuss the implications of a central Shari'ah regulation for Shari'ah boards’ duties.   
  5.5.1.1 Reputational Risk 
 
     Corporate reputation in the market economy is considered as an asset and ‘as a concept 
embodies the image and values of a company, and was intimately linked with the concept of 
corporate responsibility.’653 Reputational risk is associated with the possibility of loss in the 
going-concern value of the financial intermediary.654 In other words, ‘reputational risk comprises 
the risk of loss in the value of a firm business franchise that extends beyond event-related 
accounting losses and is reflected in its share performance metrics.’655 The reputation of an 
organization is influenced by its operation and policies, but ultimately is under the control of the 
management.656 Although reputation is not classed as an asset in balance sheet, is an intangible 
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asset for the financial institution.657 Moreover, reputational risk management is the management 
of stakeholders' expectations as it lies in the gap between expected and actual behaviour.658 
   Generally, reputational risk is linked to management's responsibility to increase financial 
institution's value and its operational issues. In the context of Islamic finance, Shari'ah 
compliance comprises an important (or the most important) part of the reputation of the industry 
and accordingly any deficiency in Shari’ah compliance risk management can increase 
reputational risk and resulting losses. The reputational Losses arose from non-Shari'ah compliant 
operation result in decrease in investment and accordingly unethical reputation for the industry. 
In this regard, the role of Shari'ah boards in reputational risk management is only monitoring and 
advising, not governing. In other words, the directors of Islamic financial institutions have to 
apply Shari'ah boards' fatwas and Shari'ah boards are only responsible for monitoring and 
reporting of Shari'ah compliance issues. In this regard, the stakeholders’ reaction will determine 
the extent of reputational losses. For instance, if Shari'ah non-compliance operation of an Islamic 
financial institution leads to increase in shareholders’ value, the reaction depends on the majority 
of Shari’ah sensitive shareholders, the level and scope of its operation (local or international) and 
the regulatory system. In this regard, if Islamic financial institution is active in a jurisdiction with 
central Shari’ah regulatory system such as Malaysia with preventive laws on Shari’ah 
non-compliant operations, the reaction would be more severe and negative as the central 
regulation monitor compliance and enforcement.  
 






   5.5.1.2 Audit  
  
   Audit is an official inspection of an organization's accounts by an independent professional. 
Audit is known as an accountability mechanism in corporate governance. In this regard, audit 
supports corporate governance to balance the interests of different corporate members and 
prevent the conflict of interests or agency problems.659  As discussed earlier, it is assumed 
shareholders as de facto owners of the company660 should have the ultimate control over their 
capital. However due to practical difficulties such as expertise and experience, they give power 
to managers as their agents to run the corporate in line with their interests. Managers and 
directors as fiduciaries are supposed to act in good faith and advance shareholders value661.  
But the increasing divergence between them, and the lack of adequate monitoring and control 
mechanisms leave directors to follow their own interests, and as a consequence results in agency 
problems. In addition, as we have seen in many scandals such as Enron, the lack of effective 
monitoring mechanisms opens doors for fraud and fraudulent practices of the agents. In this 
regard, corporate governance as a set of relationships between corporate members needs an 
effective auditing system as a control mechanism to mitigate recurring incidents of agency 
problems.662 
   Audit as a control mechanism is to ensure investors about their agents’ fairness. Auditing 
practices in the context of conventional system have experienced many changes over time 
through changes in business and political environments. Auditors had no professional status and 
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the primary focus of auditing was on fraud prevention and accordingly ‘was designed to verify 
the honesty of persons charged with fiscal responsibilities.’663 Regarding the increased size of 
business organizations and the separation of ownership and management in corporates, auditing 
became more important.664 In this context, the Industrial Revolution and the establishment of 
public companies increased the separation of ownership and management, as a consequence 
prompted the need for professional auditors.665 Moreover, the inclusion of independent auditors 
in the 1862 Companies Act reflected the importance of public scrutiny over directors. 666 
According to the Section 94 of the Companies Act of 1862 auditors were to report: ‘whether in 
their opinion the balance sheet is a full and fair balance sheet containing the particulars required 
by these regulations and properly drawn up so as to exhibit true and correct view of the state of 
the company's affairs.’ Regarding the purpose of auditing, since 1940 the emphasis has been on 
the fairness statement. According to ISA Standards: ‘in the case of most general purpose 
framework, that opinion is on whether the financial statements are prepared fairly, in all material 
respects, or give a true and fair view in accordance with framework.’ 667  However, fraud 
detection remained an important aspect of auditing task. According to ISA: ‘An auditor 
conducting an audit in accordance with ISAs is responsible for obtaining reasonable assurance 
that the financial statements taken as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether 
caused by fraud or error.’668 
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   Auditing in the context of corporate economy is a profession established based on the 
defined standards, practices and ethics. Further, objectivity, independence and public 
responsibility are the pillars of this profession and protected by local and international auditing 
organizations and standards such as the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) and Chartered institute of internal auditors.669 In this regard, the word 'Profession' 
suggests a grouping of people who have made a study of an area of knowledge or expertise and 
have achieved a level of competence in their chosen field.670 Gray describes professionalism ‘a 
preference for the exercise of individual professional judgement and the maintenance of 
professional self-regulation.’671 Independence is the cornerstone feature of a profession and 
accordingly the main concern of auditors and all involved parties. Several definitions for 
independence have been presented by various authorities. For instance, the UK Guide to 
professional Ethics (1985) states: ‘professional independence is a concept fundamental to the 
accountancy profession. It is essentially an attitude of mind characterised by integrity and an 
objective approach to profession work.’ International standards for the professional practice of 
internal auditing states: ‘independence is the freedom from conditions that threaten the ability of 
internal audit activity to carry out internal audit responsibilities in an unbiased manner.’672 In 
other words, any condition with negative effect on auditor's professional judgement is 
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considered a danger to his independence. For example, an auditor concerns over his 
appointment and remuneration, may endanger his impartiality. 
   Regarding the dimensions of independence, Sharaf and Mautz suggested that: ‘independence 
is a three dimensional concept. The auditor must be free from restriction or bias in all three 
dimensions concurrently if he is to be totally independent. Three dimensions are: 1- 
programming independence: this is freedom from undue influence in the choice of audit 
procedures and techniques and in the extent to which they are applied. The auditor must have 
freedom to develop his own program with respect to the steps included in the amount work to be 
undertaken. 2- Investigative independence: this is freedom from influence in the choice of 
activities, areas, managerial policies, etc, to be examined. No legitimate information source 
should be unavailable to the auditor. 3- Reporting independence: this is freedom from undue 
influence in the statement of facts revealed during the examination of in the expression of 
opinions, or recommendations resulting from the examination.’673 
   According to our discussion, fiscal auditing in conventional system bears a pecuniary 
characteristic which its aim is to preserve stakeholders’ confidence and prevent imbalances in 
market. However, auditing in Islamic finance bears a religious characteristic too. In other words, 
Concerns about the Shari’ah compliance design of products and the operation of Islamic 
financial institutions demands an additional and distinguished dimension in auditing. The next 
part establishes a historical and legal analysis for this issue.    
 
 
                                                          




    5.5.1.2.1 Hisbah  
 
   Shari'ah audit in Islamic law is relatively a new term. Its root is established in the institution 
of hisbah, which lies with the concept of enjoying the good and forbidding the evil. The 
institution of hisbah and the role of muhtasib (ombudsman) go back to the prophet (pbh) era. 
Historically, Hisbah has been a monitoring and corrective institution to regulate transactions 
that take place in the market. As Kahf says, hisbah comprises three aspects: ‘one that all 
activities and transactions are undertaken within the boundaries of the rules of Shari'ah; two, all 
activities and transactions are done with observation of the moral values and ethical principles 
of Islam as religion; three, the ombudsman (muhtasib) is also charged with the function of 
ordaining what is known as good and forbidding what is known as wrong in the market.’674 In 
other words, the function of institution hisbah is religious-economic as its aim, well-being of 
society, is done through Shari'ah principles. In this regard, it is discussed that as the term 
ihtasab shares the same root with hisbah as its function may mean 'to try to gain honour in 
God's eyes by acting righteously'.675 
   In this regard, hisbah implies two meanings: a general meaning implies a religious duty for 
all Muslims to order good and forbid evil; and a supervisory function by an official.676 The 
institution of hisbah has experienced evolution in Islamic law. However, the codification of 
hisbah law by Ottoman Empire was a significant landmark in the history before the emergence 
of corporate economy.677 Ihtisab quanuunameleri (hisbah law) was developed by Sultans 
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Mehmed II and Bayazid II to be as part of the process of economic centralization by the state.678 
This law provides a comprehensive regulation of production standards, general instruction on 
measures, misdeeds committed by certain merchants and the punishments for violating the 
law.679 hisbah law provided predictability with regard to the commercial and the religious 
consequences of market transactions and also secured fair competition in market to promote 
public interest. 680  Although, muhtasib was entrusted with supervising market by his 
discretionary powers, the position falls below of judge as he had no jurisdiction to hear cases 
but only to settle disputes where the facts were admitted.681 
    The institution of hisbah reflects concerns about consumer protection. Consumer protection 
by the Islamic state primarily included identifying and punishing usury and other haram 
activities by muhtasib.682 In this regard, in performing his duties to ensure that the market 
transactions and conditions are sound, muhtasib was equipped with legal authority to impose 
discretionary sanctions (tazir) such as financial compensation. 683  In fact, the institution of 
hisbah was preventive as muhtasib sought to ensure the market regulation by imposing tazir 
against illegal activities.684 
   In summary, hisbah was a religious institution and had two goals: one, regulating and 
harmonizing market commercial transactions and activities based on hisbah law established 
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based on Shari'ah and customary rules; two, preventing misdeeds, fraud and other haram 
activities by tazir. Although, hisbah was a state institution and muhtasib had an official decree 
in pursuing his duties in pre corporate economy era, is similar to the audit institution as it 
monitors and detects defects in financial institutions transactions’ and operations based on 
established rules. However, it enjoys independence and bears no religious aspect. 
   5.5.2 Shari’ah Audit 
 
    Generally, Shari'ah audit or review refers to ‘an examination of the extent of an Islamic 
financial institution's compliance in all its activities with the Shari'ah.’685  This examination 
encompasses all parts and aspects such as policy-making, contract, financial statements and any 
other activity pertinent to Islamic financial institution. AAOIFI defines Shari'ah audit: ‘the 
primary objective of the internal Shari'ah review (carried out by independent division or part of 
internal audit department) is to ensure that the management of an IFI discharge their 
responsibilities in relation to the implementation of the Shari'ah rules and principles as 
determined by IFI's Shari'ah supervisory board (SBB).’686 In other words, auditing of Islamic 
financial institutions is ‘a systematic process of objectively of obtaining and evaluating evidence 
regarding assertions about religious and socioeconomic actions and events in order to ascertain 
the degree of correspondence between those assertions and those of the applicable financial 
reporting framework including the criteria specified based on Shari'ah principles as 
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recommended by the Shari'ah supervisory board (SBB) and communicating the results to all 
interested parties.’687 
   Stability and financial performance of any business is contingent on stakeholders' confidence. 
Hence, the main concern is how to enhance and preserve stakeholders' value. In the context of 
Islamic finance, Since Shari'ah compliance is regarded as one of the most important reasons for 
the confidence in the industry; Islamic financial intermediaries endeavour to preserve the 
confidence of Shari'ah sensitive stakeholders and the industry reputation by implementing 
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms such as Shari'ah audit.688 In this regard, 
due to the doubt over the individual ability of stakeholders to get assurance over the Shari'ah 
compliance of Islamic financial services, it is necessary to establish a Shari’ah audit mechanism 
in the system of corporate governance of Islamic financial institutions. in this context, generally, 
it is discussed that one way by which stakeholders can react to the performance deterioration in a 
business is to exert influence for change from within the organization.689 However, complexity 
and diversity of Islamic fiqh and the lack of transparency and disclosure in Shari'ah discourses in 
Islamic financial institutions affect feasibility of this mechanism.690  
   There are two kinds of Shari'ah audits: 1) internal: which is the part of integral corporate 
governance system in Islamic financial institutions; 2) external: is an independent review of 
Islamic financial institutions operation which should be in support of internal audit. Shari'ah 
                                                          
687  R. Haniffa, ‘Auditing Islamic Financial Institutions: Islamic Finance: Instrument and Market’ in 
OFinance Islamic Finance: Instruments and Markets (Bloomsbury 2010) 45. 
688 Wafik Grais and Matteo Pellegrini, ‘Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions 
Offering Islamic Financial Services’ (2006) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4054, 2  
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=940709> accessed 27 August 2015.  
689 Ibid 3; A.O. Hirschman, Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms: Organizations and 
States (Harvard University Press 1970). 




audit is a new institution in Islamic finance and suffers from many ambiguities. According to the 
provided definitions, although the independence is a common factor for auditing, Shari'ah audit 
does not enjoy a comprehensive one. Further, the lack of a clear and specified scope for Shari'ah 
auditing raises questions over its specifications and function. 
   Shari'ah audit is claimed to bear a social function and accordingly its scope encompasses the 
social behaviour and performance of Islamic financial institutions.691  However, the task of 
Shari'ah auditing in the culture of Islamic finance depends on the opinions of Shari'ah 
supervisory board. In other words, auditors are not only responsible to stakeholders and 
directors, also to Shari'ah boards since they must establish their work based on Shari'ah boards’ 
fatwas and opinions. For instance, the responsibilities and authority of internal Shari'ah auditors 
are mentioned in a charter which should be consistent with Shari'ah rules and be approved and 
regularly reviewed by Shari'ah supervisory board.692 On the other hand, although the task of 
external Shari'ah reviewing is supposed to be done by an independent organization, the dearth of 
Shari'ah experts in the industry has led to the multiple employments of auditors by Islamic 
financial institutions to execute the both kind of audits.693 Even so, it is argued that: ‘ideally, 
both SSB and external auditors should be from one organizational body since Islam does not 
recognize any separation between business and religion.’694 In other words, although Shari'ah 
auditing (internal or external) is assumed as an independent and separate task, in practice the 
main responsible body is Shari'ah board. As the AAOIFI's auditing standards emphasises the 
accordance of financial statement to Shari'ah boards' fatwas and rulings is the main criteria for 
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being Shari'ah compliant. Thus, any deficiency or ambiguity in Shari'ah boards’ duties may affect 
Shari'ah auditing task. In this regard, it is argued that the lack of a clear framework for Shari'ah 
auditing is the result of ambiguity over the scope of Shari'ah boards’ duties as they follow no 
professional framework in their Shari'ah rulings. Further, there is no clear professional standards 
or codes to assess Shari'ah board’s grounds of judgment. As Karim explains: ‘SSBs are guided 
by their moral beliefs and obligations to religious peers and community.’695 
    In this regard, the absence of a professional judgement framework for Shari'ah boards may 
affect the independence and accordingly the accuracy of their rulings. Further, due to the lack of 
a clear mandate, it is possible Shari'ah board in disagreement with management opinion (for 
example, as business necessity) face pressure696 and accordingly it may report the violation or 
gives way to management pressure.697  In this regard, the implications of this situation for 
Shari'ah auditors may raise question over the independent place of Shari’ah auditing in the 
industry. In other words, due to the lack of a framework for Shari'ah auditing and the importance 
of Shari'ah boards’ opinions as the criteria for Shari'ah compliance audit reports, auditing would 
not be an independent task. Further, the lack of professional code of conducts for Shari'ah boards 
and Shari’ah auditors casts doubt over the accuracy of their functions. 
   Audit as an accountability mechanism is effective when there is an accurate audit process698  
for auditor to seek information about the operation of the company and accordingly to identify 
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material misstatements.699 As discussed earlier, preventing and detecting fraud is part of auditing 
objectives. In the context of Islamic finance, due to the partnership structure of transactions 
(mudarabah and musharakah), they bear more complexity in operation as they give more 
discretionary power to directors in applying the principles of Shari'ah (prohibition of riba, 
gharar and maisir). 700  This issue particularly is evident in Islamic banking accounts. For 
instance, in investment accounts based on mudarabah (trustee contract) banks have complete 
management power without giving any guarantee to investors over losses. In this regard, it is 
held that the operation of Shari’ah-based transactions facilitate earning manipulation, 
accordingly fraud.701 In addition, the adaptive innovation in the industry, which presents new 
Shari’ah-compliant products (such as Islamic cross-currency swaps based on w’ad and 
murabaha contracts) through the improvement or amalgam of classical Islamic fiqh contracts, 
can cause more operational and agency problems. In this regard, an effective Shari'ah auditing in 
fraud detection requires auditors to have complete knowledge on Shari'ah and also be aware of 
fatwas issued by Shari'ah boards. This requires Shari'ah boards to have a regular and close 
connection with directors and auditors. However, the dearth of Shari'ah scholars and regulations 
impede this goal.           
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  5.6 Shari’ah Compliance in the Context of Malaysia Regulatory 
System 
 
   It is discussed that regulation in terms of a set of contracts (such as laws and supervisory 
actions) can be viewed as an incentive mechanism within a standard principal-agent relationship 
(where the principal is the regulator and the agent is the regulated financial institution) to 
encourage operations of the financial institutions with regard to the core objectives of regulation, 
namely, to sustain systemic stability, to maintain the safety and soundness of financial 
institutions, and to protect the consumer.702 In the context of Islamic finance market in Malaysia, 
Shari'ah compliance is the foundation of the Industry and adherence to its principles in all 
aspects is an important objective. In this regard, the endeavour of Malaysian regulatory 
authorities has been to preserve the sanctity of the Shari'ah-compliant transactions and boost the 
public's confidence in the sector robust regulatory framework.703 
   As discussed before Islamic finance is a contract-based system established based on classical 
Islamic fiqh contracts. In this regard, Malaysia applies a contract-based regulatory system to 
provide more consistency and predictability to prevent fatwa shopping in the market. Malaysia 
the Islamic Services Act 2013 (IFSA) reflects a contract-based Shari'ah compliance system aims 
at providing more alignment between regulatory principles and Shari'ah precepts. In this regard, 
its End-to-End Shari’ah compliance regulatory model covers: Shariah standards, operational 
standards, oversight functions and resolution. The Act clearly defines the scope of assets and 
liabilities based on the underlying Shari'ah contractual features. To be Shari'ah compliant, all 
                                                          
702 David Llewellyn, ‘The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation’ (April 1999) Financial Services 




activities and operations of the Islamic financial institution should be according to the rulings of 
the Shari’ah Advisory Council. In other words, the SAC has priority and authority over 
individual Shari’ah boards' rulings. Further, compliance in this context bears preventive and 
criminal nature. According to the Act: ‘any person who fails to comply with any standards 
specified under subsection (1), commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding eight years or to a fine not exceeding twenty-five million 
ringgit or to both.’704 in this regard, although the purpose of the establishment of Shariah board 
or committee is to advise the financial institution in ensuring its business, affairs and activities 
comply with Shari’ah705, its duty bears more supervisory and auditing characteristic as Shari’ah 
board should report any non-Shari’ah compliant activity (violating the SAC rulings and 
standards) to the  Bank. 706  In other words, Shari’ah boards' rulings and advices bear no 
independent nature as they must be consistent with the SAC rulings and principles. This 
complementary nature affects Shari'ah boards’ functions. For instance in financial innovation, 
Shari'ah boards should supervise the structure of products according to the SEC principles and 
rulings. 
   This central regulatory approach to Shari'ah compliance provides uniformity for Shari'ah 
rulings and accordingly enhances certainty and public confidence in the Islamic financial 
transactions.707 In sum, although Shari'ah boards' members enjoy characteristics of a profession 
as they produce independent fatwas based on their own Shari’ah knowledge, the sustainable 
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development goals of Malaysia requires uncertainty avoidance, providing predictability and 
accountability in operation of the financial institutions, and accordingly requires Malaysia central 
Shari’ah regulatory system to limit individualism in the interpretations of Shari’ah principles.  
  5.7 Conclusion 
 
   The examination of the duties of Shari’ah boards in the context of Islamic finance reflects the 
importance of the classical concept of Shari’ah jurists in Islamic fiqh. From a religious point of 
view the authority of Shari’ah boards’ members is a subordinate authority as their rulings are 
restricted by the institution taqlid. Taqlid or imitation as the path of continuity in Islamic law is 
defined as the general acceptance of the doctrines and the intellectual authority of the past jurists. 
In this regard, Shari’ah boards’ members use the methodology established in madahib to come 
up with their Shari’ah compliance duties. In fact, the legality of Islamic fiqh reveals the 
prohibition of any opinion issued outside of the boundaries of madahib and accordingly the 
restricted interpretation of Shari’ah compliance in the industry. In this regards, the main duty of 
Shari’ah boards is defined with regard to Shari’ah compliance risk (as a kind of operational risk) 
as they are responsible to supervise the Shari’ah compliance operation of Islamic financial 
institutions and endorse the structure of financial products. In this context, Shari’ah 
non-compliance risk management is related to all types of risk management as their steps and 
process should be Shari’ah compliant. Further, Shari’ah boards fatwas are the criteria for 
Shari’ah auditing and Shari’ah non-compliance risk management. In other words, auditing and 
giving advice are not the only duties of Shari’ah boards’ duties. They are also involved in the 





management of Shari’ah non-compliance risk as an inclusive task through controlling risk 
management mechanisms and processes.  
   The auditing role of Shari’ah boards is rooted in the institution of hisbah as a monitoring and 
corrective mechanism for the regulation of transactions. In this regard, although it is believed 
that Shari’ah audit is a task done by independent internal and external bodies, the lack of an 
agreed framework and the dearth of Shari’ah jurists cast doubt over its effectiveness as a control 
mechanism. In fact, the lack of consensus over the concept and the scope of Shari’ah boards’ 
duties in the industry, has led to the ambiguity over the function and accordingly the 






























  6.1 Introduction 
 
 
   This chapter examines the influence of Shari’ah boards’ decisions on directors’ duty to 
promote the success of the company. It analyses the importance of fatwas as a legitimacy-making 
means with regard to the control and the strategic roles of directors in the governance of Islamic 
financial institutions. In this regard, it considers the concept of value in terms of Shari’ah 
compliance and addresses the role of directors in value-making with regard to 
Shari’ah-compliant risk in the operation of Islamic financial institutions. In this context, to find 
the reasons for the existence of the board of directors in the governance of corporate, the first 
part studies their role in the history of company law. It examines the concept of ‘legitimacy’ in 
terms of the fiduciary duties of directors in the Companies Act 2006 and accordingly addresses 
the influence of fatwas on the roles of directors in the context of Islamic finance. The next part 
looks at the nature of director and directorship in the context of the Act and case law to clarify 
the importance of a functional approach in understanding the roles and responsibilities of 
directors. The last part explores the implications of Shari’ah board’s rulings for the strategic and 











   The purpose of a corporation as a bundles of resources and relationships is to reduce costs and 
to create sustainable long-term value.708 In this regard, the creation of sustainable value requires 
efficiency in the creation, use and transformation of resources and the support of corporate 
governance through the application of the principles of good governance and expertise. 
   Corporate governance is about the internal and external control systems as they support a 
corporate to achieve its goals (mentioned or not mentioned in its constitution and the companies 
Act). In this regard, all parties involved in the governance system have express or tacit 
responsibility to endeavour for those goals through an efficient approach in discharging their 
duties. Generally, the Anglo-American corporate governance is known as a market-oriented 
system which ‘enables the boards to retain flexibility in the way in which it organizes itself and 
exercises its responsibilities, while ensuring that it is properly accountable to its shareholders.’709  
    The Board of directors is considered as the leader of the company as its place in the 
corporate governance is to direct the performance of all other bodies for more value creation. 
This argument reflects the main rule of the modern corporate governance, namely the separation 
of ownership and control. In this regard, the delimitation of authority, control and the 
discretionary power given to the board of directors has been an important task for corporate law. 
Concerns over the violation of the fiduciary duties by directors with regard to their own personal 
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benefits and also concerns over their adherence to the purpose of company have urged the 
implementation of legal strategies to regulate managerial agency problems. However, to reduce 
agency costs resulting from managerial agency position, an efficient company law must establish 
balance between responsibility and authority.710   Traditionally, the positive stream of agency 
theory has been the main stream and assumes that directors are the agents of shareholders and 
they should direct and distribute corporate resources according to the interests of shareholders. 
However, the concepts of value and principal-agent relationships have experienced changes. The 
statutory duties of directors in the Companies Act 2006 approve those changes as its ambit in s. 
170 is: ‘the general duties specified in sections 171 to 177 are owed by a director of a company 
to the company.’711 According to the Act the director owes the duties to the company and not to 
the shareholders of the company. Thus, the company is the only plaintiff in relation to claims 
related to the breach of directors’ duties.712 
   In this regard, a profound perception over the role and the duties of directors requires to have 
a look at the legal history of corporation. A corporation has not always been regarded as a 
separate legal entity. Historically, the concept of corporation and accordingly the duties of 
directors are influenced by trust law. In this regard, a company had no separate legal personality 
and only there was a partnership between the members of company and their property since 
beneficiaries were held on trust by company. The recognition of the separate legal personality for 
companies is the result of the House of Lords decision in Saloman v A Saloman & Co Ltd713. 
Before this decision the limited liability Act 1844 provided limited liability for shareholders to 
meet the losses of the company. Although the Act for the first time attempted to distinguish 
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between companies and partnerships, no separate legal personality was given to companies. In 
fact, the speculative activities of companies at that time caused the illegality of formation of 
companies714. However, the industrial expansion of the nineteenth Century necessitated changes 
in companies’ structure. As a result, the joint stock companies formed by the combination of 
partnership and trust legal techniques to circumvent the prohibitions.   
 
  6.2.1 Reasons for the Existence of Board of Directors 
 
 
   The origin of board of directors can be traced back to the European companies’ structure. In 
the seventeenth century only large European companies such as the East India Company and the 
Dutch East India Company had board of directors, and no other large businesses owned and 
operated by non-Europeans had this body in their corporate structure.715 In this regard, the Board 
of directors initially had two functions: legislative and adjudicative.716 The legislative function 
of board of directors aimed at regulating the membership to the company. This function is the 
reflection of Western Europe political practice in the middle ages for the use of collective 
governance by a body of representatives.717 On the other hand, the adjudicative function of 
board of directors aimed at resolving the disputes of members of the company.718  
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   The institution of board of directors carries a representative quality derived from the central 
management (direct governance) in groups such as companies with the large number of 
members.719  Further, as the result of inefficiency in directorship of large organizations the 
separation of ownership and control was necessary. Also, the superiority of group 
decision-making practice was a central belief in the medieval political philosophy.720 In this 
regard, this central control approach in corporate governance explains the isolation of partnership 
law default rule under which all owners participate in managing the firm.721  
   In the context of modern corporate law, the board of directors as a central management 
institution meets its responsibilities through group decision-making too. The complexity of the 
structure and the operation of the modern corporations particularly financial intermediaries 
requires directors to be knowledgeable as they have to overcome the fast changing environment 
of markets. To that end, a group decision-making approach reinforces corporate directorship and 
leads to efficiency in the process and accordingly in the results of decision-making. This view is 
supported by company law under which an individual director has no power to act on the 
company’s behalf, and only the board of directors as a collective institution bears collective 
decision-making responsibilities. In this regard, In the Admiralty v The Divina (Owners) and 
Others,722 and in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Griffiths and others723 although 
learned judges admitted collective responsibility of board of directors, they emphasised the 
importance of individual responsibility of each director to the company too. This reflects the 
importance of a realistic approach in the examination of board of directors’ responsibilities 
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particularly in Islamic financial institutions as Shari’ah compliance is the basis of their functions. 
In other words, directors in Islamic financial institutions should be equipped with the knowledge 
of Islamic finance techniques as they have to apply Shari’ah boards’ fatwas and accordingly any 
deficiency in their work may lead to Shari’ah non-compliant risk.  
 
  6.3 The Relation between Legitimation and the Institution of 
Board of Directors 
 
   Another reason for the existence of board of directors is the need for legitimacy. Historically, 
parliament as a mediating institution contained representatives from various constituencies, has 
been considered the reflection of board of directors’ function as they mediate between various 
corporate claimants. 724  In this regard, the practice of collective-decision making of this 
representative institutions reflects the need for legitimacy. In other words, the medieval councils 
‘provided the means to comply with the corporate law rule that what touches all be consented to 
by all, in circumstances when consent by assembly of the entire group was impractical’.725 The 
concept of legitimacy here indicates not only a democratic process of decision making also a 
congruence between the expectations of owners and board of directors. In other words, this 
conception indicates the importance of consideration of reliability or correctness of decisions 
alongside the collective process of decision-making. This account of legitimacy clarifies the 
importance of applying two concepts of legitimacy, namely the political and normative, as they 
practically provide more effective results.  
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   In this regard, the separation of control and ownership as the chief feature of the corporation 
which distinguishes it from other forms of business organization, 726  reflects technical and 
professional concerns over the governance of corporations. In fact the Companies Act 2006 as 
one of the main sources of the legitimacy of board of directors confirms this feature of the 
corporation by requiring all private and public companies to have directors.727 However the 
Companies Act does not provide a detailed knowledge over the board of directors’ power. It only 
establishes a vague conception over the legal place of directors by enumerating their fiduciary 
duties.728 In other words, from a normative point of view, the Act does not deliver clear criteria 
for the legitimacy of board of directors’ duties and only reflects a general expectation.  
   In the context of Anglo-American law, the legitimacy in the process and output of a 
company’s direction reflects a conventional concept under which the creation of value is 
considered the main concern. In this regard, since the notion of value creation (and accordingly 
the success of company) in good corporate governance mainly bears an economic essence, the 
duty of board of directors to promote the success of the company requires them to have 
professional knowledge in finance and management. 
   In this regard, whatever is the reason for applying the idea of representation as the basis for 
the existence of board of directors (whether the efficiency of group decision-making or the 
protection of all constituents’ interests) the truth is that legitimate authority in political or 
commercial forms requires consent.729 The historical evidence approves this fact not only in 
commercial trade unions or parliaments also in religious groups such as church councils. 
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However, there have been no religious board parallel to the board of directors in the history of 
corporate law. In this context, although religion is considered as an important part of the history 
of medieval Europe, it was not part of the structure of company and other commercial unions. 
Further, the conventional quality of the modern companies considers Shari’ah supervisory board 
as a unique governance body in the structure of Islamic financial institutions. In this regard, to 
have a comprehensive understanding of the implication of this religious layer of governance, it is 
necessary to look at the fiduciary duties of directors in the context of the Companies Act. 
  6.3.1 The Concept of Legitimacy in the Context of Fiduciary Duties of 
Directors 
 
   The history of fiduciary duties is connected with the evolution of the economy from one 
based upon land into one founded on capital and entrepreneurial activity.730 The delegation of 
the responsibility of directorship to directors in the context of modern company law reflects their 
root in equity. Despite of having long legal history, the Companies Act 2006 introduced a 
statutory codification for directors’ duties that does not indicate their substantive content. Instead 
it preserves the effect of previous case law and allows the future case law to determine the 
content of these duties according to the equitable principles which govern the liabilities of all 
fiduciaries.731 Accordingly, the concept of legitimacy and its applicability in the context of the 
company law is contingent on the definition and direction of fiduciary duties. 
   Although, directors due to their office and position owe fiduciary duties, there is no 
conforming views over the range of their fiduciary duties across common law jurisdictions.732 In 
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this regard, one approach lies on a narrow view which considers fiduciary duties as prospective. 
According to this approach, only ‘no conflict’ and ‘no profit’ rules comprise fiduciary duties.733 
On the other hand, the broad approach takes into account not only the proscriptive but also 
prescriptive rules to tell fiduciaries what to do.734 The English law approach is not clear and the 
codification of directors’ duties by the Companies Act 2006 has not resolved this ambiguity. In 
English Law, in Bristol & West Building Society v Motthew735 Lord Millett described a fiduciary 
duties in these terms: ‘The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. 
This core liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a 
profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may 
conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the informed 
consent of his principal.’736 The term ‘good faith’ has been construed as a duty ‘to do in good 
faith whatever one had undertaken to do; in other words, it is a duty qualifying performance of 
some other activity, virtually a duty not to misbehave, rather than a duty to do any particular 
thing’.737 
   The Court of Appeal (of which Lord Millett was a member) pronounced the prospective view 
In Attorney-General v Blake738 and repeated the passage from Motthew referred to the facets of 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty: 739  ‘…..equity is prospective, not prescriptive; see Breen v 
Williams.740 It tells the fiduciary what he must not do, it does not tell him what he ought to do.’  
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   However, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi741 has 
adopted prescriptive concept of fiduciary duties. Further, in GHLM Trading Ltd v Maroo742 Mr 
Justice Newey observed: ‘Arguably, it breaks new ground in treating a fiduciary duty as 
prescriptive rather than merely proscriptive. Its result can perhaps now be justified also by 
reference to section 172 of the Companies Act 2006, which came into force on 1 October 2007.   
The duty to promote the success of a company which that provision imposes can be said to be 
expressed in prescriptive terms (a director "must act in the way he considers, in good faith, 
would be most likely to promote the success of the company …" – emphasis added). Be that as it 
may, Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi is clearly binding on me. I therefore proceed on the basis 
that a director's duty of good faith can potentially require him to disclose misconduct. .... a 
company complaining of a director's failure to disclose a matter must, I think, establish that the 
fiduciary subjectively concluded that disclosure was in his company's interests or, at least, that 
the director would have so concluded had he been acting in good faith’.743  
   The uncertainty of English law approach over the fiduciary duties of directors implies the 
importance of the context in which directors operate. In this regard, the functional quality in 
directors’ duties can be perceived from the broad discretionary power given to directors by the 
Companies Act 2006 to promote the success of the company in good faith. Further, the UK 
principle-based approach in corporate governance endorses the importance of flexibility in the 
efficiency of directors’ decisions. In other words, there is an interaction between the concept of 
legitimacy and directors’ duties in the context of the Companies Act that indicates a functional 
oriented concept in the process and output of directorship based on statute and common law.  
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   In the context of English law, directors’ sources of power and their legitimacy are the same. 
In this regard, statutes, constitution, common law, customary rules and professional requirements 
determine the legal factors in their conceptions. In this context, applying another governance 
layer with religious function to provide legitimacy by issuing fatwa for the operation of financial 
institutions poses some questions over the duties of board of directors. The concept of legitimacy 
with regard to Shari’ah boards’ fatwas reflects a non-legal concept as there is no provision in 
statute and record in case law requiring the establishment of a religious governance layer. As a 
result, in the context of Islamic finance the implications of fatwas for the fiduciary duties of 
board of directors are not clear. In this regard, to have a comprehensive perception over this 
issue, we should examine the fiduciary duties of directors and the concept of legitimacy in the 
context of company law and accordingly have a look at the position of ‘director’ and its 
requirements. 
  6.4 Who is a Director? 
 
   The position of director in the Companies Act 2006744carries an immaterial concept as it 
provides no explicit definition for the term ‘director’. In other words, the Act has a functional 
approach over the concept of ‘director’, and accordingly does not consider necessary a formal 
appointment or position for it. In this regard, a ‘de jure’ director who has been correctly 
appointed as a director in accordance with the appointment rules set out in the company’s articles 
of association 745 and accordingly operates officially under the title of ‘director’ bears all 
responsibilities and fiduciary duties mentioned in the Act and common Law. From one aspect, 
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this elasticity provides a way to fix guilty individuals with liability, and from another aspect it 
may discourage counterparties from interfering with the managers of limited liability 
companies.746 In this regard, the broad definition provided by s. 250 implies the risk of being 
director as this position requires competence to meet its duties and accordingly necessities 
bearing liabilities for the breach of those duties. This issue is more complicated in the 
governance of Islamic financial institutions as the position of director and its responsibilities 
must be carried out according to Shari’ah board’s fatwas. In other words, the fiduciary duties of 
directors must be interpreted and performed in Shari’ah-compliant manner since the position and 
responsibilities of directors in English law are not the matter of a formal appointment.747The Act 
and common law indicate two other categories of directors: “de facto” and “shadow” directors.   
  6.4.1 De Facto Directors    
  
   A de facto director is a person (legal or natural) who is regarded as a director by the law even 
though she has not been formally appointed as a director.748 There have been no definition for de 
facto director and courts only have provided guidance on the elements of the concept of de facto 
director.749 In Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd750, Millet J. held that: ‘A de facto director is a person 
who assumes to act as a director. He is held out as a director by the company, and claims and 
purports to be a director, although never actually or validly appointed as such. To establish that a 
person was a de facto director of a company, it is necessary to plead and prove that he undertook 
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functions in relation to the company which could properly be discharged only by a director. It is 
not sufficient to show that he was concerned in the management of a company's affairs or 
undertook tasks in relation to his business which cannot properly be performed by a manager 
below board level’.  
    This decision was criticised by Lloyd J in Richborough Furniture Ltd.751  he adopted a 
practical approach as he held that a de facto director should act on an equal footing with the 
others in directing the affairs of the company.752 In this regard, in Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd753 
it was held that to be a de facto director it was no longer need for the individual in question to 
have held himself out as a director. In this regard, Lord Collins in Re Paycheck754 observed that: 
‘the basis of liability is the assumption of responsibility.’755 However Lord Hope DP, for the 
majority declared the importance of the person actual actions to see whether he assumed those 
responsibilities in relation to the subject companies.756 In other words, to regard a person as a de 
facto director, the actual role and exercised power of the person in the governing structure of the 
company should be considered.757 In this regard, Hildyard J. in Secretary for State Business, 
Innovation and Skills v Chohan758 observed the importance of being part of the governance 
structure of the company by focusing on actions only be performed by a director. 
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  6.4.2 Shadow Directors 
 
   The concept of shadow directors in English Law is the reflection of concerns about the need 
for effective measures to hold those who exercise actual influence or control (direct or indirect) 
over the management of companies accountable for their conducts. 759  In other words, the 
provisions on shadow directors reflect legal expectations over the legal nature of companies and 
the way they should be managed and the qualities of managers.760 The first formal reference to a 
shadow director in English law was in the Companies Act 1917 which included ‘any person in 
accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of a company are accustomed to 
Act.’761 A similar definition was included in s 741 (2) of the Companies Act 1985762and in other 
statutes.763 In this regard, Shadow directors as ‘moving spirit’ of the company764are entirely the 
creatures of statute’765 and unlike de jure and de facto directors, the law on shadow director is 
not completely established as courts have been conservative in applying this notion. A shadow 
director in s 251 (1) of the Companies Act 2006 is defined as: ‘a person in accordance with 
whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act’. Although, 
other Commonwealth jurisdictions such as Australia and New Zealand 766  have defined the 
concept of shadow directors similar to the English Companies Act, they have taken an integrated 
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approach by including the definition of a shadow director within their general definition of a 
‘director’.767 
   The definition and application of the shadow director have been the subject of many 
judgments with different approaches. In this regard, earlier judgements such as Re PFTZM Ltd 
(in liquidation)768 and Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No 3)769presented a narrow concept for the term.770  
The recent cases such as Secretary of State for trade and industry v Deverell771reflect a more 
practical approach. Generally, this case laid down the following general principles for the 
interpretation of the term Shadow director772: first, the definition must be according to the 
legislative aim of public protection; second, any particular communication, whether by words or 
conduct classed as a direction or instruction must be must be determined objectively. Further, the 
states of mind, intention and motives of parties in following the instructions are not conclusive, 
although the expectations of parties on the part of either parties may be a relevant factor;773third, 
it is not necessary for instructions to cover every matter related to directors or the company 
activities or affairs;774 fourth, the directors must have been accustomed to act in accordance with 
the directions and instructions. 775  In other words, the outcome of communications and the 
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pattern of compliance which must be beyond one occasion, are the criteria for the term;776fifth, 
all or a consistent governing majority of directors must have been accustomed to following the 
directions of the Shadow director;777it is not necessary directors have a subservient role to obey 
the directions, although a relationship of dominance may be evidence of a shadow 
directorship.778  
   Further, although Millet J in Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd 779 provided a narrower account for 
determining a person as a shadow director in the context of section 214 of the Insolvency Act 
1986; the essence of the judgement reflects the same principles mentioned above. In this regard, 
Millet J says: ‘A shadow director, by contrast, does not claim or purport to act as a director. On 
the contrary, he claims not to be a director. He lurks in the shadows, sheltering behind others 
who, he claims, are the only directors of the company to the exclusion of himself. He is not held 
out as a director by the company. To establish that a defendant is a shadow director of a 
company it is necessary to allege and prove: (1) who are the directors of the company, whether 
de facto or de jure. (2), that the defendant directed those directors how to act in relation to the 
company or that he was one of the persons who did so; (3) that those directors acted in 
accordance with such directions; and (4) that they were accustomed so to act. what is needed is 
first, a board of directors claiming and purporting to act as such, and secondly, a pattern of 
behaviour in which the board did not exercise any discretion or judgement of its own, but acted 
in accordance with the directions of others.’ In this regard, shadow directors influence the 
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decisions of the board in relation to the company780and accordingly directors’ act following the 
influence must in effect amount to a dictation of strategy and policy781 in a consistent ‘pattern of 
compliance with the instructions of the putative shadow.’782  
   However, the new cases reflect a more inclusive approach as the main concern is to judge 
objectively the real influence of instructions were relied by board of directors in relation to the 
business activities of the company.783 Further, the essence of the principles reflected in recent 
cases implies that ‘despite the use of the term shadow director, it is not necessary to characterise 
the person as ‘lurking in the shadows’ or for the latter’s influence to be hidden; a shadow 
director can operate quite openly.’784 
   In the context of Islamic finance, since Shari’ah compliance is the ultimate goal, a shadow 
director in discharge of his duties like a de jure director is responsible for the application of 
Shari’ah board’s fatwas. In other words, the primary liability of de jure directors regarding their 
wrongdoing or fraudulent actions related to their non-Shari’ah compliant decisions may lead to 
the liability of the shadow director too. 
  6.4.2.1 Shari’ah Boards as Shadow Directors  
 
   Shadow directorship is a kind of regulatory mechanism through which the legislator seeks to 
regulate and make transparent the conduct of a person who controls the board.785 In other words, 
since the directions or instructions of a Shadow director amount to a dictation of “strategy and 
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policy” 786 , they are subject to duties and liabilities imposed on directors. Further, the 
anti-avoidance rationale of the shadow director provisions implies the economic rationale of 
corporate law as they ‘help to internalise the costs of the wrongdoing associated with the 
common enterprise of the shadow and de jure directors.’787 This economic rationale also carries 
a deterrence quality as ‘it deters a greater amount of wrongdoing than if there was no secondary 
liability.’788 In the context of Islamic finance, the discussion over the liability of Shari’ah boards 
can be examined in terms of shadow directorship too as their functions and activities may result 
in influence over the economic directorship of the Islamic financial institutions. 
   In this regard, Shari’ah boards’ functions in terms of Shari’ah compliance audit and advice 
over the operation of Islamic financial institutions reflect a kind of communication between them 
and the board of directors carrying an instructional quality through which they may insert 
influence over the management of the company’s activities. Further, their communication bears a 
public quality too as their duties affect the operation of Islamic financial institutions and 
accordingly the interests of stakeholders. However, the objective approach in Deverell requires 
to assess their communication whether by words or conduct in the light of all evidence and 
accordingly it is suffice to prove the communication and its consequences.789 In this regard, the 
existence of direction or instruction from Shari’ah board in their communication with board of 
directors should be examined in their advisory role. Although, advice given in a purely 
professional capacity is clearly excluded from a communication based on direction or 
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instruction790 Morritt L. J in Deverrell case duly stated that ‘the exception for professional 
advice implies that the concepts of direction and instruction include advice’ and share the 
common feature of guidance. In this context, the recognition of professional quality for Shari’ah 
boards’ advices is not a clear topic as there are many questions over Shari’ah boards’ 
membership as a profession in terms of education, regulation and accountability.791 However, 
exclusion of professional advice does not exclude all other advice is included.792 In other words, 
if Shari’ah board’s advices appear to be instructions or directions which board of directors are 
accustomed to follow them and accordingly reflect Shari’ah board’s expectation that its advices 
will be obeyed, the issue of shadow directorship could be a relevant subject. Further, the 
instructions and directions from Shari’ah board should reflect its influence or control over de jure 
directors’ decisions.   
 
6.4.3 The Importance of the Identification of Directors  
 
      Directorship is the ultimate power in the governance of a company. Officially, the board of 
directors is considered the leader of the company that bears all directorship responsibility. 
However, although various corporate governance systems characterize similar indicators for a 
good directorship, in practice the process of directorship is not perfectly defined. In this regard, 
the functional-oriented approach of the UK companies’ law affirms the importance of the role of 
other players in the governance of the company by the recognition of shadow and de facto 
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directors. Further, the s. 172 (1)793 of the Act by incorporation of two concepts of ‘success of the 
company’ and ‘enlightened shareholders value’ indicates the importance of the applying of a 
functional approach in identification and interpretation of directors’ duties. In this regard, the 
directors of a company may have a particular governance perspective for the application of s. 
172 (1). In other words, the list in s. 172 is not exhaustive and the general duty to promote the 
success of the company may require directors to consider other factors or even relevant interests 
in every case.794  
   In practice directors interpret the concepts of success and the enlightened shareholders value 
and accordingly the concept and the context of strategy 795according to the primacy of the 
company’s goals. In other words, the concepts of success of the company and enlightened 
shareholders’ value as the foundation of the other fiduciary duties should be analysed according 
to the specificities of a business. As a result, the functional and inclusive approach of the 
Companies Act 2006 towards the definition of the position of directors and their duties reflects 
the importance of the practical consequences of directorship and their systemic effects on 
financial markets. As a consequence of this all-embracing approach, fiduciary duties of directors 
included in the Act and case law would encompass all types of directors and not only de jure 
one.  
   Further, since the Act and common law are based on conventional not religious precepts, 
these duties are perceived according to economic and financial exigencies. However, 
directorship in Islamic financial institutions is not very straightforward. Although the concept of 
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directorship in the both type financial institutions is similar, the discretionary power of directors 
in Islamic financial institution is limited by Shari’ah boards’ rulings and opinions. In other 
words, Shari’ah board as a religious governance layer influence directors’ roles and accordingly 
the concept of their fiduciary duties as Shari’ah-compliance is the foundation for the legitimacy 
of directors’ discretion.796 However, the lack of a specific regulatory and accountability system 
in the UK requires us to analyse the duties of directors’ in Islamic financial institutions according 
to the conventional institutions. We shall discuss the implications of Shari’ah boards’ decisions 
on directors’ duties and accordingly on the concepts of success and value-making through a 
strategic-legal point of view. Next part examines the implications of Shari’ah boards’ fatwas for 
directors in two aspects: strategy and control.  
  6.5 The Implications of Shari’ah Boards’ Fatwas for the Strategic 
Role of Directors  
 
   In the context of Islamic finance, the strategic role of directors should be analysed with regard 
to Shari’ah boards’ fatwas as they imply the strategy of the company. The strategic role of 
directors is admitted by the Companies Act as it does not set out any specific roles for them and 
only establishes general criteria for their fiduciary duties. In this regard, those fiduciary duties 
indicate a strategic quality for directors as they imply the importance of setting, monitoring and 
assessment of strategic proposals797 that affect the long-term performance of the company.798 
The discretionary power given to directors by the Companies Act must be applied in a way that 
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would be most likely to promote the success of the company.799 This discretion is in the form of 
decision (strategy) and non-decision making (monitoring) functions which should be examined 
according to the context of company. This part considers the decision-making function of 
directors in setting strategy for corporate in terms of context, conduct and content of corporate 
strategy. In other words, strategy-making is considered as a process in the performance of 
directors’ strategy role. Further, the Companies Act provisions over the duties of directors do not 
only indicate amending and distributive functions for directors, also reflect a complete 
involvement in the formation of the content, context and conduct of strategy.800            
   Strategy generally is defined as ‘A plan of action designed to achieve a long-term or overall 
aim’. 801  In Huse words: ‘strategy may be defined as the development, maintenance and 
monitoring of the firm’s core competencies with the purpose of achieving long-term results and 
survival.’802 In this regard, corporate strategy as ‘the pattern of company purposes’803 is about 
the process of decision-making over the corporate values, objectives and operation. In other 
words, the concept of strategy is a comprehensive concept which involves all objectives such as 
financial and social could affect the business of corporation. In this regard, the Companies Act 
reflects this comprehensive conception in the strategic role of directors by requiring them to 
consider not only financial factors, but also social and long-term aspects in their decisions. Also, 
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OECD declares the importance of strategic role of boards: ‘the corporate governance framework 
should ensure the strategic guidance of the company…’804  
   In this regard, to identify corporate strategy, it is necessary to answer to two questions: where 
does the firm compete and how does it compete? These questions are concerned with the scope 
of the firm’s activities and the firm’s competitive plan. In this context, the strategic role of 
directors should be interpreted in the context of the firm’s scope of activities defined according 
to internal and external sources such as the firm’s goals and purposes mentioned in its 
constitution. As a consequence, the legitimacy of directors decisions depends on how much they 
act and how they perform within the defined scope. 
   In the context of Islamic finance, the fatwas of Shari’ah boards provide the path and criteria 
for corporate strategy. In this regard, Shari’ah boards through presenting specific mode for 
interpretation of Shari’ah which is profoundly affected by the region (Middle East, Europe or 
Malaysia), type of business (banking, insurance…) and composition of Shari’ah boards in terms 
of Schools of thought affect the corporate strategy. In other words, Shari’ah boards influence the 
role of board of directors in setting corporate strategy explicitly by issuing annual Shari’ah 
reports over the operation of Islamic financial institution and implicitly by giving ad hoc 
advisory opinions over contingent issues. for example, HSBC introduction to its Islamic 
investment indicates the importance of the Central Shari’ah Committee of HSBC 
Amanah805decisions over the scope of investment funds in equities as an asset class not to 
investing in prohibited business activities such as alcohol and gambling (sectorial screen) and in 
financial institutions exhibit prohibited financial characteristics such as their total amount of debt 
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trailing market capitalisation (financial screens). As a consequence, those Shari’ah decisions 
limit the strategy role of directors in terms of business development and value creation. In other 
words, the concepts of value creation and the role of directors in the success of company should 
be examined according to Shari’ah board opinions. 
   The strategic role of directors is an important factor for the long-term performance of the 
company. In this regard, the Companies Act indicates their effective strategic role by explaining 
the importance of the success of the company in terms of directors’ fiduciary duties.806 The 
essence of management in the context of the modern financial markets is the result of the 
combination of industry-specific experiential knowledge and the application of the general 
principles according to the markets exigencies and the company’s values.807 This market-based 
view towards management affected companies’ law in Anglo-American jurisdiction under which 
directors cannot be questioned for their business decisions made ‘by a bona fide regard for the 
interests of the corporation’.808 In this regard, the exercise of discretion by directors is examined 
according to the legal standards of competence in relation to the quality of the decisions.809  
   In the context of Islamic finance, the mentioned combination does not bear a clear-cut concept 
as the board of directors in each Islamic financial institution must operate according to that 
Institution’s Shari’ah board’s opinions. Further, there is no harmonization in attitudes over the 
management of Islamic finance markets’ exigencies such as liquidity risk management, and also 
the lack of a specific regulatory system in jurisdictions like UK led to ambiguity over the concept 
of discretion in the management of Islamic financial institution and accordingly over 
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value-creation and accountability issues. In other words, the process of strategy making and 
accordingly expectations arising from the duty of care in Islamic finance are not clear.    
   The concepts of success, value-creation and strategy in company law are interlinked. In 
contrast to the fiduciary duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the company reflected in 
common law, the Companies Act requires directors to promote the success of the company in 
terms of long-term increase in value.810 This reflects a shift from a narrow approach to a broad 
approach towards the strategic role of directors. In fact, the law commission has been more 
concerned over the increasing role of directors particularly in financial institution over 
value-creation. This inclusive view has affected the concept of value and value-creation by 
directors as it reflects not only the financial performance of the company, but also social and 
environmental performances too. In this regard, the role of directors in creating and protecting 
wealth must be considered in a long-term with regard to social factors. In other words, the Act 
takes more distributive approach toward value-creation. 
   The value-creation in the context of financial markets is deeply related to three aspects: 
investment strategy, product development and risk management. This issue is more critical in 
Islamic finance as it is related to the Shari’ah-compliance risk. In this regard, Shari’ah 
non-compliance risk which is mainly known as operational risk, may be a source of risk at 
strategic level which boards are the main responsible body to control and manage it.811 Shari’ah 
compliance is not only a concern in operation of an Islamic financial institution, also it may 
occur in setting values and pattern for company. For example, investment strategy and product 
development of business and structure of financial products must be compliant with Shari’ah 
                                                          




board rulings. In this regard, ex ante and ex post functions of Shari’ah boards in engineering and 
the performance of obligations under the contracts; and reviewing investment policies require 
implementation of hardware and software mechanisms by directors to meet Shari’ah compliant 
goals. In this context, directors’ ultimate responsibility is ‘to establish a mechanism that can be 
mobilized swiftly and efficiently, as and when required, to obtain rulings from Shari’ah scholars 
and monitor Shari’ah compliance’.812 To that end, directors need to establish a proper cultural 
infrastructure based on Islamic financial institution’s business and environment according which 
the organizational and communicational structure of the institution will be formed. Further, the 
innovation process including goal definition and alignment of actions to goals must be 
considered according to Shari’ah notions established by Shari’ah board.813 This requires a close 
collaboration between directors, internal Shari’ah department and Shari’ah board.     
   The concept of value and value-creation with regard to the mentioned strategic aspects of 
financial institutions are more complex as all decisions and operation must be compliant with 
Shari’ah boards’ fatwas and decisions. In theory, the main concern of board must be 
Shari’ah-compliance and not only economic value creation for the company members. As a 
result, the concept of success is deeply connected to Shari’ah-compliant value creation, not only 
to pure conventional perception of economic and social value creation. In this regard, 
purification of non-halal income gained in process and operation of products resulting from ex 
ante or ex post aspects of financial transactions reflects the limitations on the concepts of value 
creation and success in the context of Islamic finance. However, it is noteworthy that since 
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providing Shari’ah-compliant financial services is the ultimate goal in Islamic finance industry, 
variety of investors, namely Shari’ah sensitive or non-Shari’ah sensitive, should not affect 
pursuing Shari’ah-compliant value creation models. Despite this goal, in practice directors may 
manipulate and overrule the resolutions of the Shari’ah boards by adopting different resolutions 
from other Islamic financial institutions.814  
   According to the IFSB: “Although the diversity of Shariah opinions might tempt an IIFS to 
adhere to the fatwas of other Shariah scholars at the expense of differing fatwa issued by the 
IIFS’s Shariah scholars, the IIFS shall not change their allegiance and obedience to fatwa to suit 
their convenience. Such a practice could impair the independence of Shariah scholars and have a 
damaging impact on the integrity and credibility of the individual IIFS, in particular, and on the 
Islamic financial services industry as a whole. The adverse effect of such a practice on the 
reputation of the IIFS and the Islamic financial industry would be immense and difficult to 
repair. Therefore, the IIFS shall be transparent in the adoption and application of Shariah rules 
and principles issued by the IIFS’s Shariah scholars.”815  
   The success of company is the reflection of successful value creation. Value creation here is 
based on entrepreneurship encouraging long-term perspective over value ‘by developing a work 
environment that supports corporate and individual growth, creating opportunities for employees 
to use their creative skills and fostering a culture of cross-functional collaboration’.816 This 
definition is compatible with Islamic finance partnership and entrepreneurship goals and 
technics. However, setting innovation and value patterns must be according to Shari’ah board 
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rulings. In other words, value creation in the context of Islamic finance requires establishing 
Shari’ah compliant culture and structure which are compliant to Shari’ah board’s rulings. This 
issue raises questions over the limitation of innovation and directors’ knowledge. 
   Strategic decisions over innovation is an internal value creation by which new products, 
production processes and organizational systems are created. 817  In finance, innovation and 
product engineering refers to strategies and techniques to lower transaction costs and achieve 
better return.818 In this regard, value creation in terms of product and process innovation should 
be measured by its long-term impact on financial system and in the context of Islamic finance its 
conformity to the normative standards of Shari’ah.819 The specific concept of value creation 
requires specific knowledge in understanding Islamic finance particularities by directors to 
involve in implementation of Shari’ah board fatwas in ex ante and ex post transactions’ 
formation and operation of Islamic financial institutions. This issue indicates the importance of 
directors’ duty of care in terms of their control role in proper implementation of fatwas.    
 
  6.6 The Implications of Shari’ah Boards’ Fatwas for the Control 
Role of Directors 
 
 
   The term ‘control’ here refers to the power to make managerial decisions (as discussed 
before) and monitoring process of operation. In other words, as corporate strategy involvement is 
‘the determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of the enterprise and the adoption 
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of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals’820 it 
requires ‘an oversight function that, in the normative literature at least, implies some degree of 
confrontation’ 821  between directors and other corporate components. A control system is a 
process established to allow directors to monitor the operation of business according to corporate 
goals and assessing its continuation.822 In this context, the ongoing success of corporate depends 
on an effective internal and its activities.823 This control system operates by harmonizing various 
interests of stakeholders and coordinating different parts of organization.  
   The concept of control in this context signifies the importance of information. In other words, 
to establish an effective control mechanism directors need to set up an active system to get 
information from internal and external sources to assess operation of corporation in terms of its 
strategies in the context of market contingencies. Accordingly, the control system within the 
corporate provides feedback for directors that key aspects of operation and activities are properly 
running. The importance of directors’ effective control role in Islamic finance is more 
convoluted as they must establish an internal control system to monitor Shari’ah-compliant 
operation of Islamic financial institution. In this context, the control role of directors can be 
considered in two aspects: operational and strategic.  
   Operational control generally is about short-time financial performance of an institution. 
Operational control mainly monitors past and present financial operation according to the 
corporate budget and business plan. It encompasses output and quantitative controls based on ex 
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ante standards.824 In this regard, the evaluation of investments, liquidity and risk management 
are considered the most important components of operational control responsibility of directors. 
   The operational control by directors in the context of Islamic finance is not only a matter of 
value in economic sense. The main concern is controlling financial operation according to 
Shari’ah boards fatwas and not only according to ex ante regulatory and business standards. For 
example, Shari’ah -compliant risk management and control is a complex area in Islamic finance 
as ‘the risks are more aligned on the basis of contract types as a result of the special structuring 
of the contracts in Islamic banking’ and relationships of parties changes during the lifetime of the 
contract. 825  To set a proper risk management, four elements should be well defined: the 
construction of the financial contracts; the identification of markets; the identification of the 
counterparties; and the behaviour of the above two within a time period.826  In this regard, 
directors at each level of setting and monitoring must perform their control role according 
Shari’ah board rulings. In this regard, they are responsible to define a mechanism for asking 
fatwa and consulting with Shari’ah boards. 
   Strategic control refers to monitoring long-term goals and values of a business which are not 
necessarily financial. In the context of financial industry, the main focus of strategic control is on 
the boards’ involvement in evaluating product quality and human resources. In this regard, 
directors need to establish active and substantial cooperation with internal control units such as 
audit units. The Cadbury Code states that: ‘the directors should report on the effectiveness of the 
company’s system of internal controls’.827 The main responsibility of the audit unit is to monitor 
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operation of financial institution according to its established strategic goals and pattern. The 
audit unit in conventional systems is only responsible ‘to improve the quality of financial 
reporting, to reduce the potential for fraudulent practice……to review the adequacy of the 
company’s financial control systems.’828 However, in the context of Islamic finance, shari’ah 
audit unit as an additional layer of audit is responsible for monitoring operation of Islamic 
financial institution based on the Shari’ah boards’ rulings. It provides a link between directors’ 
strategic control role and Shari’ah board by its continuous watch and information giving. It is a 
vehicle to increase legitimacy of Islamic financial institution operation and directors decisions. 
  6.7 Conclusion 
 
   The separation of ownership and control as the foundation of modern corporate governance 
reflects the crucial role of the board of directors in value creation. In this regard, the agency costs 
resulting from directors’ agency role led corporate law to establish balance between their 
responsibility and authority. The Fiduciary duties of directors with regard to the success of 
company, reflect the nature of directorship as a legitimacy-making means in terms of the process 
of decision making and the efficiency of decisions. In this context, the strategy and control roles 
of board of directors in value-creation should be interpreted in an economic sense as they are 
based on the conventional precepts. However, the existence of Shari’ah board as an additional 
governance layer with religious function has raised questions over the concept of legitimacy and 
accordingly over the strategy and control roles of directors. In this regard, the concept of 
legitimacy in the context of Islamic finance bears a duality as it encompasses economic and 
religious factors together. As a consequence, strategy as the pattern of a company’s purposes 
                                                          




which reflects the values and objectives of the business must comply with Shari’ah board’s 
fatwas. In this regard, the strategy role of directors in terms of business development and 
value-creation should be examined according to Shari’ah board’s opinions. However, the lack of 
harmonization over risk management techniques and regulation of Islamic financial institutions 
led to ambiguity over the strategic role of directors and accordingly their discretionary power. 
Further, Shari’ah compliance affects the control role of directors in monitoring the operation of 
Islamic financial institution. In this context, their operational control approach in terms of 
short-term financial performance of the Islamic financial institution must be based on ex ante 
regulatory standards and Shari’ah board’s opinion. Also, the board of directors in their strategic 
control role is responsible to set the long-term values in terms of product quality and human 
resources according to Shari’ah board’s opinions through a strong internal communication with 
























  7.1 Introduction 
 
   Modern financial markets require all legal systems to provide effective legal mechanisms for 
the protection of investors’ rights. In this regard, the existence of an accountability system in its 
legal sense implies the importance of legitimacy in flourishing financial markets. Also a coherent 
Legal accountability system is accompanied by supportive social norms formed by the 
exigencies of time. In other words, an effective accountability system should demonstrate path 
dependence in its content and a historical coherence in its development. This chapter examines 
the fiduciary and non-fiduciary duties of directors (as legal mechanisms) against directors’ 
Shari’ah non-compliant decisions. First, it reflects on the Angelo-American concept of investor 
protection then studies the influence of social norms on the formation of corporate law and 
investor protection mechanisms. At the end, it analyses the applicability of fiduciary duty of 
loyalty and the non-fiduciary duty of care as legal mechanisms for the liability of directors with 





  7.2 Investor Protection In the context of Anglo-American 
Corporate Law 
 
   The examination of investor protection in the context of modern corporate law requires 
elucidation over the concepts of investment and investor. The concept and definition of investor 
is determined by the predominant concept of corporate and its governance structure. In this 
regard, the modern idea of corporate governance does not regard merely the concept of 
managerial capitalism829 as stakeholders including shareholders and creditors have given right to 
control and question directors’ decisions by the law. In fact, common law, equity, and statute 
developed fiduciary duties to limit discretionary power of directors and accordingly to provide a 
legal solution to make directors accountable for their decisions. In this regard, the concept of 
fiduciary duties mainly reflects a proscriptive essence as its main concern has been the 
prevention and prohibition of conflict of interests and other forms of abuse of trust by directors. 
Further, increasing competition and the need for more investment in financial markets 
necessitated a self-regulatory system in a broad sense to control and prevent directors’ 
underperformance and accordingly takeover bid by other competitors.830 
   In the context of modern financial markets, the notions of investment and investor have 
changed alongside developments in the concepts of property and ownership. In this regard, the 
concepts of rights and corrective mechanisms also reflect consistency in their nature indicating 
historical changes in Law and markets. In other words, the modern notions of investment and 
investor are not based on the mere concept of ownership, but real control. As a result, the 
                                                          





liabilities of corporate directors and managers are interpreted according to the exigencies of 
market and changes in the law. 
   The word ‘invest’ indicates ‘the employment of money from which interest or profit is 
expected…..the obtaining of interest or profit is the defining characteristic of an investor’.831 In 
this regard, In Inland Revenue Commissioners v Rolls Royce Ltd832Justice Macnaghten offered a 
general definition for the word ‘investment’: ‘the word investment, though it primarily means the 
act of investing, is in common use as meaning that which is thereby acquired; and the meaning of 
the verb ‘to invest’ is to lay out money in the acquisition of some species of property’. This 
broad definition of investment reflects its financial nature as encompasses all types of property. 
As Lord Greene MR in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Desoutter Brothers833 noted: ‘the 
question whether or not a particular piece of income received from an investment must, in my 
view, be decided on the facts of the case… [Investment] is not a word of art but has to be 
interpreted in a popular sense’.   
   A profound perception on corporation in the context of corporate law is prone to a systematic 
view under which regulatory and legal forces are not the only creators of the modern corporation 
but the real association of all players such as investors and employees determines its concept and 
scope. In other words, ‘corporations do not arise by spontaneous generation’, and as a result the 
roles and responsibilities of directors and managers are assumed with knowledge of 
consequences.834 In this regard, all kinds of promises made by directors and their actions taken 
to encourage investors to believe them are deeply dependent on how to prevent and reduce 
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conflict of interests by legal and social enforcement mechanisms.835 In fact, legal and social 
enforcement mechanisms act as deterrence means to prevent misconducts and the breach of 
duties by directors. For instance, fiduciary duties reflected in common law and statutes are 
regarded as means to disincentivize corporate actors with regard to the violation of their 
responsibilities through the threat of liability. Further, dynamics of markets drive directors to act 
according to the interests of investors836 as any underperformance and the breach of duty will 
result in loss of investor confidence.  
   From a legal point of view, it is assumed that legal systems with more protective laws and 
standards attract more investment, and as a result have better developed capital markets.837 In 
fact, differences in the content, context and enforcement of laws reflect the existence of various 
patterns for corporate finance.838 Although different legal systems establish different patterns for 
investor protection reflected in various legal sources such as corporate law, insolvency laws, 
criminal laws, securities laws and contract law; they pursue a common goal. In this regard, the 
protection of investors from expropriation by insiders is regarded as the main purpose for 
investor protection laws. Expropriation in Anglo-American sense refers to agency problems and 
consumption of ‘perquisites’ by managers.839 Expropriation may take various forms based on 
different financial and legal systems.840 For instance, insiders (such as directors) may steal and 
sell investors’ profits and assets in financial institutions or projects which they are beneficiary. 
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Also, expropriation can be in the form of diversion of corporate opportunities from the firm or 
weak inside corporate governance system by employing unqualified directors.841   
   In this regard, the legal approach applied for investor protection explains the reasons for 
directors’ responsibility to act in investors’ interests, the return of profits, and accordingly the 
potential liability for the breach of any of them. This approach is expressed in contractual views 
over corporate law as they see a corporate comprised of a set of connected contracts between 
insiders and investors that give them right to claim for cash flows. As a result, ‘changing the 
capital structure of the firm changes the allocation of power between the insiders and the outside 
investors, and thus almost surly changes the firm’s investment policy.’842  In this regard, to 
prevent or decrease the risk of expropriation and accordingly the loss of investors’ confidence, a 
protective legal system should define effective legal rights for the relations between investors 
and insiders. In Jensen and Mecling words: ‘this view of the firm points up the important role 
which the legal system and the law play in social organizations, especially the organization of 
economic activity. Statutory law sets bounds on the kinds of contracts into which individuals and 
organizations may enter without risking criminal prosecution. The police powers of the state are 
available and used to enforce performance of contracts or to enforce the collection of damages 
for non-performance. The courts adjudicate contracts between contracting parties and establish 
precedents which form the body of common law. All of these government activities affect both 
the kinds of contracts executed and the extent to which contracting is relied upon.’843  
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   In this regard, the economic rationale behind the contractarian approach reflects a deep 
contradiction to legal approach over investor protection. According to contractarian view, the 
efficiency of financial contracts requires no regulatory intervention by law since they take place 
between sophisticated issuers and sophisticated investors.844 Further, corporate as a nexus of 
contracts is comprised of various (explicit or implicit) contracts among stakeholders for 
economic returns.845 Therefore, shareholders are not regarded as the owners of the company and 
accordingly their rights are similar to bondholders. In other words, from a legal point of view, 
shareholders and bondholders are all regarded as investors and their contracts’ terms determine 
the level of protection they need. Further, the existence of effective enforcement mechanisms 
(through court or market) is the essential part of this theory. For instance, investors can penalize 
companies for not disclosing information and accordingly impose more costs on them. As a 
result, to avoid these risks and costs companies have an incentive to bind themselves through 
contracts to investors to limit expropriation.846   
   The role of law in this theory is a supportive one as it facilitates contracting through default 
rules and ensures a reasonable outcome in unexpected events such as the violation of investors’ 
rights.847 In other words ‘the ideal corporate laws would be the most efficient default rules: the 
focus of legislatures and courts should be on enforcing those rules that the parties themselves 
would have entered into had they negotiated the matter.’848 However, this theory does not regard 
the role of courts in enforcement very serious since due to time and resources restrictions they 
are often unable to ascertain facts related to complicated contracts. For instance, Legal systems 
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based on common law institutions have more effective judicial and regulatory enforcement than 
civil law systems849 as courts have power to establish new concepts according to new context. 
Further, legal rules in common law system are based on precedents inspired by general principles 
such as fairness and fiduciary duties.850 In this regard, the expansion of those general rules to 
unprecedented conducts limits expropriation by insiders and accordingly provides more 
protective environment for the investment of all investors. 851  For instance, since from the 
seventeenth century courts in England came under the control of parliament and property 
owners, over time they extended protection to investors too.852  
   However, despite the existence of similar rules between common law systems, they have not 
experienced similar paths in the development of investor protection. It is discussed that, the 
contribution of common law in UK to investor protection at the beginning of the twentieth 
century in fact was devoid of antidirector rights provisions and protection of small investors.853 
In 1843 a landmark case Foss v. Harbottle854 undermined the rights of minority investors to seek 
protection through the courts and accordingly this principle was upheld in the British company 
law.855 In Lord Justice Hoffman words: ‘A statutory remedy was provided for the first time in 
1948 but this proved relatively ineffectual. It was not until 1980 that parliament forged the sword 
which is now section 459 of the Companies Act of 1985 and which enables the unfairly treated 
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minority shareholder to slay the dragon.’856 In this regard, at the beginning of the last century the 
courts involvement in directors’ breach of fiduciary duties was little, and there was only three 
cases in corporate crime and liability of directors over their fiduciary duties.857 It is suggested 
that the reason why courts were reluctant to deal with directors’ liabilities cases is that the 
articles of companies granted directors extensive discretionary power over the company 
transactions in the course of their business, and accordingly the principle of freedom of contract 
as an extra legal means supported directors to justify their discretionary decisions. 858  For 
instance in the cases of Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations859 and City Equitable Fire Insurance 
Company,860 even in the neglect or breach of fiduciary duties, the courts endorsed companies’ 
articles of association with regard to the limited liability of directors.861  
   The main source of development of investor protection in the UK are in legislation and stock 
market rules. For instance, principles of Caveat emptor and listing rules were deeply embedded 
at the beginning of the twentieth century.862 In 1944 due to increasing concerns over dispersion 
capital among an increasing number of small shareholders, the Cohen Committee on Company 
Law was set up. 863  As a result, the 1948 Companies Act introduced a variety of investor 
protection mechanisms such as resolutions for shareholders to remove directors easier. In other 
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words, common law has not been an effective and sufficient means alone, rather statute and 
stock market rules strengthened investor protection.864   




   To have a coherent legal system, the existence of dependency and consistency in its content is 
prerequisite. In this regard, consistency strengthens the effectiveness of legal enforcement and 
accordingly provides predictability for all legal relationships. However, the consistency in 
content drives the concept and form of ‘path dependence’ in context too. In other words, a 
profound study of origination and application of legal rules in a judicial system necessitates 
study over the role of social norms in their development. Particularly, from a historical point of 
view, since the law of investor protection does not reflect a mere legal and judicial essence, it is 
essential to consider social and legal norms together in the study. In this regard, for instance the 
development of the law of investor protection in the UK should be searched in provincial stock 
market rules.865 The rapid increase in the number of provincial companies and the application of 
concentrating ownership among local investors played an important role in promoting shares’ 
issues as local vendors realized the importance of elimination of dishonest promotion in their 
business reputation and accordingly in their business value.866  Further, securities exchanges 
were mainly informal and placed by private negotiation among local people.867In other words, 
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the informal relations among investors and firms were based on social norms with non-legal 
characteristics and consequences emphasized on trust and fairness in the market.   
   Regarding the importance of liability of directors in corporate law, the informal relations of 
trust in the development of investor protection mechanisms and capital markets reflect an 
informality in the concept of liability in connection to investors’ rights. In other words, legal 
history shows a kind of formal ‘no liability’ rule with regard to directors’ duties.868 In this 
regard, it is discussed that extra-legal mechanisms such as social norms provide security against 
corporate mismanagement and malpractices.869 The importance of social norms in the UK with 
regard to investor protection mechanism can be described in terms of trust in informal relations 
between investors and firms. Trust in those relations bears economic and legal meanings. It 
refers to ‘conformity with accepted norms of behaviour in the absence of explicit incentives or 
penalties to do so. It can derive from repeated interactions, moral and ethical codes, or the social 
conventions and networks discussed in the extensive sociological literature on the subject.’870 In 
other words, the concept of trust implies a kind of commitment between investors and directors 
which produces value according to social norms. For instance, one of the reasons for the 
development of trust between investors and directors (and as a result the development of capital 
markets) in the UK is the role of local stock exchanges and the close proximity of investors to 
firms. 871  This account reveals the role of culture 872  in the formation of law and its path 
dependence.  
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   In this regard, social norms, customs and traditions as informal institutions play an important 
role in the development of law.873 Since these informal institutions are linked to all social and 
legal institutions, they have strong influence on the way a society conduct itself.874  In this 
context, culture operates as a means to harmonize incentives and expectations in formal and 
informal interactions. It impacts the formation of organizational policies and individual decisions 
through influencing the content of formal legal rules.875 In this regard, legal rules on investors’ 
rights established in various laws reflect not only the practice of justice and the structure of a 
society, also demonstrate the cultural orientation. 876  For instance, the cultural value of 
uncertainty avoidance in Germany is the reason for the existence of tightly controlled legal 
procedure which is completely in contrast with relatively unpredictable lawyer-dominated 
American trial.877  
   In this regard, the legal and economic accounts of social and cultural norms, particularly in 
corporate law only consider external reasons (mainly economic) for their application and 
disregard the process under which those norms have been originated and internalized.878 In fact, 
the belief-system of actors reflects the power of obligational and non-obligational norms in 
providing incentives and disincentives.879From the legal point of view, legal rules as obligational 
norms are the main factors to affect human conduct by providing legal liability and sanctions. On 
the other hand, non-obligational norms such as social and ethical norms are regarded as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
result, social actors draw on these values and norms to evaluate and justify their actions. See Amir N. 
Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt and Shalom H. Schwartz, ‘Culture, Law, and Corporate Governance’ (2005) 
25 International Review of Law and Economics 229.  
873 Licht (n 872). 
874 ibid 232. 
875 ibid.  
876 ibid 234-236. 
877 Oscar G. Chase, ‘Legal Processes and National Culture’ (1997) 5 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1. 





internalized obligations which there is no utility or cost-benefit consideration in their choice by 
players. 880  In other words, sympathy and commitment are the sources of motivation and 
obligation.881 Those non-legal sources are established based on traditions and beliefs coming 
from social and religious norms. In this context, social norms have been applied in corporate 
governance principles and codes in terms of ethical considerations relevant to the conduct of 
business even if corporate profit is not enhanced.882   
  7.3 The Fiduciary and Non-Fiduciary Duties of Directors With 
Regard to Shari’ah Board’ Opinions 
 
 
   Directors due to their position are regarded as fiduciaries and accordingly bear all fiduciary 
obligations established in equity and statute. Further, the scope of their fiduciary duties are 
mainly defined by case law and social norms. However, the efficient function of obligational 
norms requires support by liability mechanisms provided by legal rules as the consequence of the 
breach of those norms. In this regard, also it is discussed that the non-legal factors such as 
belief-system may induce change in norms (norm-shift) and accordingly legal authorities through 
judgements or legislation induce change in belief-system.883  
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   Generally, the controversy over the core character of fiduciary accountability884 arose in the 
second half of the twentieth century as the result of changes in economic and financial 
transactions.885 In this regard, the main regulatory function of fiduciary rules was deemed to 
control opportunism.886 The application of this approach (mainly proscriptive) in the function of 
fiduciary rules are well described in two cases.887 In Parker v McKenna Lord Cairns outlined: 
‘……no man can in this Court, acting as agent, be allowed to put himself into a position in which 
his interest and his duty will be in conflict…all that the court has to do is examine whether a 
profit has been made by an agent, without the knowledge of his principal in the course and 
execution of his agency.’ This approach is based on the moral essence of fiduciary duties as they 
are prudent default governance mechanism and function as barrier to human opportunistic 
behaviour. 888  Further, the function of fiduciary duties implies the importance of loyalty in 
value-creation. In this regard, the production of value for others means limited access889 to assets 
since they should be used only for specific goals. Further, ‘opportunism is a generic mischief and 
it attracts a generic regulation across all limited access relations’.890        
   Directors’ fiduciary duties in corporate law are mainly concerned about loyalty and good faith 
of directors in exercising their functions. In this regard, there has been two main streams in 
fiduciary duties: negative and positive. As the result of the differences over the meaning and 
scope of directors’ fiduciary duties in common law jurisdictions, the provided remedies are also 
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different. This issue is particularly more convoluted under English law as there are different 
approaches in case law. For instance, the approach of the directors’ duty to promote the success 
of the company in Attorney-General v Blacke891 and the approach in Item Software v Fassihi 
reflect no defined legal idea for the interpretation of fiduciary duties.892  
   In this regard, it is discussed that the function of fiduciary rules is not to supervise the 
management of directors, but to perform as a civil liability to regulate self-interested conduct.893 
Further, to understand the nature of directors’ fiduciary duties it is important to distinguish 
between nominate and fiduciary regulation.894 According to this view, the duty to act in the best 
interest of the principal is not a fiduciary duty but a nominate duty.895 In Flannigan words: ‘the 
fiduciary duty is a separate parallel or general obligation designed to support the nominate 
undertaking in one specific respect - to suppress regard for self’.896  However, this view is 
controversial in the context of directors’ fiduciary duties since there has been no analysis either 
in the source or content of duties and remedies.897 Further, ‘the success of the company’ in the 
companies Act 2006 implies a positive obligation for directors to perform in the best interests of 
the company. This broad view is supported by the US courts too.898   
   In this regard, the history of corporate law in the UK reflects development in fiduciary 
relations and obligations. When joined stocked companies acquired the form and status of 
corporation, the legal position of parties undergone profound changes. In this context, the partner 
position of former stockholders was replaced by shareholder position and accordingly they were 
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no more principal in relation to business. As the result of those changes, all contractual and 
vicarious liability of former partners were transferred to the new corporation and as a 
consequence, new shareholders as statutory investors have been no longer fiduciaries as their 
fiduciary statute transferred to corporation. However, the fiduciary position of management (now 
directors) has gone no change and only the identity of the person (corporation) to whom they 
owed fiduciary duties changed.899 In this regard, shareholders granted open access to corporation 
with regard to assets and discretionary power.900 Further, the fiduciary obligations of directors 
have been not only statute-based, but fact-based as ‘one actor has trusted the other with limited 
access.’901  
   Regarding directors’ nominate obligations; they are subject to different layers of regulation902 
such as agency law, corporate law and specific sectorial rules. In this context, since fiduciary 
accountability and liability are subject to different layers of regulation, the nature and scope of 
fiduciary duties such as loyalty also do not reflect a fixed concept in all cases. In other words, 
these additional layers modify the content of the conventional regulation without representing a 
specific fiduciary regulation.903   
   The issue is more complex in Islamic financial industry as directors should apply Sharia 
boards’ rulings. We have two issues over the application of Shari’ah boards’ rulings by directors: 
first, as we discussed in the last chapter, directors as fiduciaries have to apply Shari’ah boards’ 
fatwas. The question here is: what is the criterion for the loyalty of directors as they are only 
responsible (according to the statute) to the company not stakeholders? This question has an 
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implicit dimension with regard to the application of proscriptive or prescriptive approaches. 
Second, we have a gap in the concepts of accountability and sanction in the event of the violation 
of Shari’ah boards’ fatwas by directors. The root of those ambiguities rests on the social gap in 
the establishment and application of Islamic finance principles and also the governance 
mechanisms applied in the context of conventional regulatory system.   
  7.3.1 The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty 
 
   Regarding the confusion over the nature of fiduciary obligations and liabilities, it is a failure 
to focus on the meaning of loyalty without considering the context of fiduciaries.904 Particularly 
in the context of Islamic finance the meaning of duty of loyalty is more complex as it bears a 
religious character and also there is no established perception over the concept of board of 
directors’ duty of loyalty in applying Shari’ah boards’ fatwas.   
   From a narrow point of view, the function of directors’ duty of loyalty should be described as 
a mechanism for controlling opportunism. This proscriptive view over the nature and scope of 
fiduciary obligations is founded upon the no conflict and no profit rules. In this regard, two 
famous cases illustrated the application of this theory. In Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver905, there 
was no breach of the duty to promote the interests of the company, and only the unauthorised 
profit was the basis for the breach of no profit rule and therefore the breach of fiduciary duty. In 
Cook v Deeks906 the defendants acted in the breach of ‘no conflict’ and ‘no liability’ duties since 
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they diverted contracts which should have been fulfilled by the claimant company to their new 
company.907  
   Those rules convey the concept of trust in directors’ duties. In this regard, although in some 
cases judges have been distracted by the issue of whether directors are fiduciaries, it is clear that 
they were meant the idea that fiduciary rules against opportunism are originated in the trust 
context.908  Lord Cranworth in Aberdeen Rail Co v Blaikie Brothers909  outlined the agency 
nature of directorship. Directors convey their agency duty to promote the interests of the 
company and a separate fiduciary duty to act without conflict of interests in the course of that 
agency.910   
   In this regard, it is discussed that the discretionary power of directors are their capacities and 
are not fiduciary in essence.911 They acquire fiduciary characteristic when they are exercised by 
fiduciaries.912 Consequently, other nominate obligations such as duty to act in the best interest of 
the company are obligations assigned to them by the general law. 913  In fact, this duty as 
Flannigan observes, is a positive default rule of agency law and accordingly has a distinct 
application: ‘the best interest rule has a wider ambit than the fiduciary proscription. Serving 
one’s own interest is but one way in which directors might fail to act in the best interest of the 
corporation.’914 Further, the fiduciary responsibility is only concerned with whether a decision is 
compromised by conflict or a personal benefit.915 In this regard, it is discussed that, this duty is 
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outside of trust-like relationships and is ‘one of those exceptional duties of care which requires 
positive action but does not exclude self-interest.’916 As a result, a generic fiduciary regulation 
cannot provide content to the duty of care and such an obligation is the preserve of the contract 
or the assumption of responsibility in tort.917  
   However, the operation of the prospective regime is questioned. As Professor Birks observed: 
‘the obligation of disinterestedness cannot be served from the obligation to promote and 
preserve. It does not make sense without that principal obligation. An independent obligation to 
abstain from pursuing interests of one’s own is unintelligible, certainly unworkable. The very 
formulation of the chief restatement of this obligation shows that it is an obligation of 
disinterestedness in the course of doing something: the trustee shall not pursue any interest of his 
own which might possibly conflict with his duty to the beneficiary, scilicet his duty to promote 
and preserve the interest of the beneficiary…the core obligation of trustee is the compound 
obligation and it is indivisible at least in the sense that while the positive obligation of care can 
exist on its own, the obligation of disinterestedness cannot.’918  Further, the essence of ‘no 
conflict’ and ‘no profit’ duties serve as deterrence means to prevent directors from breaching 
their positive obligations. 919  Consequently, this approach is regarded impractical as is not 
consistent with the current prescriptive approach of English law demonstrated in case law and 
statute.  
   In the context of Islamic finance, Shari’ah compliance and directors’ fiduciary duty of loyalty 
in the application of Shari’ah boards’ fatwas should be examined with regard to the both 
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proscriptive and prescriptive approaches. As discussed before, there is a trust-like relationship 
between directors, company and shareholders in terms of Shari’ah compliant financial products 
and the governance of Islamic financial institutions. From a proscriptive point of view, if we 
only consider no conflict and no interest rules we would have a narrow perception over directors’ 
duty of loyalty in the application of fatwas. In this regard, directors would be liable if they 
compromise discretion for their own interests. For instance, if applying a Shari’ah ruling in the 
structure of a product will impact negatively the competitive level of a financial institution in 
which they are shareholder. The problem in this approach is its narrow view over the concept of 
‘interest’. In Islamic finance the application of Shari’ah boards’ fatwas conveys a religious duty 
which must be observed even it decreases economic value or profit. In this regard, to ensure 
stakeholders over Shari’ah compliant decisions of directors, it is necessary to consider directors 
liable for their non-Shari’ah compliant decisions even there is no element of opportunism in their 
functions. However, since there is no specific regulation for fiduciary obligations of directors of 
Islamic financial institutions, we must establish the legal debate according to common Law 
institutions.  
   From an economic point of view, the concept of loyalty can be defined based on the economic 
relationship between legal and social norms. According to this view, fiduciary principles are 
contractual devices 920  and should be considered in terms of their efficiency. This view is 
Contrary to the ‘fraud-on-the-market’ theory under which the reliance required in rule 10b-5 can 
be disposed of in efficient capital markets as its focus is on the effect of misrepresentation on the 
                                                          
920 Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, ‘Good Finance, Bad Economics: an Analysis of the 




security’s prices rather than on the individuals’ reliance on a misrepresentation.921 In Macey and 
Miller words: ‘this economic perspective is important because it generates a mechanism by 
which courts can decide cases. In particular, when scrutinizing managerial behaviour, courts 
should treat an allegation of a breach of fiduciary duty as they would treat any alleged breach of 
contract. This analytic method often is described as the ‘hypothetical bargain’ approach. Under 
this approach to fiduciary duty, courts would evaluate whether the managers’ actions were 
consistent with the terms of a hypothetical fully specified, contingent contract that informed, 
value maximizing investors would have agreed to ex ante.’922 Based on this view, directors 
should be exempted from liability if their lies are made with good faith to increase shareholders’ 
interests and do not create negative externalities. 923  In other words, this view supports an 
instrumental approach in fiduciary obligations and ignores the expressive function of law.924  
   The application of this view in the context of Islamic finance is problematic not only with 
regard to the expressive function of law (and its negative social impacts), also in respect to 
economic reasons. In this regard, economic reasoning does not affirm such an approach since it 
reduces trust between directors and investors, as a consequence reduces the benefits of 
corporation. In this context, directors’ fiduciary duty of loyalty over the application of Shari’ah 
boards’ fatwas cannot be understood as a mere contractual duty as law imposes it too.925  
   From a prescriptive approach, the duty of loyalty requires directors to act within their powers 
and any diversion from company’s constitution leads to their liability. 926  Contrary to the 
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proscriptive approach under which the application of the best interest is not the main concern of 
fiduciary duties, the prescriptive interpretation of loyalty necessitates concerns about the 
prosperity of the company. In other words, in contrast to the proscriptive approach under which 
directors exercise their power only for ‘proper purpose’ regardless of the best interest of the 
company,927 directors in prescriptive approach are required to have a broad view about their 
loyalty and accordingly being concerned about both proper purpose and the efficiency of their 
decisions. In the context of Islamic finance, since Shari’ah compliance as the ultimate goal is 
mainly about the implementation of fatwas by directors, the duty of loyalty in terms of the 
success of the company should be defined according to application of fatwas too. In other words, 
the loyalty of directors and the success of company are defined according to the Shari’ah boards’ 
fatwas.  
  7.3.2 The Non-Fiduciary Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence 
 
   The concept and scope of directors’ duty of care, skill and diligence has been developed by 
courts. This duty is not fiduciary duty and as the Companies Act in s 178 (2) expresses, it is a 
statutory statement of common law duty of care. In this regard, the distinction between fiduciary 
and other duties should be examined in terms of consequences for the breach of those duties. 
Millett LJ in Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew928 elucidated that while the breach of 
fiduciary duties attracts equitable remedies which are mainly restitutionary and restorative, the 
breach of other duties such as duty of care attract compensatory remedies. Further, he pointed 
out the importance of the breach of loyalty in fiduciary duties and not a mere lack of 
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competence.929 In this regard, the liability for the breach of duty of care may be examined in tort 
or in contract when a director has a contract of employment.930  
   Regarding the concept of the duty of care, skill and diligence, it is assumed that this is one 
duty and contrary to its form, it does not consists of three separate obligations since the emphasis 
on the strength of the standard of care, skill and diligence has not been mentioned specifically for 
each of them.931 However, despite the unified structure of this duty, its components reflect 
different meanings. In this regard, The Honourable Justice recognises the different elements of 
care and skill as: ‘[skill refers to the] ‘special competence which is not part of the ordinary 
equipment of the reasonable man but the result of aptitude developed by special training and 
experience which requires those who undertake work calling for special skill not only to exercise 
reasonable care but to measure up to the standard of proficiency than can be expected from 
persons undertaking such work.’ Care involves the manner in which the skill is applied….in the 
past, skill has not been regarded as a requirement, and the standard of care expected has been 
low.’932 Moreover, on duty of care Mackenzie states: ‘the former [i.e. the duty of care] refers to 
any duties concerning factors which the layman might employ in debating issues which he is 
called upon as a director to consider.’933   
   The term ‘diligence’ has been explained as ‘expected level of active engagement in company 
affairs.’934 In this regard, it is believed, although the term diligence should be interpreted with 
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considering the limited ability of directors to have a number of skills, it is generally expected that 
they act carefully.935 Diligence equates to consciousness and attentiveness of a director to take 
an active interest in ensuring that the affairs of the company are properly looked after. 936 
Further: ‘in Dorchester Finance Ltd. v. Stebbing, Foster J, suggests that the law imposes an 
objective standard of ‘care’; that of the ordinary man acting on his own behalf. The standard of 
‘skill’ however is said to be subjective; that which may reasonably be expected from a person 
with his knowledge and experience.’937 In this regard, the development of case law over the 
nature of a director’s position as fiduciary and its difference from trustee position has affected 
the duty of care. It is admitted that directors cannot be regarded as trustees since they are 
expected to take risk and carry on business according to business rules and exigencies and938 
accordingly, their duty of care should be interpreted with regard to the characteristics of the 
company’s business and the context they function. 
   Further, In English law directors have collective responsibility in the management of the 
company, but equally directors’ duties are ‘personal and inescapable duties’939, and accordingly 
each director must meet the standard of care, skill and diligence.940 As Lord Woolf MR in Re 
Westmid Packing Services Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Griffiths941 states: 
‘….the collegiate or collective responsibility of the board of directors of a company is of 
fundamental importance to corporate governance under English Company Law. That collegiate 
or collective responsibility must however be based on individual responsibility. Each individual 
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director owes duties to the company to inform himself about its affairs and to join with his 
co-directors in supervising and controlling them.’   
   The development of standard of care in common law has been gradually. In this regard, the 
traditional view implies a low standard of care for directors as directorship was regarded as the 
representation of a class of society, not qualification and skill.942 In this context, professionalism 
or the expectation of certain professional qualities was not required as directors were appointed 
for their status, rather than for their business ability.943 In this regard, in Overend, Gurney & Co 
v Gibb944 a test of ‘ordinary prudence’ was introduced: ‘whether or not the directors exceeded 
the powers entrusted to them, or whether, if they did not,….they were cognisant of facts of such 
a character, so plain, so manifest, and so simple of appreciation, that no men with any ordinary 
degree of prudence, acting on their own behalf, would have entered into such a transaction as 
they entered into.’ 
   In the case Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co945, Romer J recognised the lack of clear 
authorities946 for directors and reviewed the traditional standard: ‘(1) A director need not exhibit 
in the performance of his duties a greater degree of skill than may reasonably be expected from a 
person with his knowledge and experience ... It is perhaps only another way of stating the same 
proposition to say that directors are not liable for mere errors of judgment. (2) A director is not 
bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of his company. His duties are of an intermittent 
nature to be performed at periodical board meetings...He is not, however, bound to attend all 
such meetings, though he ought to attend whenever, in the circumstances, he is reasonably able 
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to do so. (3) In respect of all duties that, having regard to the exigencies of a business, and the 
articles of association, may properly be left to some other official, a director is, in the absence of 
grounds for suspicion, justified in trusting that official to perform such duties honestly.’947  
   In contrast to the traditional approach in English law948, in the US, states previously did not 
regard negligence (for any degree) the main factor for directors’ liability, and instead they were 
only liable for fraud or intentional misconduct.949 The term ‘negligence’ has been described as ‘a 
state of mind opposing an intentional action, which is done not with the desire to producing a 
particular result by carelessness or indifferent.’950 Also, the term ‘negligence’ can be defined as 
the careless conduct without any reference being made to any duty being imposed to take care.951 
In the older cases, the term ‘negligence’ was used to explain the omission to perform a required 
act.952 In this regard, the modern American case law has applied three standards for the breach of 
duty of care which all have some degree of negligence: 1) only the degree of care required to 
avoid gross negligence; 2) the degree of care that an ordinary prudent director in a like position 
would exercise under similar circumstances; 3) the degree of care that an ordinary prudent 
person would exercise in conducting personal business affairs.953 However, the modern US trend 
requires the exercise of a degree of care from an ordinary prudent person under similar position 
and circumstances. 954  According to the Model Business Corporate Act: ‘A director shall 
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discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a committee:…..2) with 
the care an ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances;..’955 
   Further, the fiduciary duty of care in the US is concerned about the standard of conduct and 
review applicable to directors who act or fail to act in a matter that does not involve his own 
interest.956 In this regard, s. 4.01 (a) of The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate 
Governance sets the modern standard of care as fpllows: ‘A director or officer has a duty to the 
corporation to perform the director’s or officer’s function in good faith, in a manner that he or 
she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an 
ordinary prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under 
similar circumstances. This Subsection (a) is subject to the provisions of Subsection (c) (the 
business judgement rule) where applicable.’  
   In this regard, the connection between business judgement rule and the duty of care in the US 
law is considered in the sense that if directors’ taken decision was rational, in an informed 
manner and without self-interest, it will not be in the breach of the duty of care.957 Further, the 
business judgement rule in the US law is rooted in tort law as the directors’ decisions must be 
reasonable and accordingly ‘is designed to stimulate risk taking, innovation and other creative 
entrepreneurial activities.’958 
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   However, the introduction of business judgment rule in the UK has not been recommended by 
the Law Commission959as the application of the rule is established in the practice of English 
courts. In this regard, Parkinson has argued that the rule is an ‘articulate version of the policy of 
judicial reticence that is implicit in the practice of the English courts.’960 In fact the business 
judgement rule is well reflected in the English courts’ approach in commercial cases under which 
‘to substitute [their] opinion for that of the management, or indeed to question the correctness of 
the management’s decision…..if bona fide arrived at.’961  
The expected standard of care laid down in the Companies Act 2006 reflects a dual objective and 
subjective test.962  In this regard, the objective standard set in the law requires a minimum 
standard of care in the context of the directors’ functions, which the personal attributes of 
directors (subjective standard) cannot lower them.963  
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    The examination of the breach of duty of care by directors in the context of Islamic finance 
requires inquiry over the existence of any formal legal regulation such as legislation or case law, 
and the standard of care in the context of Shari’ah finance. The Shari’ah finance industry in the 
UK is established according to the conventional institutions and there is no specific regulation or 
privilege for it. As a result, the violation of Shari’ah rulings by directors must be examined 
according to the UK laws and custom. In this context, since Islamic finance industry has not 
presented a real self-regulation system, the regulation of Shari’ah compliance and the application 
of Shari’ah boards’ fatwas by directors are mainly discussed according to conventional laws.  
In the English law, from a contractual point of view, directors are responsible for proper care, 
skill and diligence. In this regard, one consequence of the corporate separate legal personality is 
that a director may be the employee of that company. In this regard, although executive and 
non-executive directors have collective responsibility for the governance of the company, 
executive directors due to their management power delegated to them by the company articles of 
association and their service contracts bear more responsibility. Further, executive directors due 
to the nature of their service contracts may be considered office-holders (as they are in the 
position of authority) and accordingly as employees.964 In this regard, non-executive directors 
are not regarded employees as they do not have service contract with the company.  
   In employment law, regarding the nature of the contract, some obligations of directors over 
their duty of care are more implied and do not appear in service contracts.965 In this context, as 
directors are senior employees, according to employment law they are subject to two implied 
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terms: first, employees must show reasonable skill966 and secondly they must perform their 
duties with reasonable care.967 In this regard, the unreasonable performance of directors results 
in liability for loss by virtue of their negligence.968 Further, the use of reasonable skill and care 
implies the importance of being competent to the job since incompetence is a breach of 
contract.969  
   Regarding the implied contractual standard of care and skill expected from directors of a 
company, it is discussed that reference to ‘reasonableness’ implies the objective standards of care 
in employees’ performance which are based on an ordinary employee in his duty.970 In the 
context of Shari’ah finance industry, the objective standards of care and skill are not as clear as 
the conventional one. For instance, although the objective standards for the performance of a 
reasonable finance director are established according to conventional knowledge precepts, we do 
not have clear standards for the Shari’ah compliant performance. The problem is more severe in 
the single regulatory systems, such as the UK as there is no regulation for Shari’ah compliant 
directorship. Further, the existence of many Shari’ah boards without agreement over the concept 
of Shari’ah compliance impedes the industry to present objective standards of care and skill. 
However, customs in the market made by practitioners and well-known Shari’ah scholars can fill 
this gap and accordingly serve as objective standards. In this regard, the lack of the concept of 
professionalism in terms of rules and practices has prevented the formation of a harmonised 
objective standards in the industry too.  
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   It is discussed that directors’ statutory duty of care and the application of its objective 
standard should be construed with regard to directors’ functions. In Re Barings plc (No. 5), 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker (No 5)971, Jonathon Parker J underlined that 
the competence of directors must be assessed in the context of and the management role in the 
company assigned to them or which he in fact assumed and by reference to their responsibilities 
in that role.972 He stressed that: ‘thus the existence and extent of any particular duty will depend 
upon how the particular business is organized and upon what part in the management of that 
business the respondent could reasonably be expected to play (see Bishopsgate Investment 
Management Ltd (in liq) v Maxwell (No 2) [1993] BCLC 1282 per Hoffmann LJ).’973 In this 
regard, the general content of the duty of care and the function of directors should be interpreted 
with regard to the complexity and size of business. In other words, the relevant minimum 
functions of directors must be considered with regard to the role, structure and financial position 
of the company.974  
   In the context of Islamic finance, directors’ statutory duty of care must be interpreted with 
regard to their functions in the Islamic financial institution. To assess their duty of care, the 
objective standards are required according to their functions. In other words, statutory objective 
standards must regard Shari’ah factor in the assessment of directors’ duty of care. Shari’ah factor 
here includes not only the rulings and opinions of Shari’ah board and Shari’ah department of the 
relevant Islamic financial institution, also the practice in the market. Further, directors’ duty of 
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care in the Islamic finance industry cannot be assessed without inquiry over their personal 
knowledge and experience (subjective test). Since the Islamic finance bears some particular 
characteristics, it is reasonable to expect directors practicing in this area to enjoy expertise and 
experience for the business. 
   This subjective test is connected to the content of the directors’ duty of care in Islamic fiancé 
industry. Both English and US law975 recognise the duty of care, skill and diligence that includes 
duty of knowledge, inquiry and supervision too. In this regard, sufficient knowledge is required 
for understanding company’s business, taking informed decisions and controlling the operation 
of the company. In Re Barings plc (No 5) Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker (No 
5) Jonathan Parker J recognised and emphasised on those duties.976 Further, the delegation of 
power does not abolish directors’ responsibility for supervision.977 In this regard, the residual 
duty to supervise depends on the nature of the transaction and the potential risk or loss 
involved.978 In this context, the individual role of a director requires him to examine the quality 
of the system he is responsible for, and at the board level the collective responsibility require all 
directors to ensure about the proper internal and external control systems in terms of risk 
management. 979  in this regard, in cases Francis v United Jersey Bank 980  and Smith v Van 
Gorkom981 (the Trans Union Case) US courts stressed on the importance of directorial activity, 
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familiarity with the company business, continuous supervision982 and the examination of the 
actual process.983   
   In the context of Islamic finance, since Shari’ah compliance is the core objective of the 
industry, Shari’ah risk management must be the individual and collective responsibility of 
directors and accordingly the breach of duty of care must be examined with regard to this core 
objective. In this regard, directors are responsible to implement an effective internal Shari’ah 
compliance risk management system and have regular connection with Shari’ah board and 
Shari’ah department. However, the Companies Act and common law don not consider any 
religious element in the duty. In fact, the purpose of the fiduciary and non-fiduciary duties have 
been to inspire entrepreneurship, innovation, and to prevent self-interested behaviours by 
directors. In this regard, the concept of loss resulted from directors’ breach of duty of care bears 
an economic essence and not religious. The question is if Shari’ah non-compliant decisions and 
activities of directors of an Islamic financial institution result in increase in economic value, can 
we consider them liable by common law legal institutions such as negligence? Or, only in the 
case of loss or injury resulted from their non-compliant Shari’ah decisions we can apply those 
mechanisms? In the context of UK legal system, Shari’ah non-compliant liability of directors is 
mainly a self-regulatory issue as legislation and common law do not provide any specific legal 
institution or privilege for Shari’ah-compliance and only internal control and accountability 
mechanisms of Islamic financial institutions can manage this issue. For instance, the common 
remedy for the purification of Shari’ah non-compliant incomes is paying zakat and there is no 
conventional mechanism to deal with this issue. However it is possible that courts in cases over 
the breach of duty of care by directors serving in Islamic financial institution, consider the 
                                                          




Shari’ah non-compliance factor in their judgement if it only causes loss or injury for the 
company.  
  7.4 Conclusion 
 
   This chapter examined the importance of legal accountability mechanisms in the protection of 
investors’ rights in terms of Shari’ah compliant decisions of directors. In this regard, investor 
protection in Islamic finance is mainly concerned about the Shari’ah compliance and 
responsibility of directors over the Shari’ah compliant operation of Islamic financial institution. 
In this context, since there is no special regulation for Islamic finance industry in terms of legal 
accountability mechanisms, the implication of non-Shari’ah compliant decisions of directors 
should be examined according to the common law and statute institutions. Various Judgments in 
case law over responsibilities of directors demonstrate the crucial place of fiduciary duties for the 
accountability of directors. In the context of modern corporate law, directors’ duty to promote 
the success of the company can be considered as the foundation of other fiduciary and 
non-fiduciary duties and accordingly in the context of Islamic finance directors’ responsibility to 
apply Shari’ah board’s fatwas should be examines with regard to that positive obligation. 
However, the concept and the scope of loyalty in directorship of Islamic financial institutions is 
more complex as it bears religious and economic factors together. In other words, duty of loyalty 
in the context of Islamic finance reflects religious duty of directors to apply Shari’ah board’ 
fatwas even when they decrease the economic value of the company.  
   Duty of care, skill and diligence also reflects the complexity of directors’ duty in the 
governance of Islamic financial institution as no objective or regulatory standard is defined for it. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




In this context, it is discussed that directors’ duty of care should be examined with regard to 
contractual terms of their service contract and also the implied terms such as: reasonable skill 
and reasonable care in employment law. However, due to the lack of consensus over the concept 
and scope of Shari’ah compliance, and accordingly knowledge required for directors to manage 
Islamic financial institution, it is not clear how can we consider them liable under negligence law 






























  8.1 Introduction 
 
   Corporate governance is about control mechanisms in a corporate to resolve conflict of 
interests between internal and external stakeholders. In this regard, Shari’ah governance as the 
second layer of governance is about how to assure stakeholders over Shari’ah compliant 
operation of an Islamic financial institution. This chapter questions how Shari’ah boards role in 
Shari’ah governance can result in good corporate governance. The first parts examines the 
Anglo-American concept of corporate governance. Next, it analyses the concept of governance 
according to the Shari’ah sources and definitions provided by International organizations. At the 
end it examines the impact of deficiencies in Shari’ah governance in terms of Shari’ah boards’ 







  8.2 The Concept of Corporate Governance  
 
    The concept of corporate governance must be studied by reference to the definition of 
corporation. A corporation as a bundle of resources and relationships is actually an enterprise984, 
which its purpose is to create long-term value.985  In this regard, governance system of the 
corporation should be established according to requirements of value-creation. In other words, 
corporate resources should be transformed to create more value and accordingly the corporate 
governance should consider individuals and instruments by which this conversion process takes 
place better.986  
   In this regard, although corporate governance may get different definitions according to 
values of different users, it reflects a system of directorship and control under which all internal 
and external actors contribute to value creation. 987  The Cadbury Report defines corporate 
governance as ‘the system by which companies are directed and controlled’. 988  Further 
definitions provided by various reports in other common law jurisdictions such as Australia and 
Canada imply the same understanding of the term. For instance, in Australia the Owen report on 
the collapse of HIH insurance Ltd says: ‘corporate governance refers generally to the legal and 
organizational framework within which, and the principles and processes by which, corporations 
are governed. It refers in particular to the powers, accountability and regulations of those who 
participate in the direction and management. There are aspects of the corporate governance 
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985 Huse (n 708). 
986 ibid.  
987 ibid. 
988  The London Stock Exchange, ‘Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 




regime that have an impact on the relationship between shareholders and the company.’989 
Further, the Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada provides 
this definition: ‘Corporate governance means the process and structure used to direct and manage 
the business and affairs of the corporation with the objective of enhancing shareholder value, 
which includes insuring the financial viability of the business. The process and structure define 
the division of power and establish mechanisms for achieving accountability among 
shareholders, the board of directs and management. The direction and management of the 
business should take into account the impact on other stakeholder such as employees, customer, 
suppliers and communities.’990 
   To meet a corporate intended objectives, an effective governance system provides a 
framework for corporate according to rules and principles formed based on established social 
and legal norms. It provides mechanisms for accountability of actors. 991  In this regard, an 
effective corporate governance framework also is about interactions between multiple 
stakeholders in terms of definition and representation of their interests. Its emphasis is on the 
relationships and interactions between governance actors in the process of decision-making.992 
According to this interactive view, corporate governance is about the structure of rights and 
responsibilities in stakeholders’ relationship and also about interactions between actors (mainly 
shareholders, directors and creditors) which shape the direction of the company in pursue of 
value-creation. In this regard, corporate governance reflects a systematic order. In other words, 
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corporate governance could be defined as ‘the system of regulating and overseeing corporate 
conduct and of balancing the interests of all internal stakeholders and other parties (external 
stakeholders, governments and local communities) who can be affected by the corporation’s 
conduct, in order to ensure responsible behaviour by corporations and to achieve the maximum 
level of efficiency and profitability for a corporation.’993 
     An effective corporate governance requires not only value-creation, also fair value 
distribution between actors. This implies the importance of independence of directors and 
prevention of conflict of interests in their decisions. Accordingly, ‘the purpose of the corporate 
governance is to facilitate cooperation- in addition to resolving conflicts between stakeholders 
and monitoring control. A more important purpose may be solving the problems of coordination 
and engaging in the collective processes of search and discovery.’994  
   As mentioned before, the definition of corporate governance has changed according to 
different users and contexts. However, the separation of ownership and control resulted from 
changes in corporations’ legal structure, from partnership to limited liability in the nineteenth 
century sparked debates over proper theoretical framework for corporate governance. Further, 
changes on the perception over the nature of company influenced the formation of various 
corporate governance theories.995 At first, the maximization of shareholders’ value was the main 
theory under which shareholders are the owners of the company since they are the most 
important providers of capital. This theory for a long time has been the fundamental norm in 
most jurisdiction particularly in the US corporate law. This approach was first confirmed in 1919 
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in the case Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 996  and reconfirmed in Katz v Oak Industries. 997 
Accordingly, directors are seen as agents for shareholders since they are principals and their 
primary duty is to protect shareholders from managers’ opportunism. 998  The shareholders’ 
maximization value theory mainly is focused on the internal actors’ roles and duties with regard 
to shareholders interests. In other word, this theory reflects a unitary perspective999 on corporate 
governance under which increase in short-term interests is regarded an important indicator of the 
company susses.  
   However, as the result of the influence of ethics in corporate law and finance this approach 
gradually changed. The new approach considers interests of other stakeholders and interprets 
value-creation and value-distribution in a broader sense than maximization of shareholders’ 
value. The role of stakeholders’ interests in good corporate governance and success of companies 
has been confirmed by various laws and codes. For instance, according to the OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance: ‘the corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of 
financially sound enterprises.’1000    
   In the Europe, The EU Green Paper presented the importance of stakeholders’ interests In 
terms of corporate social responsibility as companies integrate social concerns in their business 
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operation and interaction with their stakeholders.1001 In this regard, the European Commission 
states: ‘The growing perception among enterprises that sustainable business success and 
shareholder value cannot be achieved solely through maximising short-term profits, but instead 
through market-oriented yet responsible behaviour.’1002 Further, the Commission acclaimed the 
importance of effective and appropriate protection of stakeholders’ interests by recognizing 
inclusive approach in the area of company law: 1003  ‘a sound framework for protection of 
members and third parties, which properly achieves a high-degree of confidence in business 
relationships, is a fundamental condition for business efficiency and competitiveness. In 
particular, an effective regime for the protection of shareholders and their rights, protecting the 
savings and pensions of millions of people and strengthening the foundations of capital markets 
for the long term in a context of diversified shareholding within the EU, is essential if companies 
are to raise capital at the lowest cost.’  
   In the UK, as discussed before, the concept of ‘enlightened shareholder’ reflects an integrative 
(although implicitly) approach towards corporate law and corporate governance. In Davies 
words: “…the statutory formulation clearly rejects the ‘pluralistic’ approach to the law of 
directors’ duties….however, the rule of shareholder primacy was not intended by the 
Government to be adopted in an unsophisticated way. Instead, the degree of overlap between the 
interests of the members and those of other stakeholders is emphasised through the directors’ 
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duty to ‘have regard’ to the interests of other stakeholders …..[giving rise to] adopting a 
modernised version of shareholder primacy….”1004      
  8.2.1 Stakeholders’ Interests and Good Corporate Governance 
 
 
   The term ‘stakeholder’ does not bear a clear definition. Various theories in corporate 
governance define ‘stakeholder’ and its scope according to their priorities and views towards the 
interests of corporate, shareholders and society. From an economic point of view, the perception 
over the role of internal and external corporate players in economic value making defines the 
concept of stakeholder. In this regard, Mallin provides this definition: ‘the term ‘stakeholder’ can 
encompass a wide range of interests: it refers to any individual or group on which the activities 
of the company have an impact.’1005 However, a comprehensive definition encompasses the 
influence of external groups and individuals on corporate activities too. In this regard, since 
stakeholders may contribute to wealth creation for corporate and also may be affected by 
corporate activities, they “have a stake in the operation of the firm, in the same sense that 
business parents have a common stake in their venture or players on a team a common stake in 
the outcome of a game. Stakeholders share a common risk, a possibly of gaining benefits or 
experiencing losses or harms, as a result of corporate operation.”1006 This definition is more 
compatible with practice of providers’ of financial services as their external and internal 
governance may have broad impacts on financial markets. In other words, in its broadest sense 
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the term ‘stakeholder’ includes not only the internal groups and individuals (such as employees 
and shareholders), but external ones who affect or may be affected by the governance of 
corporate.1007 
   There has been many discussions over the relationship between stakeholders’ interests and 
good governance. From an integrated point of view, good corporate governance is the result of 
efficient decisions taken by directors not only on the bottom line also society as a whole since it 
ensures effectively a company long-term interests and accordingly its sustainable growth.1008 
The integrated view requires all governance bodies such as audit, control and compliance follow 
the corporate strategy as it is according to the corporate broad view to the concept and techniques 
of value-creation. In this regard, Value-creation in a stakeholder corporate governance model 
implies the importance of all risk takers’ interests in their relations (directly or indirectly) with 
the corporation not only for negative impacts of directors and other governance bodies’ 
decisions, also for distributive impacts. In other words, value is not an independent concept, but 
a concept made from cooperation between various social, economic, ethical and political 
factors.1009 As a result, “the question of value creation is therefore tangled up with that of the 
distribution or appropriation value.”1010  In this regard, from a broad approach, since value bears 
social or ethical purposes, its essence reflects economic and non-economic characteristics. For 
instance, intrinsic values such as equality, distributive justice and virtue are the results of internal 
strategies and decisions with regard to economic activities of a corporate.  
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   In fact, the importance of stakeholders’ contribution to wealth-creation reflects the 
significance of the existence of an efficient stakeholder management in a good corporate 
governance system. in Preston and Sachs words: “although the ultimate justification for the 
existence of the corporation is its ability to create wealth, the legitimacy of the contemporary 
corporation as an institution within society-its social charter, or ‘licence to operate’-depends on 
its ability to meet the expectations of an increasingly numerous and diverse array of constituents. 
The modern, large, professionally managed corporation is expected to create wealth for its 
constituents in a responsible manner (that is, not by theft or deception). The connection between 
wealth and responsibility has been stressed by both business leaders and critics for more than a 
century, and if the corporation can continue to survive and succeed today it must continue to 
adapt to social change.” 1011  In this regard, effective stakeholder management constitutes 
intangible and social resources which enhance corporate competitive ability in terms of 
long-term value creation.1012  
   The effective management of stakeholders’ interests enhances cooperation between 
stakeholders since the value of their relationships determines the success of the company. In this 
regard, the long-term value creation requires cooperation in internal structure of governance by 
which all direct (such as director and managers) and indirect (such as advisors) governance 
bodies cooperate for the objectives of the company. 
   In the context of Islamic finance, the role of Shari’ah boards must be interpreted in relation to 
other governance bodies in terms of corporate long-term economic and social value-creation 
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goals. In this regard, there should be an effective and systematic relationships between Shari’ah 
board, board of directors, auditors and other governance bodies in terms of knowledge and time. 
This systematic cooperation between Shari’ah boards and other governance bodies enhances 
stakeholder management. Further, presentation and prescription a proper model for all Islamic 
financial institutions is unlikely as the Shari’ah and Shari’ah governance bear different meanings 
in different Islamic financial institutions. In this context, a good corporate governance requires a 
cooperative relationships, conceptually and instrumentally, between governance bodies and 
Shari’ah board. In this regard, external governance factors such as regulation, laws and macro 
strategies defined by government may be regarded as guidance for an efficient cooperative 
relationship between Shari’ah board and other internal governance bodies. However, in 
conventional financial systems without any formal regulatory direction with regard to Shari’ah 
governance, this may result in unpredictability. 
   In this regard, an instrumental perception over stakeholders’ interest influences the 
governance bodies’ duties and consequently Shari’ah governance in Islamic financial institutions 
too. From an economic sense the ultimate goal of an instrumental view is wealth maximization 
for main stakeholders (such as shareholders, employees and creditors). It justifies stakeholders’ 
interests not on the basis of intrinsic values, but on the ground that effective stakeholder 
management as a means improves efficiency, profitability, competition and economic 
success. 1013  Further, Legitimacy of corporation and stakeholders’ interests are based on 
economic interests (mainly shareholders’) since ‘individuals well endowed with economic and 
social capabilities will be more productive; companies which draw on the experience of all of 
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their stakeholders will be more efficient; while social cohesion within a nation is increasingly 
seen as a requirement for international competiveness.’1014 As a consequence, a good corporate 
governance system in an instrumental view assigns control rights and responsibilities to 
stakeholders that contribute specialised input.1015  
     In the context of Islamic finance, an instrumental point of view over good corporate 
governance shares similar characteristics with Islamic law in the sense that both defend private 
ownership and property rights, at the same time they do not solely concentrate on owners’ rights 
since the legitimacy of ownership depends on non-owners interests too. For instance, in Islamic 
law ‘La darara ve la dırar’ (there shall be no unfair loss nor the causing of such loss) principle 
prohibits any ownership and right which is harmful for others’ interests and rights. In this regard, 
Shari’ah governance system including Shari’ah board, Shari’ah department and Shari’ah audit in 
an Islamic financial institution should have cooperative relation with other governance bodies 
such as directors and financial auditors since they bear responsibility for making strategic 
decisions and also are more in connection with different stakeholders in terms of their interests 
and rights. In this regard, Good governance in an instrumental point of view requires a network 
of connections between governance bodies in terms of knowledge and information to refurbish 
governance system with new requirements.      
    However, the core normative reason for having respect for stakeholder’s interests in Islamic 
finance bears an ethical essence too. Generally, an ethical view in corporate governance is 
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consistent with two principles: principle of corporate rights under which the corporation may not 
violate the rights of others to determine its own future; principle of corporate effects under which 
the corporation are responsible for the effects of their actions on others.1016  The gist of these 
principles, in terms of an ethical view over corporate governance, implies that property rights are 
not absolute and stakeholders have the right “to be treated, not as a means to some corporate end, 
but as an end in itself.”1017 However, the intrinsic value of stakeholder’s interests and its relation 
to good corporate governance in the context of Shari’ah finance must be examined according to 
Shari’ah ethical principles interpreted by Shari’ah boards. In other words, a good corporate 
governance system must provide a governance plan to ensure protection and enforcement of 
stakeholders’ interests in an ethical ground provided by Shari’ah board. 
  8.3 Governance in Islam  
 
   The Shari’ah texts do not reflect the existence of the term ‘governance’ in its modern sense. 
Shari’ah in its broad sense1018 provides ethical, legal and spiritual essence for the concept of 
governance. In this regard, the concept of tawhid (full submission to God) is the backbone of all 
governance principles in Islam as it is the ultimate guidance to justice. Tawhid calls a person to 
be responsible to human beings and everything in the universe as all are created by the one God 
and has a purpose.1019 In this regard, the Quran asks mankind to use reason to understand man’s 
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relationship with everything and accordingly to benefit humanity. 1020  The Quran regards 
mankind as one community (ummah) and askes human beings to overcome and resolve negative 
conflicts. In this regard, the Quran regards trust (amanah) and justice as the foundation of good 
governance since they provide framework for human reasoning in all aspects of life. The Quran 
defines good governance as a just and ethical order. The Quran declares: “Those when given 
authority in land, establish salah, give zakat and enjoin what is good (ma’ruf) and forbid what is 
wrong.”1021 Further: “O you who believe stand up as a witness for Allah in all fairness, and do 
not let the hatred of people deviate you from justice (adl). Be just, this is closest to piety.”1022 In 
this regard, trust and justice require accountability and transparency in a good governance 
system. As the Quran states: “..Lo the hearing and the sight and the heart –of each of these will 
be asked”.1023 Further, the Prophet (pbuh) said: “every one of you is a guardian and accountable 
for his charge. Thus the amir is a guardian of the people and he is accountable for them; and a 
man is a guardian of his household and he is accountable for them…..and a servant is guardian of 
his master’s property, ever yone of you is accountable for his subject.”1024 In this regard, while 
trust and justice provide the ontological basis, the Shari’ah and Shura furnish the practical 
mechanism for good governance.1025  
   Participation among Muslims in every aspect of private or public affairs is recognized as a 
crucial principle. The Quran says: “….and consult with them in the conduct of affairs, and when 
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you have resolved then put your trust in Allah.”1026 And “… those who have responded to their 
lord and established prayer and whose affair is [determined by] consultation among themselves, 
and from what we have provided them, they spend.” 1027  Shura is an Arabic word for 
consultation. Shura in a good governance system is based on the opinions of competent and 
capable people who are knowledgeable in their field. Shura is deemed as a mechanism to restore 
trust in society as the Quran says: “Lo Allah Commands you that you restore trust to those who 
are capable and if you judge between mankind, that you judge justly.”1028   
   The ethical rules in the Shari’ah over governance, although not backed by enforcement 
mechanisms in a conventional system, imply a stakeholder approach in understanding of good 
corporate governance. In this regard, since human being’s interest (material and spiritual) is 
considered as part of a corporate interest, it must regard interest of society as a whole in its 
operation in pursuant of defined objectives. This reflects the importance of social considerations 
in good corporate governance in Islam. However, Islamic fiqh in its traditional sense and Islamic 
finance in its modern sense have not provided specific mechanisms for an effective and efficient 
governance. In other words, spiritual concept of governance solely cannot guarantee its 
effectiveness and as a consequence it must be supported by conventional governance system 
mechanisms.  
  8.4 The Concept of Shari’ah Governance 
 
   Shari’ah compliance is the ultimate goal of Islamic finance industry. As a result, the success 
of Islamic financial institution depends on a proper Shari’ah governance framework able to 
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assure stakeholders over Shari’ah compliant operation and structure of Islamic finance products. 
The term ‘Shari’ah governance’ generally is about the alignment of corporate governance to 
Shari’ah principles1029. In other word, Shari’ah governance is about structures and processes 
adopted by stakeholders to ensure the compliance of the company with Shari’ah rules and 
principles. 1030  The IFSB regards Shari’ah governance a system comprised of “the set of 
institutional and organizational arrangements through which an IIFS ensures that there is 
effective independent oversight of Shari’ah compliance over each of the following structures and 
processes….”1031 In other words, the concept of Shari’ah governance is connected to the concept 
of risk management in corporate governance as it is about ‘putting in place systems that are 
capable of demonstrating that general and specific risks to an enterprise are identified and 
addressed in a manner that is acceptable in terms of the law, current business morality and good 
sense.’1032  
   As discussed before, Shari’ah compliance is the distinct feature of Islamic finance and 
accordingly the aim of Shari’ah governance in every Islamic financial institution is to provide 
investors with the ultimate assurance over Shari’ah compliance by setting required rules and 
system. This fiduciary responsibility of Islamic financial institutions to their customers requires a 
balanced approach in the creation of value for the shareholders while paying attention to the 
interests of stakeholders.1033  In other words, having an efficient and effective Shari’ah risk 
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management is an essential part of the concept of Shari’ah governance. In this regard, Shari’ah 
compliance is the result of a good Shari’ah governance procedure. As Professor Rider states: 
“there is little, at least in traditional systems of governance, whether characterised as ‘good 
governance’ or not, that actually prescribes a ‘good result’. The beneficial situation, which it is 
desired to achieve, is to be attained through adherence to demonstrable procedures…..in other 
words, the analysis is transferred from the end to the means, with the hope that a certain means 
will result in a ‘good’ end.”1034   
   It is discussed that Shari’ah governance is comprised of various parts that their characteristics 
depend on Islamic financial institution’s type of business and governance structure. According to 
Engku Rabiah Adawiah, there are seven parts for Shari’ah compliance governance: 1- Inception 
and Conceptualization of Islamic Instrument; 2-Structuring the Product according to Shariah; 3- 
Legal Documentation; 4-Execution and Implementation of Islamic Instrument; 5- Audit and 
Review; 6- Restructuring (if needed); 7-Recovery mechanisms and dispute resolution. 1035 
However, since internal governance system of each financial institution may be different from 
other financial institutions, the IFSB recommends more general framework for Shari’ah 
governance system as covers these structures and processes: a) issuance of relevant Shari’ah 
pronouncements; b) dissemination of Shari’ah pronouncements by monitoring Shari’ah bodies 
(internal Shari’ah compliance unite or Shari’ah compliance officer); c) an internal Shari’ah 
                                                          
1034 ibid. 
1035 E. R. Adawiah, ‘Shariah Framework for Shariah Compliance Review, Audit &Governance’ (Paper 
presented in Workshop on Shariah Review, Audit and Governance for Islamic Financial Institutions, 




compliance review/audit for verifying that Shari’ah compliance has been satisfies; d) Shari’ah 
compliance review.1036   
   Shari’ah governance system complements the existing corporate governance. Therefore, its 
structure like corporate governance system depends on the laws of the jurisdiction in which the 
Islamic financial institution operates and the type of its business. In this regard, there is no single 
model for a good Shari’ah governance model as the characteristics of markets in terms of law, 
economy and development vary from one jurisdiction to another.1037   
   An effective Shari’ah governance system requires the participation of stakeholders as their 
monitoring role benefits robustness and stability of the company. Further, stakeholders’ 
contribution results in an efficient corporate governance too as it enhances value-creation 
through supporting the reputation of Islamic financial institution. However, this comprehensive 
understanding of Shari’ah governance necessitates the implementation of an informative or 
educative plan for stakeholders over the fundamentals of Shari’ah finance products and 
operations. In this regard, to have a transparent and effective monitoring system, it is necessary 
to provide stakeholders with ‘proper information’ and education. However, what constitutes 
‘proper information’ depends on the opinion of board of directors as they are responsible for the 
management of the company and it is likely they influence on the content and issuance of 
Shari’ah board’s or Shari’ah department reports.   
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  8.4.1 The Role of Shari’ah Boards in Shari’ah Governance  
 
   The term ‘Shari’ah board’ implies a kind of expertise which requires special training or 
knowledge on Islamic financial industry. In other words, membership in a Shari’ah board should 
be considered in a broad sense as it requires knowledge in fiqh al muamalat and Islamic finance. 
In this regard, Shari’ah board’s members engage professionally in the process of Shari’ah 
compliance and complements the existing compliance system.1038  
   In this regard, the responsibilities of Shari’ah board members may vary from one institution to 
another since there is no agreement over their obligations. 1039  However, they are generally 
regarded responsible for advising and monitoring the process of Shari’ah compliance. In this 
regard, their role resembles the governance role of board of directors. As a result, Shari’ah 
compliance and governance shares similar features required for a proper governance system. 
   According to IFSB principles, the first role of Shari’ah boards in Shari’ah governance system 
is the issuance of juristic opinion (Shari’ah pronouncements), ex ante and ex post, over any 
matter pertaining to Shari’ah issues. 1040  In this regard, it is supposed that the Shari’ah 
pronouncement is the result of a due process. The Principles of due process such as transparency 
are enhanced more in jurisdictions with central regulatory system or proper self-regulatory 
mechanisms in jurisdictions without central regulation. The requirements of ‘due process’ in this 
context depends on the governance system and the business type. However, the high moral 
content of Shari’ah obligations and the highly regarded position of Shari’ah board members led 
to ambiguity over the concept of due process with regard to Shari’ah pronouncement.  
                                                          




   Further, Shari’ah pronouncement by Shari’ah boards’ members resembles the strategic role of 
board of directors as both bodies have discretionary power over the structural and operational 
aspects of corporate governance. In this regard, the enforcement of Shari’ah in corporate 
governance is the matter of contract law or fraud since the Islamic character of financial services 
in conventional jurisdictions such as UK is an additional dimension.1041 In other words, the 
concept of ‘due process’ in the context of Shari’ah finance must be interpreted according to the 
established conventional principles. In this context, due to the technical complexity of ijtihad in 
Islamic fiqh, it is important to consider a Shari’ah-based aspect for the concept of due 
process.1042 However, the Lack of a clear concept for due process in Shari’ah pronouncement 
may lead to legal risk as stakeholders can question the legality of pronouncements. This issue 
requires a balance between conventional and Islamic perceptions on the concept of due process 
of governance.    
   The other role of Shari’ah board members in Shari’ah governance can be explained in terms 
of compliance and control. Compliance and control are essential aspects of governance as they 
manage different risks and prevent undue losses. According to IFSB principles Shari’ah boards 
have a key role in the functions of internal Shari’ah compliance and audit units. In this regard, 
Shari’ah board’s pronouncements and resolutions are the criteria for the function of Shari’ah 
audit units in terms of reviewing the operation of Islamic financial institution. Further, the 
internal Shari’ah audit unite reports directly to Shari’ah board over Shari’ah issues in the 
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management and operation of Islamic financial institution. Accordingly, Shari’ah boards are also 
responsible for the annual Shari’ah review since they contribute to the process of reviewing of 
feedbacks and reports received from internal Shari’ah audit unit over the Shari’ah compliance 
operation of the Institution.        
  8.5 Issues in Shari’ah Governance 
 
   Governance is about the accomplishment of goals of a company by the use of cost effective 
tactics and strategies according to law and moral principles. A good corporate governance 
system establishes mechanisms to safeguard the process of governance to promote the efficient 
use of scarce resources to the benefit of society as a whole.1043 In this regard, a comprehensive 
approach considers the principles of corporate governance required for the prevention or solving 
of the governance failures according to the feature of the corporate. In other words, the principles 
of corporate governance enhance risk management and accordingly wealth-creation. Further to 
the risk management and value-creation aspects of good corporate governance is corruption. In 
this regard, the implementation of principles of good corporate governance weaken facilitative 
routes for corruptive behaviours in the corporate. 
   Good corporate governance as a tripartite framework in terms of fiduciary duties of care, 
loyalty and good faith1044 reinforces the values of rule of law, transparency and fairness and as a 
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consequence targets the supply and demand sides of corruption. 1045  In this regard, good 
corporate governance can be understood as public good since it benefits society as a whole in 
terms of stability and wealth-creation. In the Anglo-American perception of good corporate 
governance, public good is translated in terms of agency theory. The aim of agency cost 
management as the dominant theory in corporate law is to minimise the agency costs resulted 
from the misuse of power by managers and other agents. Regarding its roots in financial 
economics, it typically takes the maximization of shareholders’ value as the primary standard for 
assessing the corporate performance.1046 It addresses public good in terms of the control of 
opportunities and information asymmetry. However, a good corporate governance system also 
considers ‘trust’ and ‘trust-making’ in its principles with regard to agency relationships. In fact a 
comprehensive perception of good corporate governance includes stewardship as the core 
meaning. Stewardship implies an ethical characteristic which enhances governance procedure 
resulted by applying good motives and good rules.1047  
   In the context of Islamic finance, it is supposed that Shari’ah boards serve as agents of 
stakeholders and accordingly are responsible for the prevention and control of directors’ 
misconducts in terms of the operation of Islamic financial institution. In this regard, despite of 
this belief that the adherence to Shari’ah would led to good and responsible governance as there 
is a strong ethical obligation of stewardship on Muslims1048, the actual governance procedure in 
Islamic financial institutions is established according to conventional perspective and principles. 
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In this regard, the principles of good corporate governance are formed in a long term to prevent 
and control governance failures resulted from agents’ misbehaviours. This issue is more 
important in Islamic finance as agency problems are more likely due to types and structure of 
assets. Further, regulatory gaps resulted from the lack of a comprehensive perception over the 
concept and principles of Shari’ah reflects the importance of conventional principles as the 
accepted requirements for the assurance over the good governance procedure. In this regard, also 
IFSB guidelines stress over the importance of application of international corporate governance 
standards in cultivating a good governance culture.1049  
   8.5.1 Transparency 
 
     Transparency is an essential element for a good corporate governance system as it provides 
the proper basis for shareholders, stakeholders and potential investors decision-making in 
relation to capital allocation, corporate transactions and the monitoring of financial 
performance.1050 According to the OECD principles of corporate governance, a strong disclosure 
regime promotes transparency and accordingly plays a crucial role in enabling shareholders to 
exercise their ownership rights on an informed basis.1051 Further, it enables board of directors to 
evaluate the operation of the company and to take early corrective actions when necessary. 
Transparency literally means: easily seen through, recognized, understood or detected.1052 It 
empowers stakeholders by providing efficient free markets and supporting the circulation of 
information. Transparency in the context of modern corporate governance leads to capability and 
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clarity when it encompasses a more comprehensive and proactive disclosure rather than the 
release of corporate governance details in a reactive fashion.1053  
   Transparency is the basis for trust-making in financial markets. In this regard, an effective 
transparency system is the result of the culture of transparency under which essential information 
flow freely.1054 In this regard, Board of directors bears the responsibility to cultivate the culture 
of transparency by establishing policies and monitoring mechanisms which decisively facilitate 
the establishment of transparency culture.1055 
   Transparency has been addressed in different perspectives. Some such as the revision of the 
Basel II framework by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision1056 and the report of the 
Financial Stability Board on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience1057 focus on the 
micro-level by emphasising its role in restoring confidence. Others pursue a broader approach as 
they consider transparency in terms of ethical behaviour.1058 For instance the IFSB states: ‘the 
need for transparency is, above all, an important Shari’ah consideration. Any form of 
concealment, fraud or attempt at misrepresentation violates the principles of justice and fairness 
in Shari’ah as mentioned in the Quran in, among others, Surah An-Nisa’ Verse 135 and Surah 
Al-Mutaffifin 1 to 3.’1059   
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   In the context of Islamic finance, due to the existence of Shari’ah board as the second layer of 
governance, transparency bears more complex function since it must be considered in the context 
of Shari’ah boards’ duties. However, the basic and the most important dimension of transparency 
is its institutional aspect which is mainly focused on procedure and decision-making. In this 
regard, the first issue is the opacity in the process of Shari’ah pronouncement. There is no clear 
and universally accepted framework for ‘due process’ in Shari’ah ruling. This issue exposes the 
industry to uncertainty. From a macro-level point of view, it ‘effectively places the industry 
hostage to the change of attitude by scholars who have gained prominence through their years of 
serving the industry.’1060 From a micro-level point of view, the lack of a clear concept for 
Shari’ah pronouncement leads to uncertainty since Shari’ah boards can change their views 
unexpectedly without a clear process. As a consequence of this uncertainty financial institutions 
are more exposed to legal risk and loss. Further, it may pose questions over the possibility of 
negative influences on Shari’ah boards to pronounce the favourable rulings. Consequently, it 
leads to unethical behaviour of Shari’ah boards, and also supports fatwa shopping in the industry. 
In this regard, due to the lack of a professional perception over fatwa pronouncement, it is 
possible to choose individuals as Shari’ah board’s members who charge less and provide more 
convenient fatwas for the financial institution. This issue is more severe in jurisdictions such as 
UK where there is no central Shari’ah board and accordingly there is no regulatory provision to 
monitor Shari’ah governance. In this regard, Board of directors are required to take a cooperative 
approach with Shari’ah boards in establishing an effective and fair Shari’ah pronouncement.  
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   Opacity in Shari’ah reviewing is another institutional aspect of transparency in Islamic 
finance. In this regard, although International standard setting organizations such as the AAOIFI 
tries to set standards for the process of Shari’ah reviewing, due to diversity in the governance 
structure, regulation and types of business there is no single accepted model for Shari’ah review. 
Further, in practice most of Islamic financial institutions do not disclose the process of Shari’ah 
review.1061In this context as AAOIF1062 recommends, there should be a professional planning in 
Shari’ah review under which the planning review procedures, executing review procedures, 
preparation and the review of working paper as well as procedures in documenting conclusions 
and preparation of the Shariah review report are considered.1063 In other words, there should be a 
detailed exchange of information between internal bodies such as directors, internal auditors and 
shareholders and external governance players such as creditors and other investors. Further, an 
effective Shari’ah review by Shari’ah boards requires a clear mandate supported by enforcement 
and accountability mechanisms.  
  8.5.2 Accountability 
 
   Accountability is about mutual relationship in a certain ground restricted by some established 
rules which require answerability to a formal forum. There have been various literal definitions 
for accountability with the emphasis on responsibility. For instance, Oxford dictionary defines 
‘accountable’ as ‘liable to be called to answer for responsibilities and conduct; able to be 
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reckoned or explained.’ And according to Black’s law dictionary accountability refers to ‘the 
state of being responsible or answerable.’1064  
   Accountability reflects a corrective nature in relation to opportunistic and self-interested 
behaviours resulted from agency relationships in a corporate. In this regard, The OECD 
principles of corporate governance highlights the protection of shareholders’ rights and 
stakeholders’ interests by establishing an effective governance framework through transparency, 
effective supervision and enforcement. 1065  This perception over the effective corporate 
governance framework reflects the importance of accountability not only as a corrective means 
also as a process. In this regard, accountability reflects an ethical nature under which decision 
makers in any organization are responsible to justify their belief and actions to others based on 
established norms. In other words, accountability is the social norm of governance in injunctive 
sense since it prescribes certain legitimate modes of wielding power according to what most 
approves or disapproves.1066  
   The corrective nature of accountability is based on an individualized process 1067  which, 
corporate authorities play their roles in a disciplinary manner. In this regard, the ‘individualized 
process’ in the definition of accountability is formed according to the type of business and 
disciplinary rules such as accounting and financial rules. In this context, there is a constant 
relationship between the enhancement of disciplinary rules, transparency and accountability. 
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More transparent governance system results in efficient changes in disciplinary rules and 
accordingly more visible corporate governance 1068  as disciplinary rules through constant 
surveillance provide accountability and corrective mechanisms based on the established 
perceptions over the business of corporate. 
   In the context of Islamic finance, there is no established individualized process since there is 
no established disciplinary rules to correct Shari’ah boards’ misconducts. This issue in the 
context of UK law is grounded in the fact that the concept of duty of loyalty of corporate agents 
is established according to conventional precepts. In this regard, there is a mutual relationship 
between rules of professional conduct and clear mandates since an effective accountability 
system in corporate governance requires clear definition for responsibility of bodies assumed in 
charge of governance. As a consequence of clear mandate, law will provide effective 
accountability mechanisms and remedies. In Islamic law, although it is emphasised that Shari’ah 
requires personal integrity, fair dealing and imposes very similar obligations on persons with the 
position of trust, there is no rigorous concept of fiduciary accountability such as in common 
law.1069 For instance, in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver1070 Lord Russell of Killowen sates: 
‘The rule of equity which insists on those, who by the use of a fiduciary position make a profit, 
being liable to account for that profit, in no way depends on fraud, or absence of bona fides; or 
upon such questions or considerations as whether the profit would or should otherwise have gone 
to the plaintiff, or whether the profiteer was under a duty to obtain the source of the profit for the 
plaintiff, or whether he took a risk or acted as he did for the benefit of the plaintiff, or whether 
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the plaintiff has in fact been damaged or benefited by his action. The liability arises from the 
mere fact of the profit having, in the stated circumstances, been made. The profiteer, however, 
honest and well intentioned, cannot escape the risk of being called to account’.   
  8.6 Corporate Ethics  
 
   The ultimate aim of law is to coordinate human behaviour through coercive measures. Also, it 
shapes human conduct through clear and certain legal norms.1071  Contrary to law, morality 
presents less prescriptive concepts and there is no official and systematic sanction for the breach 
of moral rules. 1072  Despite the contrast, moral norms or in a narrow sense ethics are the 
foundation of legal rules and the basis for the reform of law.1073 The core concern of morality is 
about how to resolve the actual or potential conflict of interest between parties.1074 In this regard, 
although business is a self-contained activity and governed by clear standards, moral and ethical 
norms also govern relations between private individuals and resolve their conflict of interests.1075 
   Corporate ethics here refers to the company behaviour towards its stakeholders and aims to 
enhance the operation of principles related to integrity, respect and transparency of a 
company.1076 In this context, corporate ethics has had various trends. Within the last fifty years 
the major concerns were price-fixing, environmental and social destructive activities, bribery, 
insider trading and the moral capacity of individuals. However, despite of various trends the 
essence of corporate ethics is to support corporate governance in providing a proper level of 
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internal control.1077 Further, its primary goal is to protect and reinforce a company reputation as 
that is an essential factor for the success of a company. Particularly In financial services in which 
investors possess no physical assets and rely only on the reputation of the financial intermediary, 
the role of ethics in good corporate governance is more crucial. Therefore, there is a mutual 
relationship between the corporate ethics and culture as corporate ethics forms the tone and 
character of the company, and accordingly the corporate culture enhances corporate ethics.1078 In 
other words, an effective corporate ethics must be actually based on corporate culture and 
develops through repeated activity.1079 Ethical culture is the result of the ongoing reinforcement 
of ethical standards by corporate directors. In this regard, board of directors is responsible for the 
establishment of an ethical framework which defines ethical norms, monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms. 
   Islamic finance is known as an ethical industry and Shari’ah boards are considered as Shari’ah 
compliance gate keepers. In this regard, the responsibilities of Shari’ah boards concerning 
Shari’ah review has a deep influence on the formation of Islamic financial institutions’ ethical 
culture as they present Shari’ah values and help directors in defining ethical norms. Further, 
Shari’ah boards can help directors in developing a formal code of ethics as an important part in 
the institutionalization of ethical norms. A code of ethics reflects a company values and norms 
and is defined as a ‘distinct and formal document containing a set of prescriptions developed by 
and for a company to guide present and future behaviour on multiple issues for at least its 
managers and employees toward each other, the company, external stakeholders, and /or society 
                                                          






in general.’1080 Further, it helps to preserve the reputation and legitimate operation of a company, 
and also prevents misconducts by promoting ethical rules in resolving conflict of interests.1081 In 
this regard, Shari’ah boards can play a crucial role in the comprehension of stakeholders such as 
employees over the ethical values of the industry through providing more education and training 
on Islamic values and the operation of Shari’ah compliant products. Further, continuous training 
helps to promote the content and the application of code of ethics and accordingly prevents a 
culture of ‘form over substance’ in Islamic financial institution. In this context, the existence of 
an effective monitoring and reporting system is a crucial feature of an ethical culture as it 
enhances compliance through locating ethical problems or violations. In this regard, a 
cooperative mandate for the functions of Shari’ah board or sharia department with regard to 
monitoring ethical issues in Islamic financial institution improves corporate ethical culture, 
accordingly prevents misconducts and enhances reputation. 
  8.7 Conclusion 
  
   Corporate governance reflects a unified concept in corporate law. Corporate governance as a 
system is about establishing a proper control framework to manage and resolve conflict of 
interests between different stakeholders to meet value maximization as its ultimate goal. In the 
context of modern corporate law the concept of value demonstrates an inclusive essence based 
on economic and ethical perception over interests of various stakeholders’ interests. In this 
regard, value-maximization encompasses interests of internal and external stakeholders in a 
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long-time and accordingly directors’ fiduciary duties must be interpreted in an inclusive sense as 
they are responsible for impacts of corporate activities on society as a whole.  
   Although, Islamic law does not reflect the exact term and concept for ‘governance’, Shari’ah 
texts provide a sound framework for governance in terms of principles of fairness and justice. 
Further, Islamic law shares similar view with conventional law on value-creation as they both 
respect private ownership and property rights and at the same time respect the interests of society 
as a whole. In other words, property rights in Islam and conventional law are not absolute. 
However, classical fiqh and the sources of Shari’ah principles do not provide practical 
mechanisms for the governance of in its modern sense. Though, the concept of good corporate 
governance in the context of Islamic finance should be considered according to conventional 
precepts and principles. In other words, to provide an effective framework for corporate 
governance, corporate activities and the impacts of their operation on stakeholders must be 
examined with regard to the principles of good corporate governance. In this regard, the main 
concern of good corporate governance is the prevention and control of risks. In the context of 
Islamic finance, despite common belief over the supportive role of Shari’ah boards in good 
corporate governance, the lack of transparency and accountability as the foundations of an 
efficient governance system have exposed the industry to various risks such as legal and 
operational. The Lack of transparency in the process of issuing fatwa and Shari’ah auditing raise 
many questions over the effectiveness of Shari’ah governance frameworks. Further, the failure of 
the industry to present accountability mechanisms for Shari’ah boards’ misconducts facilitates 
unlawful activities by financial institutions and accordingly opens a gate for fraudulent conducts. 
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  9.1 Introduction 
   Professional knowledge is the basis of the operation of the modern financial markets. A 
profession as a vocation founded upon specialized education to serve others objectively, is 
the foundation of an efficient and effective regulatory system in terms of value-creation and 
accountability. This chapter examines the lack of professionalism in the functions of 
Shari’ah boards and its implications for their regulation. The first part reflects on the 
concept of ‘regulation’ and examines its varieties. The next part explains issues in the 
regulation of Shari’ah boards in terms of the integrity of Islamic finance industry. Finally, 
the last part examines the concept of ‘profession’ and its requirements in the context of 
Shari’ah boards’ functions.       
  9.2 The Concept of Regulation 
 
   The concept of ‘regulation’ has been subject to many debates. In this regard, as Barak Orbach 
says: ‘the evasive nature of the term ‘regulation’ is largely a product of confusion between two 




regulatory powers or desirable regulatory policies.’1082  Generally, regulation is perceived as 
control or constraint since it implies the concepts of governance and directorship. It is considered 
as a means to an end since it facilitates the achievement of goals by adopting ‘conducting rules’ 
and putting mechanisms to enforce those rules. 1083  In this regard, Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines regulation as ‘the act or the process of controlling by rule or restriction.’1084 However, 
the provided definitions reflect only a narrow concept. In other words, although restriction and 
control are the main aspects of regulation, but it carries facilitative and enabling function too.1085 
   The concept and function of regulation may be examined in an economic sense which is 
fundamentally influenced by different economic systems and legal forms. In this regard, the 
economic-oriented concept of regulation implies a ‘sustained and focused control exercised by a 
public agency over activities that are valued by a community.’ 1086  In this context, market 
systems emphasis on individuals’ will and freedom in pursuing their goals. Further, the role of 
law is mainly facilitative as ‘it offers a set of formalized arrangements with which individuals 
can clothe their welfare-seeking activities and relationships.’1087 In other words, regulation in the 
market system supports cooperation between individuals through providing a legal framework 
and enforcement which secure the efficiency of contractual forms in terms of transaction 
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costs.1088 Further, regulation in the market system mainly encompasses private laws such as 
contract law and self-regulatory principles delivered by private agencies. In contrast to the 
market systems, regulation in the collective systems is about the direction of individuals’ 
relationships in the market for the public interest. In this regard, regulation reflects a directive 
function exercised by a central superior authority which is mainly the state.1089 Further, the 
fundamental role of the state in the formation and enforcement of public law and all kinds of 
obligations resulted from individuals’ cooperative relationships, reflect the centralized concept of 
regulation.1090 The centralized concept of regulation implies the importance of the public interest 
in its reasoning. In this regard, asymmetric information between individuals and service 
providers and spillover effects of some transactions are regarded as the main reasons for 
regulation in the both systems. 1091  In fact, the massive social and economic effects of the 
mentioned reasons for regulation encouraged central intervention by state which its content has 
matured during the time. Further, the regulatory practices in terms of administrative processes 
have developed from sector specific such as financial services and consumer protection to a 
generic set of instruments and strategies deployed by the state.1092 In this regard, in the context 
of the modern capitalism which competition is recognized as the best way to secure investors’ 
rights, regulation is proper when the market operation solely cannot meet important goals of 
public interest. To meet those objectives regulations control the quality of a product or services, 
the nature of the market, or require market players such as advisers and intermediaries comply 
with certain standards. 
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   The objectives of regulation in a particular regulatory system should be considered in a 
distributive sense as they are about the distribution of rights and wealth among stakeholders.1093 
In this regard, the protection of investors’ rights requires a risk-based approach under which 
professional and retail clients are protected from ex ante and ex post market failures. Under the 
FSMA 2000, the FSA was required to discharge its functions in a way that to secure the 
appropriate degree of protection for consumers; ‘having regard to the different risks involved in 
different investments and transactions, the differences in expertise in between customers, the 
need for advice and accurate information and the general principle that consumers should take 
responsibility for their decisions.’ 1094  In this regard, providing investors with adequate and 
accurate information is the fundamental requirement for regulatory objective of customer 
protection. In this context, accurate information supports proper advice giving through enhancing 
transparency in the system. Also, it enhances customers’ confidence and leads to more 
competition and innovation in the market. Although, the Financial Services Act (2012) 
established new regulatory objectives1095, information and advice are the main elements for a 
robust regulatory system. In this regard, to meet the Financial Conduct Authority strategic 
objective, namely to ensure that markets are functioning well, it must secure investors’ right by 
providing them with accurate and fit for purpose information and advice. Further, a sound 
investors’ protection system enhances integrity (soundness, stability and resilience) of the market 
and supports prevention and combat against crimes and market abuses. 
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   The concept of regulation implies the importance of certainty as the essence of rule of law and 
a means to reach better outcome in its economic sense. In fact, certainty and discretion in a 
regulatory system support the distributive function of regulation by providing legitimacy and 
efficacy. In this regard, certainty provides predictability and consistency with other policies 
through building a defined system for the application and enforcement of regulation.1096 Further, 
it builds a proper ground for the evolvement of regulatory rules, procedures and mechanisms 
through supporting efficient path dependence in a regulatory system. In an economic sense, 
certainty results in wealth maximization and accordingly efficient economic activity as it 
supports certain property rights and the domain of legal activities in a way that enhances 
confidence in markets.1097 In contrast, discretion allows a regulatory agency or authority (formal 
or informal) to act according to its ‘own value judgement within the parameters of legally 
acceptable options.’1098 It encourages flexibility in a regulatory system as it permits tailored 
solutions for problems.1099 From a classical point of view over the rule of law, certainty and 
discretion are regarded as opposites. In Lord Bingham’s words: ‘questions of legal right and 
liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of the law and not the exercise of 
discretion.’1100 However, changes in economic systems and the rise of capitalism changed this 
dogmatic perception over certainty and discretion. Now it is believed that certainty as a 
regulatory objective can be achieved through flexible and innovative mechanisms provided by 
discretion. In other words, to prevent arbitrary decisions taken by authorities, rule of law requires 
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discretionary power to be constrained by law and the principles of rationality, proportionality, 
consistency, non-discrimination, transparency and due process. 1101  In fact, a proactive and 
durable regulation requires flexibility provided by discretion of official bodies such as 
administers, courts and enforcement agencies, and also by decisions of unofficial regulators such 
as practitioners and scholars.  
   In this regard, it is discussed that a proactive and complete regulatory system is comprised of 
rules and principles as they support each other in different aspects of regulation. Certainty 
mainly is considered as the inevitable result of the applications of rules, and flexibility as the 
result of the application of principles. In this regard, despite their differences in characteristic and 
nature, they both in their formation and mandate ‘define opposite ends of a continuum: 
‘principle’ is to ‘rule’ as ‘plan’ is to ‘blueprint’, the latter being merely a more detailed form of 
the former in each case.’1102 However, despite similar objectives and functions, some scholars 
favour differences in the form and mandate of rule and principle. In Raz words: ‘a court can 
establish a new rule in a single judgement that becomes a precedent. Principles are not made into 
law by a single judgment; they evolve rather like a custom and are binding only if they have 
considerable authoritative support in a line of judgments. Like customary law, judicially adopted 
principles need not be formulated very precisely in the judgements that count as authority for 
their existence. All that has to be shown is that they underlie a series of courts’ decisions, that 
they were in fact a reason operating in a series of cases.’1103 Further, since ‘rules prescribe 
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relatively specific acts; principles prescribe highly unspecific actions’,1104 their implementation 
in a regulatory system should be examined individually.  
   However, in practice the distinction between rule-based and principle-based systems is not 
clear and most regulatory systems particularly in financial services, such as the 2007 FSA 
endorse a hybrid approach1105 since rules and principles support and elaborate each other in 
various areas. In this regard, the relationship between principles and rules was discussed in R (on 
the application of British Bankers Association) v Financial Services Authority and Financial 
Ombudsman Service1106 and in Quseley J words: ‘the principles are best understood as the ever 
present substrata to which the specific rules are added. The principles always have to be 
complied with. The specific rules do not supplant them and cannot be used to contradict them. 
They are but specific applications of them to the particular requirements they cover. The general 
notion that the specific rules can exhaust the application of principles is inappropriate. It cannot 
be an error of law for the principles of to augment specific rules.’1107    
   To have a comprehensive perception over the concept of regulation and its mechanisms, we 
should examine it in different senses. Generally we have three perceptions over the concept and 
domain of regulation. The first approach refers to regulation as a specific set of commands. The 
second approach studies regulation as deliberate state influence; and the third approach considers 
regulation as all forms of social and economic influences.1108 Regulation as a specific set of 
commands deals with rules. It is described as direct or command-and-control regulation and 
                                                          
1104 ibid 838. 
1105 Philip Rawlings, Andromachi Georgosouli and Costanza Russo, ‘Regulation of Financial Services: 
Aims and Methods’ (April 2014) Queen Mary Centre for Commercial Law Studies, University of London 
40, http://www.ccls.qmul.ac.uk/docs/research/138683.pdf accessed 2 June 2015. 
1106 [2011] EWHC 999 at 162 
1107 Ibid. 




reflects a traditional style for regulation under which generally is about the ‘promulgation of a 
binding set of rules to be applied by a body devoted to this purpose.’1109 In this regard, the major 
tasks of a regulator (mainly the government) as the agents are perceived to be rule-making, 
enforcement and the application of sanctions.1110 Generally, the type of rule is the result of 
function, character, status and the structure of the rule. Further, the main issue in 
command-and-control concept of regulation is the ideal degree of precision of a rule in terms of 
its transparency, accessibility and congruence.1111 The precision of rules in some industries such 
as financial services and health sectors is more important since they bear high responsibility for 
public interest and welfare values. In this context, a central regulation provides more adequate 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms as ‘the behaviour expected of regulates can be 
specified with considerable clarity (for instance, through the provision of national minimum 
standards), making it relatively straightforward to identify breaches of the legal standard and to 
enforce the law.’ 1112  Further, regulators and regulated industries are provided with precise 
concept of operational and regulatory obligations. 1113  However, since command-and-control 
regulatory system lacks the comprehensive and accurate knowledge of industry, it cannot 
produce effective rules to resolve the industry specific problems. In other words, changes in the 
structure of markets and contingencies in their operation require regulatory mechanisms with 
incentivizing and controlling qualities as a rule-based centralized regulation cannot incentivize 
the industry to be innovative in terms of the structure and operation of products. 
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   Regulation as deliberate state influence refers to regulation in a broad sense under which state 
resorts to command or non-command actions to influence business or social behaviour. Further, 
it includes other methods of influence such as economic incentives and franchises. 1114 
Regulation as all forms of social and economic influences refers to all means whether formed 
and applied by state or other sources such as markets, corporations and professional bodies with 
deliberate or incidental regulatory effects.1115    
  9.3 Issues in the Regulation of Shari’ah Boards 
 
   Integrity is the essential part of distributive perception over regulation. Its moral root reflects 
the importance of probity in the discharge of contractual or customary responsibilities to others. 
In this regard, those act as steward are responsible to safeguard others’ property against 
reasonably foreseeable risks that may present a threat to the integrity of the property in 
question.1116 Integrity is recognized as a key intangible, strategic asset1117 in the success of the 
company since it boosts its reputation and accordingly its competitive power. In fact, the 
reputation of a commercial entity is influenced by its moral capability and the performance of its 
leadership. Integrity in this context involves the conduct or the absence of conduct implying 
dishonesty and the lack of fairness in stewardship.1118 In this regard, integrity capacity as ‘an 
individual or collective capability for repeated process alignment of moral awareness, 
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deliberation, character and conduct that demonstrates balanced judgement, enhances sustained 
moral development and promotes supportive systems for moral decision making’,1119 supports 
the unity of purpose and action when faces the complex and conflicting values.1120 Further, it 
supports long-term sustainable competitive advantage of a company through ‘exploiting an 
enduring core of relevant capability differentials cultivated by responsible management of 
tangible and intangible internal skills and assets.’1121 In this regard, the protection of integrity is 
not only an obligation on the shoulders of management, also any person or body whose 
misconduct may affect the reputation of company. In this context, obligation bears a broad 
concept including moral, professional or legal duties to act or assure the integrity of the business. 
In this regard, under secular law, companies also can be held liable same as individuals for their 
misconducts and resulted harms.  
   The regulation of any profession and delimitation of responsibilities is a common legal 
practice in many jurisdictions. In this regard, certainty in the definition of duties, responsibilities 
and obligations is an essential element to form an effective and efficient regulatory system. In the 
context of Islamic finance, the regulation of Shari’ah boards does not demonstrate a 
straightforward task. Despite the existence of consensus in the industry over the general duties of 
Shari’ah boards, their exact responsibilities vary from institution to institution. Further, the lack 
of harmonization in the interpretation of Shari’ah led to uncertainty in its concept and the content 
of Shari’ah boards’ duties. This is compounded by uncertainty in the application of some Islamic 
law principles in the secular legal systems too. As discusses before, although the issue of legality 
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in Shari’ah is irrelevant in non-Islamic jurisdictions, it is possible the application of the common 
law illegality leads to uncertainty of obligations’ status and their enforceability.1122  
   Although uncertainty in obligations and duties constitutes the main issue and impediment in 
the regulation of Shari’ah boards’ conducts, the lack of the concept of professionalism can be 
considered as additional barrier. 
  9.4 Professionalism and Shari’ah Boards’ Functions 
 
   The regulation of professional services is an important part of the application of the modern 
concept of rule of law. ‘Profession’ or professional conduct as a form of human conduct is 
claimed to be of significance for the well-being of human in modern society as its specialization 
in knowledge and ethics enhances competition and the economic performance of markets.1123 A 
Profession as an occupational group provides solution for the anomie arising from the division of 
labour in the industrial society.1124As Durkheim says: ‘once the group formed, a moral life 
appears naturally carrying the mark of the particular conditions in which it has developed. For it 
is impossible for men to live together, associating in industry, without requiring a sentiment of 
the whole formed by their union, without attaching themselves to that whole, preoccupying 
themselves with its interests, and taking account of it in their conduct.”1125  Further, on the 
importance of morality as part of a profession he says: “what we specially see in the occupational 
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group is a moral power capable of containing individual ego, of maintaining a spirited sentiment 
of common solidarity in the consciousness of all workers…’1126  
   There has been several definitions for profession. In this regard, it is discussed that profession 
is about formally rational abstract utilitarian knowledge.1127  A broader view defines it as a 
vocation founded upon specialized education to serve others objectively.1128 In other words, 
profession refers to a declaration of belief by a person to uphold the rule of law by obeying the 
regulations of a professional associations.1129 Further, according to the Directive 2005/36/EC on 
Recognition of Professional Qualifications: ‘those practised on the basis of relevant professional 
qualifications in a personal, responsible and professionally independent capacity by those 
providing intellectual and conceptual services in the interest of the client and the public.’ In other 
words, a profession is about the systemic governance of an occupation through the establishment 
and development of formal education and qualification order controlled by a regulatory body 
with power to discipline members. The idea of profession is associated with the notions of status, 
and functional privilege which require recognition from society.1130 In this regard, as provided 
definitions reflect, the existence of certain objective standards for the establishment of a 
profession is necessary. Further, a profession is intellectual in character and derived from 
learning based on an orderly educational process.1131 The mentioned characteristics reflect the 
importance of a systematic theory, recognized authority by clients, the existence of a system of 
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sanction and approval, a code of ethics and a professional culture sustained by formal 
associations.1132  
   A profession as a system is concerned with the definition of duty and setting technical, 
disciplinary and regulatory rules of an occupation with regard to the social, economic and 
cultural aspects of a jurisdiction and also in harmony with other professions’ functions. In this 
regard, the concept of profession implies a process to pursue, develop and maintain the interest 
of the occupational group in terms of their ideology and practice (professionalization). 1133 
Consequently, the professional group as an association has autonomy ‘in constructing its 
occupational identity, promoting its image with clients and customers, and in bargaining with the 
state to secure and maintain its (sometimes self) regulatory responsibilities. In these instances the 
occupation is using the discourse partly in its own occupational and practitioner interests but 
sometimes also as a way of promoting and protecting the public interest.’1134 In this regard, the 
professions in the modern world affect the interests and well-being of individuals and society by 
their intellectual dominance. Further, their critical role in the pursuit of the public interest1135 has 
created a strong sense of ethical responsibility for them. 1136  In other words, the value of 
human-well-being is the foundation for the interpretation of professions’ ethical responsibility to 
pursue the public interest.1137  
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   Although, the discourse from above of the professional group such as organizational 
objectives and clients’ priorities, may influence professional services and thereby limiting the 
exercise of discretion by them, they cannot abolish the authority and independence of the 
profession in terms of establishing technical and accountability rules. In other words, from an 
ethical point of view, clients’ priorities and organizational objectives influence ‘deep theory’ of 
professionalism. ‘Deep theory’ here refers to the ultimate motivation for obeying rules and 
encompasses three categories: goal-based, rights-based and duty-based.1138 In this regard, the 
goal-based category of deep theory is focused on the outcomes and ends of clients irrespective of 
the means.1139 Its emphasis is on the instrumental function of law to achieve particular personal 
ends and consequently believes in moral relativism as its ethical model.1140 On the other hand, 
the focus of right-based approach is on human freedom through the application of principles of 
justice. In contrast, the duty-based deep theory is focused on the moral aspects of a profession 
under which goals do not justify means.1141 According to this approach, dignity and probity and 
not sole economic and social objectives are crucial motives for a professional to serve clients. In 
fact, persevering dignity as a value1142is the priority in the duty-based approach. Dignity as an 
inherent nobility is about self-respect by which professions enhance independent judgement and 
objectivity. Further, it helps to keep predictability in professions through improving order in their 
systematic rules and operations. In this regard, rules in the duty-based perception of professions 
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in the forms of principles, policies and regulations attempt to coordinate actions for inherent 
professional values and goals such as independence and fairness in connection with clients’ 
purposes. In this context, effective and efficient rules are made by accepted professional 
authorities that their nature of power is based on moral and technical precepts.  
   In the context of Islamic finance, the lack of the concept of profession for Shari’ah board 
membership is an impediment for establishment a regulatory system with regard to Shari’ah 
board’s functions. In this regard, the first issue is uncertainty and ambiguity in the concept and 
scope of knowledge. The concept of Shari’ah in terms of Shari’ah financing encompasses a 
broad idea over commercial transactions (fiqh al-muamalat) which is mainly based on individual 
interpretations made by Islamic scholars. In other words, the concept of Shari’ah is contingent on 
the definitions and interpretations resulted from the authority of Shari’ah jurists in specific 
contexts. Professional knowledge in the modern world reflects a systematic concept which is 
based on the established theory, skills and training system which are known through a specific 
professional association. In fact, the reason for the existence of credential system resulted from 
the formalization of professional education, is to meet the need for some degree of predictability 
and uniformity in the market.1143In this regard, Islamic finance industry has not presented a 
systematic concept for Shari’ah as the professional knowledge since there has been no consensus 
over its concept. This issue is more severe in jurisdictions like the UK, there has been no 
professional association to accomplish this responsibility. Professional associations reinforce 
professions credibility through the internalization of professional and ethical norms, continuous 
monitoring the quality of services, setting standards and sanctions, for instance by the removal of 
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licence or bringing criminal charges for misconducts.1144 Although at micro level, some advisory 
institutions such as Islamic finance council in the UK, and at macro level international standard 
setting organizations such as AAOIFI provide Shari’ah training services, they are not 
professional associations since they have no formal and legal status to control the conducts of 
Shari’ah boards’ members. Further, the services of those institutions are not based on the 
professional conception of knowledge since they only teach the current structure of Islamic 
finance transactions and products. Professional knowledge requires regular development and the 
amendment of rules according to market incidents. In other words, there is path dependency in 
the form and essence of a profession that reflects a historical preference over the usage of those 
rules in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. Further, the path dependence in a profession 
reflects a professional culture shaped in a long time. To establish an effective regulatory system, 
the professional culture helps to perceive the peculiarities of a profession in terms of required 
incentives or deterrents. In this context, the concept of Shari’ah does not reflect path dependency 
as the Islamic finance industry contract-based innovation and product engineering is established 
based on classical fiqh opinions. Further, this contract-based approach in innovation has been 
also an impediment in the formation of a professional culture as it prevents the formation of rules 
of professional conduct in a reasonable processes.    
  9.5 Conclusion 
 
   This chapter examined the importance of professionalism in the regulation of Shari’ah boards’ 
functions. Regulation as a governance mechanism controls the interactions between market 
actors and also facilitates the achievement of private and public goals through its conducting 
                                                          




rules. In the context of Islamic finance, the lack of the concept of professionalism for the 
membership in Shari’ah boards in terms of education, knowledge and professional association 
has led to the ambiguity over their responsibilities and liabilities. Further, the lack of a 
professional association to monitor the functions of Shari’ah board’s members in terms of their 
ethical and technical responsibilities resulted in the absence of professional culture in their 
discharge of duties. In this regard, to establish an effective regulatory system, it is imperative to 
develop the concept of Shari’ah and accordingly present clear process for the functions of 



















   This study sought to investigate the role of Shari’ah boards in the context of Islamic finance 
and determine their position in English common law. This is followed from the contention that 
although Shari’ah boards are regarded as the Shari’ah compliance gatekeepers of Islamic finance 
industry, there is no consensus among practitioners and academics over their specific roles. 
Further, in the context of corporate law there is no legal position for Shari’ah boards’ 
membership, as a result their role in the governance of Islamic financial institution is not clear. In 
fact the lack of a precise legal position for Shari’ah boards in the context of Islamic finance is the 
result of contention over the concepts of law and law-making in Islam as there is no agreed 
definition for Shari’ah. Accordingly as the result of ambiguity over the concept of Shari’ah, the 
notion of Shari’ah compliance as the ultimate goal of Islamic finance industry suffers from 
uncertainty in meaning.  
  In this regard, Chapter Two sought to show the structure of Islamic finance industry developed 
in the last decades. It found that despite the consensus of all Sunni and Shari’ah schools of 
thought on the importance of human well-being, wealth creation and accordingly stewardship, 
there is no agreed perception over their concepts and scopes. The issue of human quality in the 
interpretation of Shari’ah revealed (the Quran and Sunnah) and non-revealed (analogy and 
consensus) sources has got a crucial influence on the development of Islamic finance as it 
determines the legitimacy of the industry. In this regard, the tradition of intellectual endeavours 




characteristic of Shari’ah. In fact, the tradition of issuing fatwa as a personal relationship 
between a questioner and Shari’ah jurist over legal and non-legal issues demonstrates the 
fatwa-based characteristic of the Islamic finance. This chapter found the adherence to 
fatwa-issuing tradition in the context of modern financial market is not an efficient approach for 
the development of Islamic finance as it is too rigid to meet Shari’ah goals (maghasid 
al-Shari’ag). The importance of facility and cost effectiveness in the functions of the modern 
financial intermediaries are also crucial issues in Islamic finance industry. In fact, adherence to 
the legalistic approach in the interpretation of principles of Shari’ah with regard to financial 
transactions (prohibition of riba, gharar and maisir) led to the problem of form over substance as 
it is only concerned about the legal form not maghasid al-Shari’ah. In this regard, the legalistic 
approach in fatwa ruling led to the use of legal stratagems (hila) as they help to avoid legal 
responsibility. In other words, to alleviate financial predicaments, the industry instead of 
adherence to an objective-oriented approach in the interpretation of Shari’ah (which is based on 
expertise) relies on the legalistic approach established based on classical fiqh concepts over 
commercial transactions. This issue has affected the scope of individualism in Islamic law and 
provides a narrow concept for the freedom of contract in contractual relationships as their 
legality is only perceived according to the terms of nominated contracts defined in fiqh. In this 
regard, the legalistic approach in the interpretation of Shari’ah, in its collective or individual 
form, is the predominate approach in shaping the operation of Islamic financial institutions and 
accordingly providing legitimacy for the industry.  
  The significance of Shari’ah boards in the development of Islamic finance is studied in Chapter 
Three. The historical development of Shari’ah boards reflects the evolvement of their role from 




the elimination of poverty and the decrease of inequalities as the goals of Shari’ah. In this regard, 
Shari’ah jurists had no institutionalized place in the industry and after decolonization and 
accordingly sudden increase in oil prices, competition in the market necessitated the 
establishment of a formal body for controlling the legitimacy of the industry. In this regard, since 
there was no systemic effort to engineer Islamic financial products as substitutions for 
conventional products, the main role of Shari’ah boards was endorsement and they had no 
auditing role. However, developments in financial markets broadened the scope of Shari’ah 
boards’ role as the industry now considers a supervisory responsibility for them too. Although, 
Shari’ah supervision is generally regarded as a process of review to check the Shari’ah compliant 
operation of Islamic financial institutions, there is no agreed definition for it. This fact is the 
result of ambiguity over the definition of Islamic finance (as no definition is provided by 
jurisdictions with Islamic banking system) and the concept of Shari’ah. In this regard, although 
some international organizations such as IFSB provided the industry with some definitions on 
Shari’ah supervision, the lack of an agreed perception for Shari’ah led to ambiguity over the 
functions of Shari’ah boards. This chapter found, Shari’ah certification as the main function of 
Shari’ah boards is subject to the widely divergent opinions and accordingly impeded innovative 
product engineering in the industry. Further, the industry suffers from the dominant legalistic 
approach in ijtihad and Shari’ah review which prevents any innovative interpretation and 
flexibility in the industry. This classical view in fiqh forms the current practice in the industry at 
individual, national and international levels. Even international organizations such as the 
International Fiqh Academy, which is responsible for the harmonization and integrity of the 
industry, follows a legalistic approach and accordingly does not recognize any innovative 




some crucial aspects of the industry such as liquidity and credit risk management as does not 
approve innovative financial products such as derivatives. In fact, the extent of acceptance of 
derivatives products by Shari’ah boards reflects the interpretative approach they use in their 
ijtihad. In this regard, regulatory systems such as in Malaysia may affect Shari’ah boards’ 
interpretative approach. The national development plans of Malaysia led Islamic finance 
authorities to follow a proactive approach in regulation and accordingly requires Shari’ah boards 
to adhere to an economic ijtihad which is compatible with development goals. However, product 
development in the context of Islamic finance follows a process innovation as the structure of 
Shari’ah-based and Shari’ah-compliant products must be based on the nominate contracts. In 
other words, Shari’ah boards follow legalistic approach in financial innovation and accordingly 
seek to actualize the economic effects of conventional products within the boundaries of 
nominate contracts.  
  The Chapter Four examines the legal relation between Shari’ah boards and Islamic financial 
institutions. It found that since the structure and operation of Islamic financial institutions are 
based on conventional perceptions rooted on the economic function of law and accordingly 
corporation, the content and form of Shari’ah boards’ legal relationships should be addressed 
according to those perceptions as well. In this regard, the modern corporation is perceived as an 
economic instrument acts as a nexus of contracts between individual suppliers of various inputs 
and managers to generate economic profit. This economic rationale and objective affects the 
operation and accordingly the legal relations of corporation as directors and all other responsible 
bodies have to pursue principals (shareholders) interests and avoid self-interested conducts. In 
the context of Islamic law, human well-being is regarded as one of the objectives of Shari’ah and 




well-being. However, the ethical dimension of Islamic finance presents a broader concept for 
objectives of Shari’ah and accordingly for Islamic financial institutions. In this regard, Shari’ah 
assumes a collective responsibility for all to follow the common good of society. In this context, 
Shari’ah boards’ functions bear a social-economic feature as they are responsible for the 
well-being of society and accordingly their rulings should be based on public interest.  
  This chapter explicated Shari’ah boards’ legal relation with Islamic financial institutions in 
terms of fiduciary law. In this regard, their fiduciary relationship implies a trust-like quality 
which requires the performance of promises. In the context of UK legal system, since there is no 
defined legal position in statute for Shari’ah boards, their fiduciary characteristics should be 
explained according to certain factors explained in common law. As is explained in Lac Minerals 
Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd 1145  and Hospital Products Ltd v United States 
Surgical Corp1146, the presence of discretion or power given by beneficiary to the fiduciary, 
vulnerability of the beneficiary, trust, ascendency and confidence result in fiduciary obligations.  
  The discretionary power of Shari’ah board is explained with regard to their access to critical 
resources such as confidential information and accordingly their power to affect reputation of 
Islamic financial institutions. In this regard, the discretionary power of Shari’ah boards in their 
ex ante and ex post functions bears religious-conventional characteristic as it should be applied 
according to Shari’ah and conventional perceptions. Due to the lack of an agreed interpretation 
over Shari’ah principles, there is an uncertainty over the definition of discretionary power of 
Shari’ah boards in their ex ante and ex post functions. This chapter found that since directors are 
the ultimate responsible body in the management of corporations, the discretionary power and 
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accordingly duties of Shari’ah board must be explained with regard to the fiduciary duty of 
directors to promote the success of company provided in the Companies Act 2006. In other 
words, they are responsible to establish equilibrium between the religious and economic interests 
of stakeholders through a rationale and reasonable approach in their ijtihad. This arguments 
reveals the vulnerability of stakeholders in terms of knowledge and expertise in Shari’ah and 
finance. In fact, the issue of information asymmetry in Islamic finance industry is more intense 
as stakeholders lack Shari’ah knowledge to assess the performance of Shari’ah boards. 
  Further to the recognition of fiduciary factors, this chapter examined the fiduciary duties and 
rules which Shari’ah boards must follow. Generally, loyalty as the essence of fiduciary duties 
requires Shari’ah boards to enhance economic interests of stakeholders and avoid self-dealing in 
their functions. However, due to the existence of intense legal pluralism in Islamic law, the 
meaning and scope of loyalty of Shari’ah boards suffer from ambiguity. As a consequence of this 
ambiguity the protective function of loyalty and other proscriptive rules, namely no conflict of 
interest, no conflict of duties and no profit rules suffer from ambiguity be weakened. Further, the 
lack of a solid ground for the concept of fiduciary duties affects Shari’ah boards’ accountability 
and accordingly their liability. In the context of common law, this issue is more problematic as 
there is no theory of liability in terms of the specificity (civil or criminal) and enforceability in 
Islamic fiqh. 
  The application of no conflict of interest rule occurs where a person is placed in a position 
where the proper discharge of a duty to another, he has assumed, conflicts with his own interests. 
In this regard, one category of this conflict could be unauthorised remuneration within which a 
Shari’ah boards obtains beyond what is authorised. However, it is argued that since their 




ground. But, regarding high payments to Shari’ah boards by Islamic financial institutions over 
Shari’ah compliant products, it is possible due to their interests in Shari’ah board membership, 
they do not discharge their duties impartially. Further, the conflict of duties rule requires 
Shari’ah boards’ members to avoid multiple employments when there is a possibility of actual 
conflicts such as inability to come up properly with several Shari’ah auditing positions in various 
Islamic financial institutions or receiving confidential information from one client which its 
disclosure or employment may affect negatively its competitive power. The use of confidential 
information for personal interest also is relevant to fiduciary duties of Shari’ah boards as it may 
be used in following for self-dealing purposes. Further to the existence of those issues and 
questions in Shari’ah boards’ fiduciary relation with Islamic financial institutions, there is no 
accountability mechanism to judge over the violation of duties by Shari’ah boards.    
  The general duties of Shari’ah boards is examined in Chapter Five. This chapter addressed the 
importance of the classical authority of madahib and its influence on the duties of Shari’ah 
boards in the context of Islamic finance. In this regard, the concept of authority has experienced 
changes from the absolute ijtihad or intellectual power of a jurist to the complete acceptance of 
the doctrines of past jurists. In this regard, taqlid or imitation forms the nature of authority of 
Shari’ah boards as their intellectual endeavour is limited by the authority of madahib in terms of 
their doctrines, methodology and opinions. In other words, the authority in the regime of taqlid is 
established in a school as Shari’ah jurists validate their legal opinions through the acceptance of 
the school methodology and doctrines. This restricted approach in the perception of Shari’ah 
boards’ authority has had positive and negative implications for the industry in terms of 
development and integrity. In this regard, the legality in Shari’ah boards’ duties and accordingly 




the legality in Islamic law is different from legality in conventional system in terms of the 
process of law-making and enforcement. While law in a conventional system is the result of an 
official procedure supported by state, law in Islamic law is the result of an individual process of 
ijtihad. Further, while the enforcement and liability for the breach of law in conventional system 
are supported by state, the concept of liability in Islamic law is limited between God and human.  
  Shari’ah compliance as the cornerstone of the industry defines the main duty of Shari’ah 
boards in Shari’ah compliance risk management. This chapter found that the inclusive and the 
broad concept of Shari’ah compliance encompasses monitoring and advising duties of Shari’ah 
boards. Shari’ah non-compliance risk as an operational risk affects Islamic financial institutions 
reputation and accordingly results in losses for the industry. In this regard, Shari’ah boards are 
responsible to supervise the application of Shari’ah in the process of risk management according 
to their own fatwas. However, the lack of a defined framework for Shari’ah boards’ duties 
resulted in the ambiguity in the concept and scope of Shari’ah compliance risk management. 
Further, the concept and scope of Shari’ah as an independent mechanism is also affected by 
uncertainty in Shari’ah boards’ duties. In this context, the institution of hisbah as a monitoring 
and corrective mechanism for the regulation of transactions according to Shari’ah is considered 
the origin of Shari’ah audit. Although, hisbah at the beginning was not an organized institution in 
terms of concept and scope, the Ottoman hisbah law reflects the importance of codification for 
an effective monitoring system. In this regard, although Shari’ah audit is considered as an 
independent institution to monitor the Shari’ah compliance operation of Islamic financial 
institution, the dearth of Shari’ah jurists or practitioners with the knowledge of Shari’ah led the 
Islamic financial institutions to employ Shari’ah boards’ members. Further, the lack of a clear 




the result of ambiguity in the concept and scope of Shari’ah compliance and accordingly in 
Shari’ah boards’ duties.  
  Chapter Six examines the implications of Shari’ah board’s fatwas for directors’ duty to 
promote the success of the company in terms of their strategy and control roles. In this regard, 
board of directors as a collective institution is responsible for value-creation and accordingly the 
success of company. In the context of Islamic finance, board of directors as a collective 
decision-making institution must comply with Shari’ah principles reflected in Shari’ah board’s 
fatwas. Although the operation of Islamic financial institutions in the context of UK jurisdiction 
bears no religious obligation, the contractual provisions require directors to discharge their duties 
in Shari’ah compliant manner. This reflects legitimacy as the essence of board of director’s 
function. In other words, the board of directors’ legitimate discharge of duties in terms of the 
process of decision-making and the output of Islamic financial institution depends on Shari’ah 
board’s opinions. Also, directors’ prescriptive duty to promote the success of the company in the 
context of Islamic finance should be interpreted with regard to Shari’ah board’s fatwas. In this 
regard, since Shari’ah compliance is a non-legal duty, the dual nature of ‘success’ in terms of 
economic and Shari’ah compliant value-creation reflects ambiguity over the fiduciary duties of 
board of directors. Particularly, the immaterial concept of ‘director’ in the context of Companies 
Act 2006 implies the importance of Shari’ah compliance with regard to the duties of all 
categories of directors. For instance, a shadow director in an Islamic financial institution may be 
liable for the misconduct of de jure directors which is related to their non-Shari’ah compliant 
decisions. In this context, also it is possible to consider Shari’ah board’s members as Shadow 
directors when their advisory role and accordingly their influence on directors’ decision-making 




conventional law and there is no record of religious factor in their duties. This fact has affected 
the strategy-making and controlling functions of board of directors.   
  The strategy role of directors is affirmed in the Companies Act as the fiduciary duties of 
directors imply the importance of setting, monitoring and assessment of strategic proposals that 
affect the long-term performance of the company. In this regard, the interaction between the 
context, the content and values of the company shapes its strategy. In the context of Islamic 
finance, Shari’ah boards form the strategy through their specific interpretation over Shari’ah 
compliance and accordingly over the operation of the company. Although the conventional 
perception over the role of directors in the management of the company is based on the financial 
industry, there is no harmonized concept for Shari’ah knowledge required for directors in terms 
of their strategy role. This issue has affected the concepts of value-creation and success in terms 
of investment strategy, product development and risk management as they all must be Shari’ah 
compliant. Shari’ah boards’ opinions also affect the monitoring role of directors. In this regard, 
the operational control of an Islamic financial institution reflects a broad concept as it 
encompasses the past and present financial operation according to ex ante regulatory standards 
and Shari’ah board’s opinions. Further, the strategic control in terms of long-term goals and 
values requires directors to evaluate product quality and human resources according to Shari’ah 
board’s opinions.     
  The legal consequences of the breach of Shari’ah board’s fatwas by directors is examined in 
Chapter Seven. This chapter found that since Shari’ah compliance as the ultimate goal of the 
industry is mainly interpreted in the application of Shari’ah boards’ fatwas, directors as 
fiduciaries are responsible for their application. The analysis is founded on the importance of 




In this regard, the history of common law demonstrates the crucial role of fiduciary duties as 
accountability mechanisms against directors’ misconducts. Although case law reflects the 
application of both positive and negative approaches in the definition of fiduciary duties, the 
companies Act 2006 provisions express a comprehensive perception over the duties of directors 
as they are comprised of prospective and prescriptive rules. In other words, the concept of 
loyalty as the foundation of all fiduciary duties in the Act is defined in negative (to avoid 
self-interested conducts) and positive obligations (to perform in the best interest). In this regard, 
this chapter found that since the concept of directors’ duty of loyalty in Islamic finance bears 
religious and economic factors together, its scope is not clear. In other words, the trust-like 
relationship between directors and investors requires board of directors to apply Shari’ah board’s 
fatwas and at the same time its positive duty to promote the success of the company demands 
attention to the economic prosperity of the company. Practically, this issue may result in a 
contradiction between the Shari’ah compliance and economic interests of Islamic financial 
institutions as directors are obliged to discharge both. However, the economic consequences of 
non-Shari’ah compliant decisions of directors reflect the economic effect of fatwas, and as a 
result directors’ duty to apply Shari’ah board’s fatwas is not only a contractual obligation, also a 
statutory one. 
  This chapter also examined directors’ non-Shari’ah compliant decisions in terms of duty of 
care, skill and diligence. In this regard, this non-fiduciary duty as the statutory statement of 
common law duty of care indicates the importance of professional knowledge and attentiveness 
in directorship with regard to business risks. The objective standard of care which is reflected in 
section 174 of the Companies Act requires directors to exercise reasonable care with regard to 




compliant decisions can be examined in terms of the company articles of association and their 
service contracts. In this regard, since executive directors due to the nature of their service 
contracts may be considered office-holders and as a consequence employees, employment law 
requires them to show reasonable care and skill in their duty. However, duty of reasonable care 
and skill in Islamic finance reflects no clear concept as there is no specific regulation or case law 
to explain it. In other words, reasonable care and skill in the context of Islamic finance is not 
only about the application of Shari’ah board’s fatwas, also about expertise in finance and 
management. 
  Chapter Eight examines the role of Shari’ah boards in the Shari’ah governance of Islamic 
financial institutions in terms of good corporate governance. It showed that corporate governance 
as a system of directorship is concerned with establishing a proper control system under which 
all internal and external actors contribute to value creation. This concept reflects the economic 
nature of corporate and the importance of the regulation of power of actors in value creation. In 
this regard, an effective corporate governance establishes a fair process of decision-making 
under which rights and responsibilities of stakeholders are defined according to the goals and 
values of the company. Further, as the result of the influence of ethics in corporate law and also 
understanding the significance of stability as a public good in financial development, the concept 
of value-creation got a broad sense under which the interests of all stakeholders must be 
considered in the process value maximization. In this regard, Islamic law and conventional law 
shares the similar views on the property rights as they both defend private ownership till it is not 
harmful for the interests of third parties. In this context, this chapter found that, the role of 
Shari’ah board in the governance of Islamic financial institution should be defined in relation to 




Shari’ah board in Shari’ah governance should be considered with regard to the corporate 
long-term social and economic value-creation. In this context, they need to establish a 
cooperative relation, conceptually and instrumentally with other governance bodies in terms of 
knowledge to reach the company goals. 
  Although, the term governance in its modern sense is not reflected in Shari’ah, the principles 
of justice, responsibility and the institution of Shura (consultation) support the modern function 
of governance. In this regard, the role of Shari’ah boards in Shari’ah governance, as a system to 
align corporate governance to principles of Shari’ah, reflects their permanent control over the 
operation of company. However, due to the lack of a clear definition and framework for ‘due 
process’ in Shari’ah pronouncement, there is no harmonization over the role of Shari’ah boards 
in Shari’ah compliance and their relation with other Shari’ah units’ functions. Further, the lack of 
transparency in the process of Shari’ah pronouncements leads to uncertainty in Shari’ah board 
opinions as they can change them easily. This issue raises questions over the efficiency of 
pronouncements and the increase of fatwa shopping in the industry. Further, the lack of 
accountability as a corrective means reflects the lack of disciplinary rules with regard to Shari’ah 
boards’ misconducts. Also, the lack of accountability demonstrates the lack of rules of 
professional conduct required for Shari’ah boards’ duties. In this regard, since technical rules 
define the concept of liability in every profession, the establishment and effectiveness of 
accountability depend on those rules as they provide clear mandate and concept for Shari’ah 
boards’ duties.    
  The issue of professionalism and its implication for the regulation of the duties of Shari’ah 
board’s members is examined in Chapter Nine. The regulation of professional services bears 




professional’s duties. In the context of Islamic finance, the functions of Shari’ah boards’ 
members are not based on the concept of profession and the rules of professional conduct as 
there is no professional association to define the required technical rules. Further, the concept of 
Shari’ah in the operation of Islamic finance industry reflects the lack of path dependency and 
development as its application is based on classical fiqh. This issue implies the absence of 
professional knowledge in the industry. In other words, the application of Shari’ah in the form of 
contract-based innovation and product engineering cannot develop as the rules of nominate 
contracts and madahib cannot be changed.  
  The aim of this study was to examine the role of Shari’ah boards in the context of Islamic 
finance and investigate their position in law. It was shown that the main role of Shari’ah boards 
is to provide the industry with legitimacy through the endorsement of financial products and the 
audit of the operation of Islamic financial institutions. However, due to divergent opinions 
arising from different interpretations over the concept of Shari’ah, there is no clear definition for 
Shari’ah compliance as the ultimate goal of the industry. This issue has affected the search for 
the fiduciary duties of Shari’ah boards. In this regard, the trust-like relationship between Shari’ah 
boards and Islamic financial institutions reflects the nature of their position as fiduciary. Further, 
it was shown that, Shari’ah boards’ fiduciary duties should be interpreted with regard to 
directors’ prescriptive fiduciary duties defined in the Companies Act 2006 and common law. In 
other words, fiduciary duties of Shari’ah boards should be clarified according to directors’ duty 
to promote the success of the company. Also the aim of this study was to assess the implications 
of Shari’ah boards’ fatwas for the strategy and control roles of directors. It found that since 
Shari’ah compliance in directors’ duties should be interpreted in terms of Shari’ah boards’ 




the fiduciary and non-fiduciary duties of directors in the application of Shari’ah board’s opinions 
and explained the importance of harmonization in the goals and duties of those governance 
bodies. 
  The results of this study indicate that the emergence of Shari’ah supervisory boards and their 
roles should be examined according to the developments of markets. In other words, the 
responsibilities of Shari’ah boards like other governance bodies should evolve according to the 
exigencies of markets. In this regard, to enhance stability and predictability of the operation of 
Islamic financial institutions in terms of Shari’ah boards’ fiduciary duties, it is imperative to 
define a common concept for Shari’ah compliance. This issue requires the harmonization of 
divergent opinions over the concept of Shari’ah through a centralized approach in the regulation 
of Shari’ah boards’ services. Particularly in the context of UK financial market, the centralized 
regulation with the support of a professional association responsible for defining the rules of 
conducts for the functions of Shari’ah boards’ members helps to delineate the legal position of 
Shari’ah boards in terms of their fiduciary duties and liabilities.  
  This study has examined the general responsibilities of Shari’ah boards and the nature of their 
position in theory and practice. To clarify the nature of Shari’ah supervisory boards, this study 
examined their historical root in Shari’ah jurists (foqaha) functions and in Islamic fiqh. It 
described their responsibilities such as auditing and giving advice in terms of the conventional 
institutions. The remit of this thesis therefore is to reconceptualise the functions of Shari’ah 
boards in the context of Islamic finance. Further, this study examined common law to find the 
legal position of Shari’ah boards and their fatwas in the context of the operation of Islamic 
financial institutions in the UK. Also, it explored the implications of Shari’ah boards’ fatwa for 




  This study has thrown up many questions in need of further investigation. Regarding the public 
and private aspects of Shari’ah boards’ functions, it is necessary to examine the best form of 
regulation for the operation of Shari’ah advisory boards in the context of UK financial market. 
Also, it is imperative to investigate the implications of conventional financial laws for the 
functions of Shari’ah boards in terms of the interpretation of Shari’ah.    
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